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A few years ago, during the heyday of the urban crisis,
the role of the state in urban affairs was a hot subject for
debate. After years of being ignored, state government,
the invisible partner in the federal system, suddenly
became the candidate for a new and more meaningful
role. One result of this new-found interest — plus the
availability of federal funds — was the creation around
the country of state departments of local or urban affairs.
In Illinois, legislation brought into life the Department
of Local Government Affairs. The story of the department
begins in 1968 when the initial studies were made. In
this paper we will examine the creation and the first
three years of the department. During this period the
legislation for the agency was drawn up and passed;
the department set up operations and designed several
significant programs. We will focus on the strategies
behind the creation of the department and the thrust of
its early programs. At the end of the paper we will
summarize some of the major issues associated with the
development of such agencies in state government.
Development of the Department
The Department of Local Government Affairs (DLGA) was
created in the early part of 1969. ' During the previous
summer the Municipal Corporations Committee of the
Republican-controlled state Senate had begun research
on a local affairs agency. That fall the Republican candidate
for governor, Richard B. Ogilvie, took a public position
in favor of
"establishing a Department of Local Government
Affairs to assist municipal governments in planning and
technical advancement." After his election in November,
Ogilvie urged that the background research on creating
such an agency continue. In order to understand the
present functions of this agency, it is necessary to outline
the early decisions which helped to shape initial depart-
mental policies. The following description is based upon
personal involvement at the formative stages and upon
interviews conducted during the summers of 1969 and
1973.
Michael A Murray is Associate Professor of Public Management, Graduate
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' This paper is based on personal observation and upon frequent discussions
with the principal DLGA officers, including Robert Lehnhausen and Henry
Holling, during the period from 1968 to 1972 Mr Lehnhausen and Ron
Michaelson, formerly on Governor Ogilvie's staff, reviewed the paper.
Some of their comments have been included
THE TASK FORCE PHASE
The first step within the Ogilvie administration was the
assembling of an informal gubernatorial task force to
develop the form and functions of a state agency which
would assist local units. The task force consisted chiefly
of Ron Michaelson, the governor's aide for local affairs;
George Warnecke, the staff counsel for -the Committee
on Municipal Corporations; and this writer, who was then
at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the
University of Illinois. Temporary members included
Donald Tolva of the State Senate staff and William Hanley
of the governor's legal staff, both of whom were involved
on particular issues.
By the end of 1968 the outline of the proposed code
department emerged (see Fig. 1). As envisaged by the
task force the agency would serve two basic functions.
It would provide a coordinated and comprehensive state
level response to local problems, and it would assist
local units in solving their own problems, theoretically
enhancing the prospects for local self-determination.
The task force proposed transferring several existing
state units with local responsibilities to the new department.
These included the State Housing Board, the Property
Tax Appeals Board, the Office of the Fire Marshall,
the local responsibilities of the Auditor's Office, some
limited planning functions of the Department of Business
and Economic Development, and the Division of Local
Government and Property Tax from the Revenue Depart-
ment.
The department proposed by the task force contained
three important features:
1 The director of the agency was permitted to provide
assistance directly to nonofficial local bodies (the
bypass clause)
Figure 1
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2. "Little state capitols" would be set up in various
parts of the state to provide citizen access to the state
governmental process.
3 Through consolidation, a single state agency was
given comprehensive operational authority in the areas
of housing, community services, local finance, poverty,
and planning.
Clearly, the agency departed from the traditional and
noncontroversial form of ad hoc, fragmented state assis-
tance to official local units, as experienced in Illinois.
STRATEGIES OF CHANGE
As the task force prepared the measure for introduction
in the General Assembly it decided to follow several
unwritten legislative rules. First, although the governor's
staff wanted passage in the 1969 session, no rigid time-
table for implementation was prepared or followed. This
is not an unusual procedure in Illinois, where chaotic
legislative calendars and periodic executive involvement
in legislation preclude adherence to tightly ordered
schedules. Second, in line with tradition, the task force
cleared major provisions with Senator Arrington, one of
the important leaders in the General Assembly. For
example, as the bill took shape, the matter of transferring
the Property Tax Appeal Board, a matter close to
Arrington, was reviewed with his staff. Third, there was
an attempt to couch potentially threatening terms in
technical language. In Illinois it is common practice to
render bills noncontroversial by "thesaurusizing" them.
In drafting this bill, for example, a temporary member
of the task force insisted that the phrase "eliminate
poverty" was too strong. With some reluctance, the task
force accepted the innocuous phrase, "reduce economic
disparities." Fourth, in accordance with formal legislative
procedure, it was decided to introduce the measure as a
committee-prepared bill but to identify it as an adminis-
tration priority.
The task force honored some aspects of legislative
protocol but rejected others. There was an early decision
not to consult the major interest groups affected by the
legislation. Interest groups in Illinois customarily have
a great deal to say about legislation. In some cases,
consultation in the drafting stage is a matter of courtesy;
in others, it is a matter of practical politics. In this case,
the major interest groups were the Illinois Municipal
League and the city of Chicago. The decision not to involve
them in the drafting stage was made in full recognition
of their influence in Springfield.
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A second major decision was to draft the bill as a
highly detailed and specific measure. Normally, legislation
of this kind is drafted in general terms so as to maximize
administrative flexibility and minimize specific opposition.
In this case, however, the bill detailed the powers of the
department, outlined the innovative concepts, listed the
functions of the divisions, and made specific reference
to community organizations, direct contracting, and local
centers.
A third innovative approach involved an attempt to
coordinate executive and legislative resources in drafting
and implementing the bill. Such coordination had been
impossible in the recent past because of the split in
political parties between the executive and legislative
branches.
By January 1969 the basic provisions of the bill were
outlined. After several detailed "cleanup" sessions to
refine the language and straighten out technicalities,
the bill was prepared for introduction in March.
THE LEGISLATIVE PHASE
Although the proposed new department and its functions
were quite unexceptional, the bill creating DLGA generated
a good deal of resistance from a number of sources at
each stage of the legislative process. Most of the ob-
jections were raised during the first hearing on the
bill in the Senate Municipal Corporations Committee.
Some were technical and concerned transfers of agencies
and imprecise language, but many were substantive.
The center of controversy was the authority of the director
to "bypass local officials and to deal directly with
accredited community organizations." This concern
over bypassing local officials was summarized in a
lengthy memo from the Illinois Municipal League. The
director of the league suggested that the department
be purely advisory and that all references to community
organizations be deleted. He persuaded three of the ten
Republican committeemen to withhold support for the bill
until amendments were made. The three Republicans
were joined by the five committee Democrats, who labeled
the bill "the biggest power grab" they had ever seen.
By a vote of 8 - 7, the committee chairman was forced to
postpone consideration until a compromise could be
effected.
Two sides formed over the issues. The Municipal League,
on one side, wanted the department to be purely advisory
and to have no functioning authority. On the other side,
the governor's task force and the committee sponsors
insisted that the state had a responsibility to provide
direct services. Informal compromise sessions were of
no avail, and final agreement on the bill was reached
only a few hours before the committee held its second
hearing. Compromise language calling for the provision
of services upon request only was accepted, and all
references to community organizations were dropped.
These were the major substantive changes. The bill
was resubmitted and passed out of committee by a party
vote of 10-5.
Upon advancement to second reading, the bill was
further revised. The language transferring the Office
of the Fire Marshall and the local duties of the Auditor's
Office was amended out. Although the functions of these
offices are minimal and their power relatively insignificant,
the agencies were strong enough to prevent an attempted
reorganization.
At the time of third reading, there was little doubt that
COMMUNITY SERVICES
The Office of Community Services, created to serve as a
"one-stop service center to local governments," became
the star of the department during the first three years.
More than any other subdivision, its policies and programs
illustrated the approach of DLGA to local affairs.
With a professional staff of ten to fifteen, Community
Services provided four kinds of assistance to local units.
The division established an information service for local
units on federal and state programs. The staff played an
advocate role in coordinating the resources of related
state agencies such as the departments of agriculture and
conservation. It maintained a three- to five-man field staff
to provide advice and assistance to local officials. Finally,
Community Services assisted local units in matters of
budgeting and finance, functions intended in the task
force draft for the Office of Local Finance.
There were a number of major programs in the Office
of Community Services. Leadership training seminars
were held periodically throughout the state to upgrade
local officials and provide information on.current adminis-
trative issues, such as home rule and revenue sharing.
A city-county talent bank fashioned after the federal
intergovernmental personnel exchange was set up but
never got off the ground. Crisis-oriented community
development grants were distributed; in one year they
totaled $80,000 Task force studies and reports were
prepared on such topics as small town development and
revenue sharing. Indeed the role of DLGA in rural develop-
ment and the work of the Office of Community Services
with the governor's special cabinet on small town problems
were viewed as major accomplishments of the new agency.
The field staff devoted a great deal of time to casework.
An urban intern program was established; students from
all over the state spent the summer working for various
urban governments. The Cook County Council of Govern-
ments' intern project was subsidized for a year. Support
was given to the Urban Area Study Commission. The
office provided information and assistance to local
governments on finance and budgeting. A clearinghouse
was set up to keep track of federal programs.
Programs like the urban intern experience were extremely
popular. Other activities, such as the clearinghouse, were
so casual as to be of limited value. At any rate, the programs
of this division seemed to be characterized by the
following policies:
1. To engage in activities which are technical, like
information sharing, or noncontroversial, like debris
removal.
2. To provide assistance only upon request, as opposed
to taking an aggressive planning role.
3. To work with official agencies and involve only
official representatives, as in the leadership training
programs and in the hiring of former elected officials
as field staff.
4. To spend limited funds in small amounts in several
localities, as opposed to concentrating resources on an
in-depth project in one area.
5. To focus on downstate, rural communities, rather
than large, urban centers.
To some degree these policies and priority areas were
developed by the DLGA leadership and staff. In another
sense, of course, these activities were a result of legislative
direction and were done in strict accord with legislative
mandate.
HOUSING AND BUILDINGS
Formerly a separate unit in state government, this agency
was intended by the Ogilvie administration to play a
secondary role to the Illinois Housing and Development
Agency (IHDA). To some extent, knowledge of its intended
role prevented Housing and Buildings from developing
into the innovative unit which had been Director Lehn-
hausen's original intention. Yet, because it was loosely
coordinated by the governor's staff, the office developed
its own programs and policies independent of DLGA
direction.
Generally speaking, the office stayed within the tradi-
tional programmatic boundaries of the state agency
responsible for public housing administration — issuing
certificates, approving appointments, and the like. It
provided comprehensive technical assistance to the 126
local housing authorities in Illinois, administered its
federal HUD training programs, and supervised grant
applications for housing-related programs.
In addition, the office initiated new programs in quality,
low-income housing development, began occupancy
audits of local authorities on a fee basis, and studied
low-income housing needs through the Social Service
Delivery Systems Project. Another program, related to
the HUD Breakthrough Program, involved the construction
of modular units on a pilot basis in selected Illinois areas.
The policies which seemed to guide the implementation
of these projects were:
1 Administrative agreement between IHDA and the
Office of Housing and Buildings (OHB) to assume different
roles, with OHB assuming a low profile but nonetheless
taking advantage of its statutory flexibility and developing
new programs.
2. Emphasis on negotiations and the involvement of
local authorities in training programs and pilot projects,
rather than on regulation of local authorities.
3. Concentration of limited staff and money in selected
program areas (federal grants and federal pilot projects),
rather than the provision of broad technical assistance
to local authorities.
4. Concern with the noncontroversial physical and
administrative aspects of public housing to the neglect
of the explosive issues of economic inequality and racial
tension.
RESEARCH AND PLANNING
The Office of Research and Planning (ORP) was transferred
almost intact from the Department of Business and Eco-
nomic Development (BED). Although the original act
was vague as to the planning functions of the new depart-
ment (statewide and local planning were mentioned in
the initial bill), ORP's major activity in DLGA continued
to be administration of the federal Comprehensive Planning
Assistance Program (the popular 701 grant). In addition,
localities were provided with limited technical and advisory
planning services (the TAPS program), and the issue of
regionalization was studied in depth. Finally ORP was
viewed internally as a means of evaluating DLGA's
operations. Despite the confusion of the legislation, at
no time were ORP's functions redundant with other state
planning operations or with the later-created Office of
Planning and Analysis.
Research and Planning did not meet its anticipated
responsibilities in three key areas. First, the staff did
not conduct formal and regular internal evaluations of
To carry out these objectives and provide a coordinated
response to local affairs, the DLGA was organized into
four operating divisions (see Fig. 2). The divisions func-
tioned until January of 1973, when a new governor
appointed a new director of the agency. In the following
section of the paper the policies and programs of the
department as a whole and of the four divisions are
evaluated for the period of January 1969 to January 1973.
The analysis is based on DLGA records and on a series
of interviews with most past or current officers, division
heads, and principal staff available durinq the summer
of 1973.
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
There seems to be little concurrence between the five
objectives of the bill creating the department and the
actual operations of the agency.
1. Despite the goal of dealing more effectively with
the urban crisis and the conditions of urban areas, most
interviewees pointed out that the department dealt
mainly with small, rural, downstate communities; evolved
a hands-off policy with regard to Chicago; and, until 1972,
largely ignored even suburban Chicago municipalities.
It is true, however, that DLGA did attempt to get involved
indirectly in suburban activities through the Cook County
Council of Governments. Moreover, in fairness to the
department, representatives of the city of Chicago rebuffed
initial attempts at cooperation by Director Lehnhausen
with the comment, "How much money do you have for us?"
At a time when urban problems are often equated with
racial problems, DLGA did not have a single black
officer on its staff during its first three-year period. More
importantly, DLGA had virtually no minority- or race-related
programs in operation. The initial legislation had encouraged
the agency to be responsive to the particular needs of
urban minorities, but the department took no special
measures to develop such policies.
2. The record is mixed with regard to the department's
efforts to promote an integrated response to metropolitan-
wide problems and provide incentives for coordinated
planning and consolidation. The effort spent on the
metropolitan transit study, the idea of the city-county
talent bank, the continuation in DLGA of the Department
of Business and Economic Development's legacy of
metropolitan planning, and the subsidation of areawide
planning agencies indicated some state action in this
area.
On the other hand, the actual dollars and staff time
allocated to support areawide planning were negligible.
Interstate urban areas were largely avoided; almost no
work was done with metropolitan-wide special districts.
A $15,000 intern program subsidy was given to the Cook
County Council of Governments, which Governor Ogilvie
founded, but even this grant was discontinued after one
year. In short, little was accomplished during these initial
years in the critical areas of metropolitan land use,
interagency planning, or financial incentives for consoli-
dation. DLGA did cooperate with study groups, such as
the Commission on Urban Area Government, but this type
of involvement never went beyond the study stage.
3. The third goal was to make the department a central
source of information on state and federal programs.
Interviews indicated partial achievement of the original
legislative intent. The department staff did keep track of
federal programs affecting local areas, and provided
basic information on federal grants on an informal basis.
At the same time, it was admittedly difficult for a depart-
ment with a limited budget and staff (five field staff
in the Office of Community Services) to follow through on
helping a community participate in federal programs.
In addition, the department has little influence over the
setting of federal or state priorities and must compete
for resources under a set of rules which informally earmarks
funds to certain constituencies or certain areas. For ex-
ample, half of the Law Enforcement Assistance money
goes automatically to Cook County, and one-twelfth of
the state income tax is automatically rebated to existing
local units. Much of the process of distribution of state
and federal monies is inflexible, not discretionary, and
DLGA can do little to adjust this process.
4. The fourth objective was to make state agencies
more visible and responsive to local governments. Although
the goal is obviously vague and its achievement difficult
to measure in any specific way, interviewees made two
points. Some argued that through casework by the Office
of Community Services field staff, local units were given
moral and technical support. The department attempted
to be a friend in Springfield to small government throughout
the state. This policy was reinforced by the official policy
of serving governments only at their request, as the
legislation specified.
Others contended that the basic policy of the department
was to deal with those local problems that were dramatic
and highly visible, but noncontroversial. Three examples
illustrate the point: 1) the $20,000 grant to Crescent City
to clean up after a train wreck in the spring of 1970;
2) the $20,000 grant to Thompsonville to assist after a
1971 tornado; and 3) the coordinated planning offered
by the department to the city of East St. Louis after a
1972 railroad explosion. Although the assistance was
undoubtedly well intentioned and useful, it reflects the
crisis approach of dealing with dramatic and visible
emergencies rather than with complex, long-term problems.
5. Finally, the interviewees were asked about the goal
of decentralizing state authorities and enhancing local
determination and home rule. Several comments were
directed to this issue. One respondent pointed out that
the director and the staff of the department personally
believed in the principle of local control. Consequently,
grants and assistance were extended with no strings
attached and only at the request of local officials. As
another example, the highly publicized training programs
for local officials were designed to improve local leader-
ship. Although there was no question that the department
honored the home rule principle, it is less clear that this
hands-off attitude regarding local officials is the same
as citizen local determination. The department never
attempted to bypass elected officials or municipal govern-
ment and deal directly with formal community organi-
zations and other citizens' groups.
Given the mixed responses in these various areas, it
is perhaps safest to agree with one respondent that "the
department's policy was a lack of policy"; there simply
were no clearly defined, departmentwide plans and
priorities in dealing with local affairs. Rather, the policies
and programs reflected the background and outlook of
the first director, a former downstate mayor; the constraints
of a legislative body used to dealing with technical
problems; and the lack of gubernatorial allocations of
money and staff to implement massive change.
If there was no clearly formulated, consistently applied
departmental policy, there was a good deal of action
at the division level. Division programs and policies
illustrate the diversity of the department's roles.
the heavily amended bill would pass the Republican-
dominated Senate. The Democrats made a show of
opposition, reiterating that the bill "was nothing but a
power grab" and would force the city of Chicago to come
"hat in hand to Springfield," especially when federal
grants were involved. Nevertheless, when the final roU
was called, the Democrats "took a walk" and the bill
passed the Senate 37-4. As the Democratic leader
admitted, "[This] was the kind of bill we would like to see
pass." Apparently, the proposal had been watered down
enough to make it acceptable to "Municipal League
Republicans" and "city Democrats" alike. But it was
not yet out of trouble.
Following passage in the Senate the bill was routed
to the House Executive Committee where, on first reading,
it was almost defeated by a vote of 13-13. The objections
at this point were articulated by a Chicago-area Republican
who feared that the department would interfere with
federal grants and would "become another NIPC"
(Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission). These
objections were somewhat irrelevant as the bill never
specifically authorized state or regional interference in
local control, and federal grants were protected by "non-
interference" provisions. Nonetheless, changes were
made reflecting these concerns, and the bill was given
a "do pass" recommendation.
Although there was no opposition during second
reading in the House, at third reading these objections
surfaced again. Suburban and some downstate Democrats
quietly favored the bill, but Chicago Democrats charged
that the bill signaled the end of local authority. Even some
Chicago-area Republicans compared the department to
an octopus which would grab everything in sight, especially
federal grants. The controversy over community organi-
zations was resurrected by references in the debate to
community action activities. In the end, after vigorous
horsetrading by the Republican sponsor James Peterson,
the bill was passed, 95 - 57.
The bill signed by the governor bore only a skeletal
resemblance to the original task force draft. In the original
bill the director had the authority to work with community
groups; now his powers were substantially reduced. I he
proposed office of economic opportunity was removed.
All references to community organizations were deleted.
The department was limited to providing services only
at the request of local officials. The number of local
officials on the advisory council was increased, thus
reducing participation by at-large members. Little state
capitals were not provided for, and only four of the recom-
mended six agencies were to be consolidated into the
department.
Performance of the Department
The legislative statements which accompanied the creation
of the agency outlined five broad goals:
1. To reorganize agencies at the state level to deal
more effectively with the urban crisis.
2. To provide statewide financial and technical assis-
tance and incentives for areawide organizations and to
reduce fragmentation of government.
3. To establish a central source of information on state,
and especially federal, programs.
4. To make state agencies more visible at the local
level and more responsive to local units.
5. To strengthen local governments by providing state
services upon request.
Figure 2
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DLGA's operations. Second, ORP did little to provide
financial or programmatic incentives for local, and espe-
cially metropolitan, planning operations. Nor did it
assist local planning by ranking and evaluating local,
including community, needs and proposing strategies for
the state to meet these needs.
FINANCIAL AFFAIRS
The legislation creating DLGA transferred the Division
of Local Government and Property Tax from the Department
of Revenue to the new department. The functions of this
division had been to assist local units in such technical
matters as budgets, real and personal property tax
assessment, and tax district boundaries. Most of these
functions were continued in its new location.
In terms of staff and budget, the Office of Financial
Affairs (OFA) became the largest division in the new
department. Although the legislation referred to assigning
new functions, the division continued the program of
intercity equalizations, the state assessment of property
tax, and the assistance provided to local units. The most
visible and popular features of the OFA were soon
transferred to the Office of Community Services. Since
then, Community Services, through its local budget and
financial affairs section, has coordinated the federal
revenue sharing plan with local units and administered the
state income tax rebate.
In the one area in which OFA attempted to innovate —
using new criteria in computing the state equalization
factor, which is used to determine tax assessments —
the agency received critical press coverage for playing
politics with the multiplier. In addition, it was noted that
OFA failed to assist in assessing complicated properties
such as sophisticated industries and intercounty areas
and that during the first three years it failed to seriously
study the property tax, even though OFA was the one
state agency with authority in this area.
Conclusions
By any reasonable measure, the performance of DLGA
during its first three years must be rated as mixed.
Despite its lack of overall policy and its case-by-case
approach to problems, the department accomplished
several modest goals. It was a "friend in court" to cities
and villages, it channeled some federal and state planning
and emergency money to local units, and it provided
limited technical advice. The question, as one observer
put it, is whether these jobs are worth doing — whether
there should be a state-supported version of the Illinois
Municipal League. More than this, the question is, Can
such a department be anything more than an upgraded
Illinois Municipal League, given the vagaries of politics
and the strength of the league in the Illinois legislature?
It is difficult to evaluate the performance of DLGA because
it is a new agency with a limited budget and staff, and
the statutory expectations were unrealistically great. To
accomplish the many objectives outlined in the statutes,
DLGA would have had to have been a massive bureaucracy
with an unlimited field staff and operating budget The
major criticism of the department is that it could have
done so much more even with its limited resources. It
might have worked informally but directly with community
organizations. It might have concentrated technical
resources on metropolitan and regional planning efforts.
It might have recognized and publicized the responsibility
of state government for urban problems through study
commissions and through conferences and training
sessions.
To put these criticisms in perspective it should be
emphasized that the Illinois experience is not unusual.
Around 'the country departments of community affairs
and departments of local government have been criticized
for not doing enough to help the cities. 2 These criticisms,
while not severe, are the natural result of unmet expec-
tations. In many states, the heady rhetoric of the urban
crisis was not matched by delivery of resources or pro-
grams. In this context it is perhaps a disservice to "fault"
agency administrators on lack of action when in fact they
had little staff, money, or legislative authority to accomplish
multiple goals imposed on them. If the staff of DLGA during
the first three years is criticized for being overcautious
and reluctant to get involved, this is at least partly
understandable.
Regardless of the specific criticisms of its performance,
the Department of Local Government Affairs did achieve
its single most important purpose. Merely by its existence
the department acknowledged that there is a role for
the state in local affairs. This is the department's significant
contribution.
2 Lawrence O
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THE SMALLER METROPOLITAN AREAS OF ILLINOIS REVISITED
Diane L. Gottheil and Susan Welch
APRIL 1975 39
In a 1962 issue of Illinois Government, James Coke
compared conditions in the smaller downstate metro-
politan areas of Illinois with those of the far larger Chicago
area. An analysis of several indicators for selected down-
state counties and cities revealed that the smaller metro-
politan areas were themselves the site of social and
economic problems equal in proportion, if not absolute
size, to those facing Chicago. At that time, and even more
so today, the plight of the large urban areas was a subject
of national debate. According to Coke, however, dis-
cussion of the problems of the smaller metropolitan
areas hardly was heard beyond the confines of the areas
themselves.
Coke suggested several possible reasons for the lack
of public discussion of the problems of these smaller
areas. First, problems of housing or employment in larger
cities, even if proportionally no larger than in smaller
cities, created more people who were discontented,
which in turn led to larger numbers of people and groups
becoming involved in articulating their problems. He also
speculated that the social and economic problems of
the larger cities were more concentrated, creating
highly visible slums in parts of the city. Larger cities also
support many more voluntary organizations, which in turn
may become involved in enunciating community prob-
lems. Moreover, the greater number of professionals in
large metropolitan areas provides a larger and more
specialized leadership pool for these groups. In sum,
Coke attributed the greater attention to the problems of
the larger metropolitan areas to their visibility and to
public involvement in these problems, but the problems
themselves were not of a relatively greater magnitude.
After providing an overview of population changes in
Illinois metropolitan areas during the 1960s, this paper
reevaluates and updates the findings of Coke from a
number of perspectives. First, using both city and county
census data, we compare the downstate and Chicago
metropolitan areas in 1960 and 1970. Insofar as possible
we have relied on the same indicators as Coke. Second,
we have broadened the scope of the analysis by using
additional, "quality of life" indicators to compare the
two areas. We specify the criteria on which a downstate-
Chicago comparison could be based, and then compare
the areas according to these criteria. Adding quality of
life indicators to the economic measures used by Coke
yields conclusions somewhat different from his 1962 re-
sults. Third, from our updated and broadened findings
we reevaluate Coke's argument concerning public atten-
tion to the problems of medium-sized cities.
Diane L Gottheil is visiting assistant professor at the Institute of Govern-
ment and Public Affairs. University of Illinois
Susan Welch is associate professor. Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Nebraska
Population Trends in the 1960s
The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) de-
fined by the Bureau of the Census include every county
containing a city with more than 50,000 population, plus
adjacent counties that are economically tied to the cen-
tral city. The eight Illinois SMSAs in 1960 increased by
one in the 1970 census, with the addition of Bloomington-
Normal. The nine SMSAs include seventeen of the 102
counties in Illinois. The counties included in the SMSAs,
their population, and population growth during the
decade are reported in Table 1. The huge difference
in population between the Chicago and downstate SMSAs
is readily apparent. The Chicago area has thirteen times
the population of the next largest SMSA, and seventy
times the population of the smallest Illinois SMSA.
Population growth during the decade of the 1960s
occurred in all SMSAs, but the range in amount of growth
was fairly wide. Three downstate metropolitan areas had
the highest rates of growth, Champaign-Urbana, Blooming-
ton-Normal, and Rockford.
Unlike SMSAs some Illinois cities lost population during
the decade. The city of Chicago, which contains half the
population of the Chicago SMSA, lost 5.2 percent of its
population during the decade of the 1960s, while many
Chicago suburbs had rates of growth exceeding 100 per-
cent. Growth of cities within the downstate SMSAs was less
spectacular than in the Chicago suburbs. Eighteen of
the twenty-four cities in the downstate areas exceeded the
statewide average growth of 10.2 percent during the
decade. Of the five cities with less than 5 percent popu-
lation increase, four were in the economically depressed
Illinois portion of the St. Louis SMSA (East St. Louis,
Centreville, Granite City, and Alton), and the fifth was
Rock Island. Cities not part of an SMSA had a much slower
rate of growth.
In sum, the downstate metropolitan areas as well as the
suburban Chicago metropolitan area experienced great
population growth during the 1960s. Population loss in
Illinois was found in the city of Chicago, some of the areas
around St. Louis, and in the smaller towns of the state
Economic Comparisons of Chicago and
Downstate SMSAs, 1960 and 1970
Comparisons between the Chicago and downstate
SMSAs were initially based on both the city and the
county as the unit of analysis to determine if the unit
examined affected the results in any way. Because no
substantial differences were found, both county and city
data are reported (see Tables 2 and 3) but the discussion
focuses mainly on county data.
We have divided the SMSA counties into four groups,
separating Cook County from the suburban Chicago SMSA
Table 1
STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS IN ILLINOIS
SMSA
Table 2
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHICAGO AND DOWNSTATE SMSAs
BASED ON COUNTY AGGREGATES
1960 1970
Table 3
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHICAGO AND DOWNSTATE SMSAs
BASED ON CITY AGGREGATES
Table 4
SOME QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS FOR ILLINOIS SMSAs,
BASED ON COUNTY AGGREGATES
air and water quality available, and perhaps some
measure of neighborhood conditions, we might have
called this area of social concern "environmental quality."
HEALTH
Infant mortality rate is widely accepted as an indicator of
level of healfh. The relative number of physicians in a
community is a somewhat problematic indicator because
we cannot say with certainty that having more physicians
insures better health, 1 Nevertheless, we have included
it here as a measure of potential access to medical care
through availability of physicians.
SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION
Robbery rates and rates of admissions to mental health
facilities are rather vivid indicators of the degree of
personal and community stability and security. Due to
inaccuracies in reporting, however, robbery rates tend
to underestimate the actual occurrence of the event.
Proximity of a mental health facility to a particular com-
munity may inflate the rate of admissions in such areas
and decrease the rate in communities where access is
less convenient.
SOCIAL PARTICIPATION
We have limited the indicators of social participation
to two measuring participation in politics — registration
and voting. Variables related to participation in voluntary
organizations, family life, or church activities might give
a more complete measure of social participation, were
such data available.
These indicators enable us to compare the quality
of life in the Illinois counties we are examining. As in
our initial county analysis, we have separated out the
figures for Cook County and for the two Illinois counties
that are part of the St. Louis SMSA. Because we have
limited the indicators to those for which data are readily
available, the analysis provides a base line for other
studies assessing past or future trends. It can also be used
to examine the impact of public policies designed to
affect one or more of these areas.
The Quality of Life in Illinois Metropolitan Areas
The two indicators of income and employment show that,
with the exception of the St. Louis area counties, down-
state is somewhat better off than Cook County. The sub-
urban counties in the Chicago area are better off than
either Cook County or downstate and considerably
better off than the St. Louis area counties. The portion of
the St. Louis SMSA population either in the poverty
bracket or unemployed is more than double that of the
suburban Chicago counties.
Differences among residents of the four areas in median
school years completed are rather small. The only clear
difference was in the lower figure for the St. Louis counties
compared to the three other parts of the state. The
percentage of adult population with less than five years
of school is somewhat higher in Cook County than in the
St. Louis area counties; both areas compare unfavorably
to the Chicago suburban counties and the downstate
' This may also be true for the education measures, in that more years of
schooling may not produce better-educated people
metropolitan counties. The downstate areas are fairly
close on this criterion, with Champaign County having
the highest median education, 1 2.6 years, and six counties
having the lowest, 12.1 years.
Chicago suburban counties and downstate metro-
politan counties are similar in percentage of crowded
housing units, with housing conditions in both areas
better than in the St. Louis suburban counties. Housing
conditions in Cook County, however, are considerably
worse than in the other areas. Again, little variation was
found among downstate counties with McLean having
the lowest percent of crowded units (5.1) and Tazewell
the highest (7.7).
Infant mortality rates are highest in the St. Louis area
counties, with Cook County somewhat lower. The suburban
Chicago area counties and downstate fare considerably
better, and their rates are similar. Cook County leads in
number of physicians in the population — no doubt be-
cause of the number of medical schools and centers
in the Chicago area — followed by the suburban Chicago
and downstate counties. The proportion in the East St.
Louis area is less than half that in Cook County. The
variations in physicians per 100,000 population are
quite large among downstate SMSAs, ranging from
70.8 in Boone County to 167.6 in Champaign County.
Residents of Cook County are subject to a much greater
robbery rate than that found in the surrounding counties
of the Chicago SMSA. The robbery rate is almost eight
times greater in Cook County than in the surburban
Chicago counties On this indicator of social disorgani-
zation, we found conditions to be considerably better
downstate than in Cook County, but still not as good
as in the suburban counties of the Chicago SMSA, where
the robbery rate is lowest of the Illinois areas we examined.
The range in downstate areas was great; Boone, for
example, had a robbery rate of 7.9, while the rate in
Peoria County was 233.8. Nevertheless, this range is not
as great as that between Cook and its suburban counties.
On rates of admissions to mental health facilities, once
again the suburban Chicago counties do better than the
other areas perhaps because in higher income areas
residents tend to use private facilities. The St. Louis area
counties are next, followed by Cook County. The down-
state counties rank poorest on this indicator, and among
them Peoria and Rock Island have rates of mental health
admissions that are considerably higher than the other
counties. Among the Chicago suburban counties
Kane has the highest rate. Each of these three counties
has a rather large mental health facility located in it,
whereas no such facility is found in the other downstate
or Chicago suburban counties, suggesting that this
indicator may indeed be influenced by the convenience
of a mental health facility to residents of the county
Nevertheless, in six of the nine downstate counties —
four of which have no mental health facility — admission
rates are higher than any of the Chicago suburban counties
with the exception of Kane.
On both indicators of social participation — registration
and voting — the differences among our four areas are
slight. In all areas the great disparity lies in the proportion
of registered voters who actually vote. The East St. Louis
counties have the lowest voter turnout, Cook County the
highest, with the suburban Cook counties and other
downstate counties in between. We have used figures
for a nonpresidential election year; hence, a portion of
the nonvoters may have been drawn to register by in-
volvement in national issues, but did not maintain this
involvement by voting in an off-year election.
The difference among the downstate areas themselves
is again large. In both registrants and voting, Champaign
County ranks low (49.7 percent and 34.1 percent, respec-
tively) while 85 percent of Tazewell County eligibles are
registered and about 60 percent of Sangamon County
eligibles vote. The large student population of Champaign
County undoubtedly depresses its political participa-
tion rates.
If we look again at the figures reported in Table 4,
what can be said about the quality of life in each of the
four parts of Illinois we have examined? The suburban
Chicago SMSA counties appear to fare the best on this
set of indicators. They appear weakest in social partici-
pation, but the differences are slight. On levels of in-
come, employment, and education, they are the highest,
and they do best on the two measures of social disor-
ganization. In housing and health, they still compare
favorably, topped only by one other part of the state
in each of these areas.
The performance of the downstate SMSA counties,
excluding the St. Louis SMSA counties, is the next
highest. The infant mortality rate and percentage of
crowded housing units are lowest in the downstate
counties, and on education they are almost identical to
the Chicago suburban counties. The robbery rate is
lower only in the suburban Chicago counties, and although
the number of physicians in proportion to the population
is low, the figure is not very different from that of the
suburban Chicago area. Only the admission rate to
mental health facilities suggests that it is difficult to
make a general statement about the quality of life in
downstate metropolitan areas. We may be able to say
that personal safety is greater in the smaller metropolitan
areas given the lower robbery rate, but we cannot con-
clude that personal security on the psychological level
is enhanced.
Cook County, which includes a major central city,
and the two suburban St. Louis counties, which are part
of an SMSA with a major central city, fare less well in
almost all the areas of social concern than do the other two
parts of Illinois. Conditions in Cook County are generally
worse than in its suburban counties and the downstate
counties, and considerably worse in number of robberies.
It excells only in the number of physicians in proportion
to the population. On the other measure of health it does
not differ greatly from other parts of the state. The two
St. Louis counties fall at the lowest performance level
on several measures of the quality of life, and close
to the bottom on others.
All of our indices, taken together, give a contradictory
picture of the quality of life in the Chicago and downstate
areas. These measures have identified areas of social
well-being in which the smaller metropolitan areas of
Illinois fare better than the Chicago area, and emphasize
the contrast between Cook County and the surrounding
suburbs of the Chicago SMSA. Incomes may be higher
in the Chicago area, but for residents of Cook County
slightly larger pockets of poverty and greater unemployment
levels accompany the higher incomes. Moreover, most
of the indicators separate the suburban counties of the
Chicago SMSA and the downstate metropolitan areas on
the one hand, and Cook County and the St. Louis SMSA
Illinois counties on the other. Social well-being in metro-
politan areas of Illinois appears to be lagging in Cook
County and the two downstate counties of the St. Louis
area. In these two parts of the state, the black proportion
of the population is greater than in any of the other
metropolitan areas. The deprivation that usually accom-
panies high percentages of black residents accounts
for the greater similarities between Cook County and the
suburban St. Louis area counties in Illinois.
Response to Problems
Coke asserted that the problems of downstate SMSAs
went relatively unnoticed in comparison with big city
problems even though the problems were as great. He
attributed this in large part to lack of indigenous activity
in the smaller, cities directed toward publicizing and
rectifying city problems. This explanation was presumably
based on his feeling that the press and government give
much more attention to the huge metro areas than to
Peoria, Springfield, or other small communities. It seemed
to us that this statement might be invalid on at least two
counts: first, the problems of the downstate areas may
not be as great, and, second, the level of attention paid
to them may be equal. Our analysis has already shown that
in many respects the downstate areas are better off
than the central city area of the Chicago SMSA and the
suburban St. Louis counties. To determine the extent to
which attention is paid to those problems, we examined
two indicators of concern about problems in metropolitan
areas and compared the larger and smaller SMSAs on
these indices. First, we examined riot incidence in Illinois
during the 1960s as a measure of articulation of problems
or activity within cities designed to call attention to the
problems of the cities. Secondly, as a measure of remedial
activity or attention to urban problems from outside the
city, we evaluated the flow of intergovernmental revenue
into the cities in 1970.
A riot is not typical of all protest activity, let alone all
activity directed toward calling attention to and improving
the quality of life in the city. Yet in the 1960s riots were
the type of protest that received the most attention and
analysis by the press, and by "concerned" citizens and
governmental officials. If Coke's thesis is correct, that
smaller cities lack indigenous protest, riots should have
been confined to Chicago and the St. Louis area. In
fact, these disorders occurred throughout Illinois.
Because these disorders are race-related, we might
expect Cook County, with 83 percent of the black population
of Illinois, to have a proportionate number of disorders.
What we found, however, was that Cook County experienced
only 61 percent of the total number of riots, while downstate
and St. Louis, with slightly over 10 percent of the black
population, experienced 22 percent of the riots. In terms
of human and property destruction, the magnitude of the
major Chicago riot (the one following the death of Martin
Luther King) was far greater than any downstate not.
Nevertheless, these crude tallies do not support the notion
that deprived residents of the downstate areas did not
attempt to bring public attention to their problems.
Riots are a measure of concern expressed within the
community itself. Intergovernmental revenue received
by counties and cities is an expression of attention by
other governmental levels to metropolitan problems. If
the state and national governments are being inattentive
to the problems of middle-sized communities, one indi-
cation will be a small inflow of intergovernmental revenue.
Per capita intergovernmental revenue data for major
cities within Illinois SMSAs are shown below. 2
2
Figures are drawn from U S
. Department ot Commerce Bureau of the
Census. County and City Data Book. 1973
Chicago SMSA cities in Cook County
Chicago
Evanston
Skokie
$43.90
. 16.20
. 23.60
Chicago SMSA cities outside Cook County
Elmhurst ....." - $12.90
Lombard
Aurora
Elgin
North Chicago
Waukegan 14 00
5.70
13.20
10.70
14.40
Joliel 9.20
St. Louis (III.) SMSA cities
Granite City $26.40
Alton 33.90
East St. Louis 28 50
Other downstate SMSA cities
Champaign
Urbana
Bloommgton
Normal
Decatur
Peoria
Rock Island
Moline
Springfield
Pekin
Rockford
$28.60
. 14.10
. . 16.80
n.d
. . 12.70
15 00
.. 18.60
16.00
.. 36.24
1410
. 7.20
Per capita intergovernmental inflow to the counties is
highest in Cook County, next highest in St. Clair and
Madison counties, with the downstate counties receiving
the least. At the city level, Chicago receives by far the
largest per capita amount of intergovernmental revenue
($43.90). Cities in the East St. Louis area receive between
$26 and $34 per capita, and only two other downstate
cities, Champaign and Springfield, receive more than $20
per capita from the state and federal governments.
Downstate cities outside the St. Louis area fare slightly
better than the suburban Chicago cities, but most
downstate cities receive surprisingly little per capita inter-
governmental revenue.
To what can we attribute this seeming lack of support or
remedial attention to the downstate areas? Coke's explana-
tion that big city problems seem greater must be given
some credence here, along with our finding that, on the
whole, the quality of life in the medium-sized communities
is in fact better than in Chicago. Other explanations for less
federal and state attention to the downstate areas may also
be valid. For example, awareness of federal and state pro-
grams for which they are eligible may be lower in the
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smaller cities, and perhaps there is less expertise in apply-
ing for federal money. The greater political influence of the
Chicago city administration ably supplements its larger
staff of experts in seeking and obtaining intergovernmental
funding. The downstate areas have been dominated by a
traditionally conservative public opinion which militated
against participation in federal programs. Peoria, for
example, undertook its downtown renewal program without
federal funds. Then again, the criteria on which Cook
County fared poorly may be most relevant to tapping inter-
governmental funds. In sum, many factors may work
together to produce the intergovernmental funds picture
presented above. Deliberate inattention by higher levels of
government may be one, but other factors probably are
more relevant, including the fact that on many indicators the
downstate areas are in fact better off than Cook County.
The establishment of multicounty and single-county
regional planning agencies is another indication of recogni-
tion of problems and attempts to take action. Planning has
come to involve important quality of life areas as well as
physical development of the community. Although planning
agencies have been given impetus from the state govern-
ment, in downstate counties most of these agencies were
created as a response to federal grant requirements, a
further measure of attention from other governmental levels
rather than from groups indigenous to the community.
Conclusions and Implications
Our findings did not totally support Coke's contention
that the smaller, downstate SMSAs share the level of urban
problems of Chicago What we found was a great deal of
contrast between the large metropolitan centers, on the
one hand, and the less urban and suburban areas, on the
other. Cook County and the suburban Chicago SMSA
counties are as different as Cook County and Champaign
County, in terms of many quality of life indicators. Sim-
ilarly, the Illinois portion of the St. Louis SMSA no more
resembles the other downstate SMSAs than it does the
suburban Chicago counties. Further, differences among
the other downstate SMSAs are sometimes equal in
magnitude to the differences between downstate and
Cook County. For example, the range among downstate
areas in infant mortality was 17.3 in McLean County to
21.9 in Macon, a range far exceeding the mean difference
between downstate and the suburbs, or even downstate
and Cook County. These differences do not contradict
our finding that generally, with respect to the quality of
life of their residents, the downstate areas rank slightly
behind the suburban Chicago counties, followed by Cook
County and the suburban St. Louis counties.
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Richard L. Day
On July 1, 1971, for the first time home rule became an
option available to Illinois municipalities and counties.
The extent and ways in which home rule has been used were
among the topics studied by staff members of the Illinois
Home Rule Clearinghouse and Policy Analysis Project.
In October 1974 a survey was conducted of the seventy-
five existing home rule municipalities in Illinois to determine
the amount and types of home rule use since the inception
of home rule. In this paper the frequency of home rule use
by the units is discussed and an attempt made to account
for the number of times a given municipality has employed
home rule. Then, more importantly, the various areas in
which home rule has been used are described to identify
factors associated with the different uses. Finally, the atti-
tudes of municipal officials toward home rule are examined.
Background of Illinois Home Rule
The 1970 Illinois Constitution contains what may be the
most liberal home rule provisions of any state constitution.
Under previous Illinois constitutions, all local governments
in the state operated under Dillon's Rule. This doctrine,
first enunciated by Judge John F. Dillon of the Iowa
Supreme Court in an 1868 case, declares that local govern-
ments have only those powers specifically delegated to
them by the state constitution or state law. All other powers
are the province of state government. Although home rule
means something different in each of the approximately
forty states where it exists, in all these states home rule
was introduced to change the state-local balance of
power in favor of iocal government. Dillon's Rule still
prevails in many of these states, however, because of
narrow judicial interpretations of local powers.
Illinois home rule is unique, since it follows neither of
the two usual models for home rule. It neither delegates
specific powers and functions to state and local governments
nor gives the state completely free rein in preempting
local powers and functions.
The general constitutional home rule grant is extremely
broad. Section 6(a) of article VII states that, except as
Richard L Day was a research assistant at the Institute of Government
and Public Affairs at the time this paper was written. The paper reports on
one aspect of the Illinois Home Rule Clearinghouse and Policy Analysis
Project conducted by the institute in cooperation with the Illinois Department
of Local Government Affairs (DLGA) The preparation of the report was
funded in part by a comprehensive planning grant from the federal Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development under an agreement with
DLGA.
limited by other parts of the section, "a home rule unit
may exercise any power and perform any function per-
taining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the
public health, safety, morals and welfare; to license; to
tax; and to incur debt." Unless it receives authorization from
the General Assembly, a home rule unit may not (1) license
for revenue, (2) impose taxes upon or measured by income
or earnings, or (3) tax occupations (sec. 6(e) ). The General
Assembly has not granted any of these additional powers.
Under the preemption provisions — sections 6(g), (h),
and (i) — the General Assembly may deny or limit almost
any local power. However, these provisions require a
three-fifths majority in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives for some types of preemption, including
preemption of local taxing powers. There have been only
a few instances of legislative preemption; the most im-
portant deal with licensing and regulation. A generally
liberal series of Illinois Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting local exercises of home rule power, the majority
upholding home rule taxing measures, stems from the
exhortation of section 6(m): "Powers and functions of
home rule units shall be construed liberally." This com-
bination of legislative restraint and liberal judicial inter-
pretation has meant that home rule units are now free to
act in many areas previously governed by state consti-
tution and state statute.
The home rule provisions of the constitution's local
government article grant home rule status automatically
to any municipality — city, village, or incorporated town
— of 25,000 or greater population. A county achieves
home rule status if its governmental structure includes an
elected chief executive officer. Cook County, which had
such an officer prior to the 1970 constitution, is the only
home rule county to date.
Municipalities under 25,000 population can become
home rule units if their voters approve this change by
referendum. As of October 1974 there were seventy-five
home rule municipalities, ten of which had held successful
home rule referenda ' Approximately two-thirds of the
state's population reside in home rule units, with the majority
of these units located in the six-county Chicago metro-
politan area.
' Since that time, successful home rule referenda have been held in
nine additional municipalities, two other municipalities have gained home
rule status by passing the 25,000 population mark.
Method of Study
The survey method was chosen because it offers a system-
atic and efficient means of obtaining answers to various
pertinent questions. The survey questionnaire used in
the present study was constructed by this writer, other
members of the home rule project staff, and the Survey
Research Laboratory of the University of Illinois, Re-
spondents to the survey were the mayors or village presi-
dents, attorneys, and managers or administrative assistants
(for those units with such officers) of all seventy-five home
rule municipalities. Attorneys who represent more than one
home rule municipality were interviewed once for each
unit they represent. One hundred eighty-four interviews
were completed out of a potential 196. The interviews were
administered by telephone between March and September
1974.
The survey sought to determine the amount and types
of home rule use by dividing uses into seven categories:
licensing, taxation, issuance of nonreferendum bonds,
regulations, alteration of governmental structure, inter-
governmental agreements, and other. Respondents were
asked to describe home rule use by their units, if any,
in each of these categories, and were also asked to supply
the interviewer with copies of ordinances enacting the
various measures taken. In analyzing the survey the cate-
gories were further divided into nine types of use. Respon-
dents were also asked a series of questions dealing with
their attitudes toward home rule, as well as other activities
related to home rule in their municipalities.
In addition to information obtained from the survey,
twenty-five other items of information were collected for
each of the seventy-five municipalities. Items included
the unit's median income, level of municipal indebtedness,
type of attorney, form of government, major industry,
population growth between 1960 and 1970, and region of
the state in which the unit is located.
Both the responses to the questions and the additional
information were coded onto cards and a series of analyses
performed. The two most important factors considered
were the amount and type of home rule use by each unit.
All the other information was crosstabulated with the
2 The strength of the relationships tested in this section was determined
by the Gamma and Cramer's V statistical techniques Relationships con-
sidered strong registered 30 or higher on both measures. Interested
readers may communicate with the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs for complete explanations of statistical tests used in this paper.
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amount and type of home rule use to determine whether
any relationships linked these two factors with the other
information. 2
Frequency of Home Rule Use
One of the most important variables examined in this study,
the amount that each municipality had used home rule,
was determined in several ways. Every official interviewed
was asked about any home rule uses in his or her com-
munity. Local newspapers serving home rule units were
reviewed for any mention of actual or potential home rule
uses. Additional information was obtained from other
sources, notably the Department of Local Government
Affairs. Each municipality with any possible ordinances
using home rule was asked to send copies' of those
ordinances or any others they considered to be home
rule.
All ordinances that were received were examined twice
to determine if they were home rule uses. An ordinance was
considered home rule (1) if the authority to adopt the
ordinance or procedure was not clearly delegated to the
municipality by state statute, or (2) if no state statute existed
in the area, or (3) if it was difficult to decide if home rule was
necessary for a municipality to act in an area and the
municipality cited home rule authority in the ordinance.
One of the problems associated with these criteria is
that they cover instances in which municipalities cite home
rule in an ordinance when they already have statutory
authorization to act. However, some of the statutory
authorizations are so vague that local governments
are often reluctant to act without home rule authorization.
For example, chapter 24, section 11-1-1, of the Illinois
Revised Statutes states, "The corporate authorities of each
municipality may pass and enforce all necessary police
ordinances." In theory this could cover any type of regu-
latory ordinance. DeKalb's action allowing 19- and 20-
year-olds to consume all types of alcoholic beverages could
conceivably have been allowed by this broad statutory
provision. Given the vagueness of the statute and the
Dillon's Rule tradition of state-local relations, however,
DeKalb cited home rule as authorization. For DeKalb
and many other units, home rule is cited as authorization
to act in areas that were otherwise questionable for
local government.
Each municipality was given a score based on the
number of uses determined under the above three criteria.
During the first three years the number of home rule uses
Table 1
HOME RULE USE
July 1, 1971, through October 31, 1974
ship between the revision of form and structure and the
likelihood of a unit's employing a full-time planner on its
staff.
For some types of home rule use relatively few ordinances
have been enacted, making it difficult to find factors that
relate strongly to these types of use. Home rule ordinances
that deal with intergovernmental relations, bond procedures
without the issuance of bonds, and penal ordinances
fall into this group, which comprise 14 percent of the total
number of home rule ordinances passed. Units which have
used home rule to enact ordinances pertaining to inter-
governmental relations tend to have residents with con-
siderably higher average incomes than do other home
rule units.
Of all the characteristics that appear to be related to
the various types of home rule use, attendance at Home
Rule Attorneys Committee meetings is clearly the most
prevalent. Although there is no clear explanation for
this on the basis of the data, it would seem logical that
before a municipality embarks on new ground — as is the
case in much home rule activity — its officials feel the
need to consult with officials of other home rule units.
In other words, those units that are predisposed to the
use of home rule or are interested in using home rule to
solve a particular municipal problem send representatives
to meetings to benefit from the collective wisdom of their
peers.
Attitudes of Home Rule Officials
Several attitudinal questions were asked as part of the
survey administered to 184 home rule officials. These
questions sought to determine whether there were any
significant attitudinal differences among these officials
based on either the positions they held (mayor, attorney.
and manager) or on the number of times their municipalities
had adopted home rule ordinances.
Each official surveyed was asked what he considered
to be the greatest problem facing his municipality. He
was also asked whether home rule could be used to help
solve this problem, to characterize the way in which home
rule had been used generally, why he would make this
characterization, and whether he had done any lobbying
on behalf of home rule with his elected state represen-
tatives
Regardless of their positions or how often home rule
had been used by their units, the officials overwhelmingly
cited financial difficulties as the greatest problem facing
their municipalities. Officials from the municipalities with
high and medium use of home rule were confident that
home rule could help solve their greatest problem.
Officials from the units with relatively few uses of home
rule were somewhat less sure about this point. Irrespective
of the number of times their units had used home rule,
officials felt that home rule was most effective in solving
financial problems and in meeting special local needs.
When asked to characterize the use of home rule
generally, 73 percent of the respondents from low use
municipalities, 82 percent of those from medium use mu-
nicipalities, and 100 percent from high use municipalities
described the use of home rule to date as cautious. In
explaining this response, the officials said either that
they had been advised to be cautious or that they feared
antagonizing members of the Illinois General Assembly.
On the basis of these and other responses, it appears
that local officials see home rule as a valuable tool in
helping to solve their particular problems. To date they
have used home rule sparingly — probably to ensure that
it would not be weakened or lost through legislative
preemption. Much of this caution has been at the behest
of officials of the Illinois Municipal League. The league
has advised its members to proceed slowly so that
favorable legal precedents could be established and
members of the General Assembly would have little
reason to preempt home rule power. In addition, a
municipality which waits until the courts uphold a given
type of home rule use does not risk the trouble and
expense of litigation.
Conclusion
On the basis of this early research it is possible to identify
some of the characteristics associated with frequency
and type of home rule use by municipalities. A municipality
characterized as a high home rule user tends to be a
north Chicago suburban or an urbanized downstate
community which has not experienced dramatic changes
in its population. Its population tends to be affluent
and fairly well educated. It generally has a well-staffed
municipal government, and these staff members are well
aware of home rule and its potential uses. Many of the
high users are represented at meetings and conferences,
so they know what is being done with home rule.
The types of home rule ordinances adopted correlate
with the opinions expressed by home rule officials in
the interviews. The officials said that their greatest
problems tended to be unique to their communities and
of a financial nature. They generally felt that home rule
could be used to help'solve these problems. And, as
we have shown, home rule has been used quite extensively
in dealing with financial affairs. Uses related to indebted-
ness and taxation combined account for 37 percent of
the number of uses to date. Many of the unique problems
described by the officials may have been dealt with by
the other types of use described in this paper — especially
licensing and regulation.
It appears that in the first three years of home rule use
the municipalities have proceeded cautiously. Apparently
the cautious approach stems largely from advice given
by Illinois Municipal League officials and from the
reluctance to proceed too rapidly in this new area. During
these three years home rule has been defined and
strengthened by a large number of favorable court de-
cisions. It would appear, then, that the coming years
will see many more uses of home rule: home rule has
been bolstered by experience, favorable court tests,
and a legislature which does not appear to be particularly
hostile
Although home rule has not yet been used as extensively
as it might have been, when one considers the many
problems facing local governments it seems safe to
say that this early stage has been more than a symbolic
period. The first three years of home rule have been
marked by a cautious but steady establishment of this
new power, largely by units that have been acting with
the knowledge and resources to support their innovative
efforts. If home rule continues to follow this deliberate
and somewhat controlled path, the Dillon's Rule mentality
that has hampered local governments for so many years
will steadily be eroded. Local governments in Illinois
will thus be able to continue to discover unique solutions
to solve their unique local problems.
types: licensing and regulation, debt, taxation, officers
and employees, local procedures, form and structure of
government, intergovernmental relations, bond procedures
without actual bond issuances, and penal ordinances.
In this section we describe the ways in which municipal-
ities have used. home rule and attempt to identify charac-
teristics of the municipalities that distinguish them by
the types of use. Those characteristics showing strong
and moderate relationships to the nine types of use are
indicated in Table 5. 3
Table 5
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOME RULE USERS
Home Rule Use
(type and number)
Relationship to Characteristics
Strong Moderate
Licensing and
regulation, 45
Debt, 35
-Frequent attendance
at attorneys' meetings
-Planner on staff
-High average income
-Frequent atten-
dance at attorneys'
meetings
-Slight population
change, 1960-70
Taxes, 24
Officers and
employees, 22
Local
procedures, 20
Form and
structure, 16
Intergovernmental
relations, 12
Bond procedures
without bond
issuance, 12
Penal ordinances, 3
-Large population
-North suburban
location
-Residential type
city
-Frequent atten-
dance at attorneys'
meetings
-Frequent atten-
dance at attorneys'
meetings
-Frequent atten-
dance at attorneys'
meetings
-Planner on staff
-High average income
As shown by the table, the most frequent use is in
the area of licensing and regulation. This category covers
a "broad range of home rule uses, from the licensing of
cats to the regulation of pollutants emitted by industries.
It also includes all ordinances dealing with liquor control
that vary from state statute. The second largest category,
the use of home rule to pass debt ordinances, primarily
involves the issuance of nonreferendum general obligation
bonds, the mortgaging of public property, and similar
uses. The third largest category is home rule taxation.
When taxation, debt, and nonreferendum bond procedures
are combined, over half of the home rule uses have
involved municipal finance.
There is a strong positive relationship between the use
of home rule for licensing and regulation and three
characteristics of the municipalities: (1) the number of
times a municipal attorney attended meetings of the Home
Rule Attorneys Committee, (2) the presence of a planner
on the city's staff, and (3) the average income of the
residents of the municipality.
4
The use of home rule to incur debt was frequent, but
there were few characteristics that tended to distinguish
the units incurring such debt from the units which did
not. There was a moderate relationship, however, between
the incurrence of home rule debt and attendance at Home
Rule Attorneys Committee meetings. Municipalities with
small population change between 1960 and 1970
tended to use home rule debt more than did the units
which had experienced rapid population growth in that
period.
Two factors tended to correlate strongly with the number
of times home rule taxing ordinances were enacted.
The larger the population of a home rule municipality,
the more likely it was to use home rule to enact taxing
ordinances. Units over 50,000 population and units located
in the northern Chicago suburbs were most likely to pass
ordinances dealing with new methods of taxation.
Home rule use in the category officers and employees
generally involved the alteration of civil service regula-
tions, the creation of a staff position, or the elimination
of such a position. These ordinances are more likely to
be passed by residential municipalities than by other
types of municipalities. There is also a moderate, positive
relationship between this type of home rule use and the
frequency of attendance at Home Rule Attorneys Commit-
tee meetings.
Few characteristics distinguish the units which have
used home rule to change their local procedures. These
changes generally involve such matters as voting pro-
cedures in council meetings or the revision of the budgetary
process. There is a moderate relationship, however,
between attendance at Home Rule Attorneys Committee
meetings and the introduction of local procedural changes
under home rule
Municipalities which have used home rule to revise
the form or structure of their government show two
characteristics that vary directly with the frequency of
this type of use There is a moderate relationship between
this type of use and attendance at Home Rule Attorneys
Committee meetings. There is also a moderate relation-
3
Strong relationships were those that scored at least 36 in two of the
three statistical measures used in this section (R 2 in multiple regression
analysis, Pearson's r, and Cramer's V) Moderate relationships were those
falling between 24 and 35 in at least two of the three statistical measures
' A positive relationship means that as the value of one indicator
(such as licensing and regulation) increases, the other indicator (such
as mean income) also increases In a negative relationship, one indicator
either increases or decreases as the other indicator moves in the opposite
direction
percent are high users. The last group includes Chicago
with the highest number of home rule uses, fourteen.
Twenty-five characteristics of each municipality were
crosstabulated with the amount of home rule use. The
characteristics that showed the strongest relationship
with the amount of use were (1) attendance at meetings
of the Home Rule Attorneys Committee of the Illinois
Municipal League, (2) presence of a planner on the staff,
(3) size of the municipality, (4) tax effort index, (5) income
levels of the residents, and (6) region of the state.
Attendance by municipal attorneys at the Home Rule
Attorneys Committee meetings was the strongest indicator
of municipal home rule use. This committee, established
by the Illinois Municipal League, meets to discuss the
legality and advisability of enacting various kinds of
home rule ordinances. Each municipality was given a
score based on the number of times that its attorney
attended the fourteen meetings held from January 1973
to November 1974 (see Table 2). Eighty-two percent of
Table 2
ATTENDANCE AT HOME RULE ATTORNEYS' MEETINGS
Home
Rule
User
Number of Meetings Attended
0-5 6-10 11-14
Number ot Municipalities (%)
Low
Medium
High
32 (82)
16(59)
2(22)
4(10)
8(30)
1 (11)
3(7)
3(11)
6(67)
the low users had representatives at the meetings five
or fewer times. The attendance of the medium users
varies considerably. Of the nine units classified as high
users, 67 percent attended between eleven and fourteen
meetings.
The distinction between full-time and part-time attorney
also seems to be significant as an indicator of home rule
use. Among the high users four of the nine, or 44 percent,
retained part-time counsel, while five retained full-time
counsel. Although retention of full-time counsel proved to
be a strong indicator, an unusually large number of the
high and medium users appeared to retain only part-time
counsel. A closer look revealed that some of the attorneys
who represent home rule units specialize in municipal
law and represent more than one home rule unit. These
attorneys were separated from others who are part-time
and who maintain a general practice in addition to their
municipal practice When full-time attorneys are grouped
with part-time attorneys with specialized municipal prac-
tices, the total accounts for 77 percent of the high users,
48 percent of the medium users, and 10 percent of the low
users.
The presence of a full-time planner is one indicator of
sophistication in city management. Seventy-eight percent
of the high users employ planners, compared with 60
percent for medium users and only 26 percent for the low
users of home rule
Each of the seventy-five units was placed in one of
five geographical regions (plus the city of Chicago).
The results of this crosstabulation show that the high
users tend to be either in the north suburban region of
Chicago or in the more urbanized areas downstate. The
latter is the largest and most diverse category. The low
users are located largely in the south Chicago suburbs
and the more rural areas downstate (see Table 3).
Table 3
LOCATION OF HOME RULE MUNICIPALITIES
(BliGPA
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ILLINOIS ENERGY PROBLEMS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Boyd R. Keenan
Governmental institutions wrestling with energy problems
—
ranging from American states to international organi-
zations — are like elements in a gigantic mobile. They
seem suspended in time and space, battered by erratic
winds. The least force affecting even a minor element
causes reactions in other parts of the mechanism.
More than two years after the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74
signaled the end of cheap fuel for the Western world,
the U.S. Congress and President Ford are still searching
for national energy management guidelines. For a time,
it was felt that attention to the place of the states in
national energy matters could wait until the federal
government hammered out firm policies. Now, however,
it has become increasingly clear that states must begin
to search for their own distinctive roles in the complex
energy mobile. It can only be hoped that initial plans
conceived by the states will mesh well with overarching
policies later devised in Washington.
The full scope of state responsibilities in energy affairs
cannot be assessed yet. But leaders in each state must
ask at least three basic questions: (1) How should the state
organize itself to protect its citizens against the emer-
gencies which could accompany severe fuel shortages
and even another oil embargo? (2) What does the state
have to offer to the nation at large in a time of long-range
energy shortages? and (3) What are the environmental
implications within the state of solutions to energy prob-
lems?
In the fall of 1973, when Arab nations cut the supply
of crude oil being delivered to the U.S., Illinois, like other
states, responded on a "crisis" basis. A "hot line" was
set up in the state Department of Agriculture, and personnel
there began assisting not only farmers in need of fuel,
but also industries, independent gasoline dealers, and even
large oil companies that turned to the state for help in
coordination. When the broad dimensions of the allocation
problem became apparent, Illinois Governor Dan Walker
created the Office of the Illinois Energy Coordinator
and moved the hot line operation there. The agency
cooperated with the new Federal Energy Office — now
the Federal Energy Administration — during the near
chaotic period of the embargo.
Over the past two years other state agencies have also
implemented specific programs related to energy. On
April 1, 1975, Governor Walker centralized many of these
Boyd R Keenan is professor of political science. Institute of Government
and Public Affairs, and Department of Political Science, University of
Illinois at Chicago Circle
activities in the nevy Division of Energy within the state
Department of Business and Economic Development (BED).
Among the new division's responsibilities were those
petroleum allocation tasks formerly handled by the Office
of the Energy Coordinator. The division was also charged
by the governor to provide leadership in such long-tange
matters as developing lllinois's coal reserves, creating
energy conservation programs, investigating alternative
energy sources, coordinating energy research within
Illinois, and establishing coal research centers in the
state.
Thus, the Division of Energy is presently the keystone
of the executive branch's organizational response to the
energy crisis, although virtually all state departments and
agencies have been forced to face their own problems.
In a perhaps unprecedented manner the General Assembly
has sought to meet many of the same problems through
legislative action. At times the distinct approaches of
the two branches have resulted in collisions with strong
political overtones.
Illinois Energy Resources
Illinois is mentioned increasingly as possessing both
natural and human resources critical to the nation at large
in energy affairs, the result of a combination of geological,
historical, and political circumstances. During World War
II, the city of Chicago was the site of early research and
planning on the fabled Manhattan Project, which produced
the first atomic bomb. In large measure the presence of
federal and university nuclear laboratories near Chicago
can be traced to the wartime project. It was to be expected
that a Chicago public utility — Commonwealth Edison —
would become the first such company to develop a
civilian nuclear reactor. Today that firm possesses the
greatest nuclear capability of any utility in the nation,
and Illinois relies more heavily on nuclear generation of
electrical power than does any other state.
lllinois's prominence in nuclear energy was an expected
development. It was the recognition in 1973 of the nation's
dependence on foreign oil, however, that brought sudden
and renewed attention to an even older and more plentiful
energy source in the state — coal. Over the past two years,
Illinois citizens have been subjected to a bewildering
array of proposals for exploiting the state's massive coal
reserves for the benefit of its own residents and the nation.
For a long time geologists have known that Illinois
possesses the largest bituminous (soft) coal reserves
of any state, estimated at between 140 and 150 billion
tons. They argue over just how much energy these reserves
represent in terms of oil "equivalency." Some contend that
as much potential energy is locked in Illinois coal as is
contained in the oil reserves of the Middle East.
One of the most striking ironies of our technological
age is the fact that the bituminous coal of Illinois and
several neighboring states became unacceptable for use
shortly before the embargo and the accompanying quin-
tupling of crude oil prices. In the late 1960s scientists had
discovered possible health hazards from sulphur oxides.
Most of lllinois's vast coal reserves have a high sulphur
content. As early as 1969 environmentally conscious law-
makers in Congress and in the Illinois General Assembly
began to enact legislation which discouraged or in some
cases prohibited burning Illinois coal for generating
electricity or other purposes. For instance, power plants
in Chicago and even in cities of more moderate size were
ordered to discontinue their use of Illinois coal. As a
consequence, in the early 1970s many public utilities
and other industries which had depended upon Illinois
coal either made expensive conversions to oil and/or
natural gas burners or began transporting low-sulphur
coal from western states. Transportation costs in moving
this coal to Illinois and other Midwest states became a
burden on both public utilities and consumers. Of the
coal burned by electric utilities in Illinois, western coal's
share increased from 3.7 percent in 1970 to nearly 25
percent in 1974.'
New elements were introduced into this situation, in
Illinois and elsewhere, by the embargo, which led to
skyrocketing oil prices. The risk to national security in
relying on imported fuels became obvious. Adding to
the irony was the diminishing supply of natural gas,
praised by environmentalists as the "cleanest" fuel which
could be used.
All these factors, particularly the realization of the
country's growing dependence upon foreign oil, led
Congress and federal agencies to fund dramatic research
and development (R&D) programs in 1974 and 1975.
Critical in these efforts is the aim of developing tech-
nologies which will permit safe utilization of high-sulphur
coal such as that available in abundance in Illinois.
Suddenly experimental processes for coal gasification
and liquefaction, formerly known only to chemists and
' George Provenzano, "Coal Conversion In Illinois," Illinois Business
Review 32 (July 1975): 6-8.
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engineers, became familiar to government leaders and
politicians.
Illinois Coal Development Program
In January 1974 the second session of the Seventy-eighth
Illinois General Assembly convened and Governor Walker
delivered his second annual State of the State message.
The governor's sweeping proposals for energy legislation
included a plan to develop ways to use lllinois's vast
soft coal reserves. His eight-point energy program was
acclaimed by legislative leaders of both parties. Once the
legislators began studying the governor's proposals, how-
ever, the complexity of the energy area and the competing
forces at work precluded substantive agreement. Under-
standably, legislators argued among themselves and
with the governor over control of state energy programs,
particularly those elements dealing with coal development.
In June 1974, during the final hours of the session,
the General Assembly passed compromise legislation in
the form of four specific energy bills. On August 19
Governor Walker signed these bills into law. Central to
the package was Senate Bill 1659, authorizing the sale
of $70 million in state bonds to be used for coal develop-
ment projects. It called for BED to administer the bonding
authority. The same law also established the Illinois
Energy Advisory Council on Coal Development to advise
BED on the development of Illinois coal reserves. Chaired
by the governor, the council includes as members the
lieutenant governor and directors of state departments
and agencies relevant to coal development.
A second law, House Bill 2651, established the Illinois
Energy Resources Commission, composed of ten legis-
lators and eight public members. Before BED can fund
projects through its bonding authority, the commission
must give its approval. The commission is also charged
to develop an overall long-range plan for Illinois energy
and to investigate all phases of energy use and develop-
ment within the state.
Another measure, Senate Bill 1667, allows BED to
utilize the right of eminent domain in acquiring or using
land for coal development. This measure amends the
Act to Provide for the Exercise of the Right of Eminent
Domain, which dates from 1872. A final law, Senate Bill
1660, appropriated $10 million in "operational" funds to
BED from the $70 million coal development fund authorized
in Senate Bill 1659.
From the outset it was clear that the legislature's efforts
to provide checks and balances in the management of
Illinois would result in two major rival bodies. One —
the BED'S Division of Energy — would be the spokesman
for the executive branch of government. The other —
the Energy Resources Commission — would mainly
reflect the attitudes of those in the legislative branch.
The latter condition prevails because all appointments to
the commission — including the eight public members
— are made by the legislative leaders of both parties.
When considered together, the statutes appear to create
a system whereby only BED can propose funding for
coal development and only the commission can approve
such funding. The law does provide, however, that a
grant under the bonding authority which is recommended
by BED is made automatically if the commission fails
to approve or disapprove a proposal within forty-five
days after it is submitted.
Even before the measures became law, it had become
evident that massive new industrial consortia — powerful
energy corporations fortified with multimillion dollar federal
grants — would be seeking parcels of the available
$70 million. Given the emotional character of the emerging
energy politics, it was inevitable that the executive branch,
principally through BED, and the legislatively oriented
commission would be pitted against each other. Even in
the most congenial political setting, it is probable that
officials in the executive branch and representatives of
the General Assembly, irrespective of party, would have
vied for credit in bringing coal development projects
to Illinois.
But relationships have been far from congenial as the
BED'S Division of Energy and the commission have wrestled
with requests from energy consortia to tap the bond fund
for the development of coal conversion facilities in Illinois.
The Illinois Energy Advisory Council, also established
by the 1974 energy package, does not seem to have been
active. The council's purpose, as defined by statute, is
to advise BED and generally give counsel in state energy
affairs. Critics of the governor, chairman of the council,
contend that he has failed to convene the body regularly
because of an unwillingness to share the energy "spotlight"
with the lieutenant governor, vice-chairman of the council.
Like the governor, the latter is a Democrat, but the two
high state officials represent different factions of the party.
The governor's defenders maintain that heavy reliance on
the council would obstruct energy planning.
Inadvertently or by intent, the General Assembly appears
to have harnessed, by statute, three new energy units which
have similar mandates and objectives but which relate
to totally different constituencies. Despite the rivalries
among BED, the commission, and the council, Illinois
appears to be one of the more successful coal-producing
states seeking to create lucrative coal utilization industries
within their borders. The state's most important boost
came on November 17, 1975, when the federal Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA)
announced that an Illinois site was its choice for the
location of the nation's first major demonstration coal
conversion plant. The proposed $237 million facility
would convert sulphur-tainted coal into synthetic gas and
fuel oil. The plant would be constructed by Coalcon
Corporation of New York City on a 2,000-acre site just
east of New Athens, twenty-five miles southeast of East
St. Louis.
After ERDA announced its selection, Governor Walker
stated that the willingness of the state executive branch
to contribute $25 million in coal development bond funds
to the Coalcon project was the key to the choice of the
New Athens site. At this writing (December 1975), the
Illinois Energy Resources Commission is awaiting BED's
formal request — with technical supporting data — for
approval of the $25 million.
The commission has already committed funds to the
one formal proposal submitted by BED. On November 5,
1975, the commission approved BED's recommendation
that $10 million be awarded a consortium headed by the
General Electric Corporation to develop an experimental
coal-burning system. The R&D effort will utilize existing
facilities of the Illinois Power Company near East St.
Louis.
Strain on Federal System
The scope of the nation's broad energy dilemma is illus-
trated well by complexities attached to the state's plight
in wrestling with the coal development problem. When the
Illinois legislative energy package was enacted in the final
hours of the 1974 session, the state and the nation were
still in a state of shock following the Arab embargo.
Among the new complexities which this situation has
led to is competition among coal-producing states for the
initial coal conversion plants. Rivalry in obtaining these
facilities is understandable — their location may very
well determine where huge new technological industries
will be centered. Such rivalry could exert an almost un-
precedented strain on our federal system. At a time when
all agree that our national needs match those felt in a
full-scale war, intrastate and interstate conflicts could
affect the national interest adversely. It is hoped that these
tensions will lead to a healthy reality, not a bitterness
among the actors involved.
In Illinois, leaders in both the executive and legislative
branches of state government are likely to become more
realistic in their quest for the new industry. When the
package of energy bills was passed in 1974, leaders
felt that the state could rather easily strengthen the nation's
energy posture while financially benefitting itself and its
citizens through development of coal reserves. The months
have shown, however, that even though Illinois does boast
the largest reserves of bituminous coal in the nation,
it is not unique among the states. Other coal-producing
states are proclaiming their own uniqueness in coal
opportunities.
It is inevitable that unpredictable social and political
factors will be in play when sites for coal conversion
facilities are selected. This reality is only one facet of the
incredibly complex set of problems faced by Illinois and
other states in constructing state energy policies which
both protect the interests of their citizens and are consistent
with broader national interests.
Relevance of World Economics
There is a striking difference between the plight of states
now seeking R&D installations and of states which in the
1960s competed for scientific plums like nuclear acceler-
ators and space laboratories. Today, the state of the world
economy is hauntingly relevant. Shifts in international
oil pricing could upset the most carefully conceived state
plans dramatically. For perhaps the first time, state
governments must devise long-range technological poli-
cies which could be disrupted by sudden changes in
the behavior of international organizations over which
the states have no control. Most critical of these groups,
of course, is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), the price-fixing cartel whose success
in late 1973 stimulated the Western world's search for
alternative energy sources.
Since the emergence of OPEC as a major force in world
politics, rumors have persisted that the cartel was at the
point of disintegration. For a time the U.S. federal govern-
ment seemed to encourage such speculation. At present,
however, State Department officials and other governmental
spokesmen leave the impression that coexistence with
OPEC over many years is inevitable. Yet, states attempting
to create new coal conversion industries know that any
breakup of the cartel would result in a sharp decrease in
world oil prices. If this should happen, industry in the
U.S. and other Western countries — unless strongly
encouraged by governmental policies to do otherwise —
would rely once again on cheap oil and would ignore the
expensive oil substitutes derived from coal gasification
and liquification.
Such an eventuality — and the accompanying risks —
lurk in the minds of American investors who are studying
the wisdom of placing capital in coal conversion ventures.
It is recognition of the risks and the related issue of
national security which have led to the host of proposals
from Washington and other Western -capitals to help
meet uncertainties. Among the projects being planned
in this country, of course, are those based on the notion
that both the federal government and coal-producing
states should share the risk in these new ventures. The
possible scale of federal involvement in such efforts
is suggested by President Ford's proposal, made public
on September 22, 1975, for the creation of a new national
corporation — the Energy Independence Authority (EIA).
Under this plan, EIA would channel $100 billion into energy
projects over the next decade.
International economists are divided on such ambitious
plans for coal conversion facilities. Some feel there is no
alternative but to develop them. Others fear that an un-
expected decline in world oil prices could leave the
U.S. landscape strewn with white elephants in the form
of unfinished gasification and liquification plants.
It is too early to speculate on the success of President
Ford's efforts to convince Congress of the necessity of
the EIA or similar plans. It is not too early, however, for
states to begin preparing for the new federal-state relation-
ships, as well as intrastate tensions which are likely to
evolve.
Energy-Environment Debate in Illinois
In Illinois, tensions will be produced by long-standing
conflicts between "no-growth" environmentalists, on the
one hand, and coal developers and public utilities, on
the other. The latter believe the interests of the state and
the nation at large would be served by creating a new
coal conversion industry in Illinois. The movement toward
such a new industry has been mounted so quickly that
many environmentalists have been caught off guard.
When they begin to study in depth the total environmental
impacts of large conversion plants, they will probably
introduce new factors into the energy-environmental debate.
Among their concerns will be water, an abundant supply
of which is needed by any conversion plant, and possible
encroachment upon highly valued agricultural land. Inter-
action among social, economic, and political forces in
Illinois on the coal conversion issue will be a microcosm
of broader, deeply felt ideological conflicts which are
beginning to rage across the country
— indeed around
the world. Proponents of no-growth conservation ap-
proaches to our energy problems will probably oppose
those who favor technological solutions.
More than most states, Illinois is like a laboratory where
efforts to resolve energy-environmental conflicts may be
viewed by the entire country. In 1970 the General Assembly
won the attention of ecologists around the nation with
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a set of laws acclaimed as the most environmentally
advanced efforts in the country. When in 1974 the energy
measures described above were passed, many legislators
were beginning to feel that their earlier environmental
package was destructive to the state and national economic
health.
Concrete evidence of a change in legislative attitudes
came several months ago, when the General Assembly
approved a bill which environmentalists construe as re-
versing the Illinois direction set by the 1970 actions. In
the face of opposition from environmentalists, Governor
Walker signed Senate Bill 805, which requires "economic
impact statements" for environmental regulations estab-
lished by the Illinois Pollution Control Board Evidence
that the entire country will be watching Illinois comes
from a variety of technical and scientific journals which
have given the matter attention. An illustration of the level
of national interest is the following item from Chemical
Week:
Before promulgating any environmental regulation, the Illinois
Pollution Control Board must now prepare an economic impact
statement under an amendment to the state's Environmental
Protection Act, believed to be the first such provision in the
nation. Statement preparation is expected to cost the Pollution
Control Board over $500,000/year, 2
The dynamics of energy-environmental politics in Illinois
over the coming years are likely to challenge the ingenuity
of state executives and lawmakers as never before. It is
hoped that their responses not only will meet the state's
needs, but also will provide helpful models for other states
in struggles to find their own niches in both energy and
environmental management within the broader national
system.
Conclusion
The need for state leaders to strike out on their own in
understanding their states' distinct energy roles can hardly
be overstated. Although it is indeed true that society is
analogous to a fragile mobile composed of interrelated
energy components, each unit in the system has unique
characteristics. For example, Illinois — with its abundance
of coal and highly advanced nuclear reactors — will
require knowledge and expertise different from that needed
in states which seek to exploit offshore oil and gas reserves.
The geography of the country is such that natural clusterings
of states may encourage regional cooperation in attacking
some energy issues. But as long as states remain integral
parts of our federal system, day-to-day management of
energy problems will rest heavily upon individual states.
In the remaining years of this century there can be no
substitute for state-oriented leadership in managing
energy in Illinois and elsewhere.
2
"Illinois Requires Economic Impact Statement for Environmental
-
Regulations," Chemical Week 117 (October 18. 1975): 38 The estimate of
$500,000 cannot be verified.
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ILLINOIS AND THE UNITED STATES: SOME ECONOMIC PARALLELS
Robert N. Schoeplein
The Library of the
JUL l 3 1976
Illinois is situated both geographically and in production
at the crosscurrents of the national economy. Virtually all
U.S. industries have one or more firms with productive
facilities in Illinois, resulting in a diverse state economy.
To what extent, however, can Illinois be characterized as
a "microcosm" — a representation in miniature or on a
small scale — of the overall U.S. economy?
One must distinguish between the two concepts of a
"microcosm" state and a "representative" state. Among
the fifty states the economy of Illinois generates a dispro-
portionately large percentage of the gross national
product. Illinois ranks fifth among the states in popula-
tion, fifth in per capita income, fourth in manufacturing
value-added, and fourth in value of state agricultural
product Certainly Illinois is not representative among
the states, but is this state's economy representative of
the composite of the entire country? In this more global
sense, the relatively large size of the Illinois economy
may be necessary to generate the diverse output that
might be representative of the U.S. as a whole.
If several important facets of a state's economy do
parallel those of the aggregate U.S., this recognition
could produce several distinct benefits. The microcosm
state, or select elements of that state's economy, could
serve as either a bellwether or a control in observations
and social experiments leading to national policy.
Comparisons can be made at each of several levels
of generality, and one would anticipate that differences
between the economic composition of any specific
state and that of the entire U.S. would become more ap-
parent as the analysis grows more specific. Many key
overall parallels between the structure of 1 1 1 inois's
economy and that of the U.S. continue to hold, however,
as the basic sectors are subdivided and the more
specific elements are compared. The Illinois and the
U.S. economies are analyzed at a specific moment in
time; in essence we are studying the fine details of two
photographs. In the future, economic dynamics may dis-
tort or destroy the striking similarities between the Illinois
and the national economies, but for the moment re-
searchers may look to their specific needs and
curiosities in evaluating whether at present this state's
economy is a microcosm of the U.S. economy.
Robert N Schoeplein is associate professor of economics, Institute of
Government and Public Affairs, and Department of Economics. University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A more detailed version of, this report
is contained in "The Illinois Economy: A Microcosm of the United States 9 ",
by Professor Schoeplein with Hugh T. Connelly, also published by the
institute, and available without charge upon request
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
Population
Labor effort, capital, and natural resources are the three
general categories of inputs into the economic produc-
tion process. The population base of a state forms the
labor pool from which the civilian labor force emerges.
Distribution by age, sex, education, and other charac-
teristics of the population shapes the mode that is a
critical determinant of a state's economic structure.
In several important respects social characteristics
of Illinois residents are similar to those of the aggregate
U.S. One exception is the rate of immigration. Illinois
is somewhat below the national average in migration
— 71.6 percent of Illinois residents were born in the
state, compared to 68 percent of the entire U.S. popula-
tion residing in their states of birth. The range among
the fifty states is quite large: the "booming" states in
the southwest have only 25 percent natives in their
population, and most stable states count over 80 per-
cent natives.
The Illinois population includes 52.6 percent of
persons age twenty-five and over who have completed
four years of high school or more; the national figure
is 52.3 percent. The range among the fifty states is from
a low of 37.8 percent to a high of 67.3 percent for this
segment of the population. The median number of years
of schooling completed by white male and white female
adults in Illinois is the same as for the aggregate United
States. Black male and female adults have one more year of
schooling in Illinois than the average among the fifty states.
Illinois has become an urban state as the United States
has become an urban nation. Urban residents account
for 83.0 percent of the Illinois population; the national
distribution is 73.5 percent urban residents. Illinois has
4.5 percent rural farm residents, comparable with 5.2
percent for the U.S. The differences are accounted for
by rural nonfarm residents: Illinois has 12.5 percent rural
nonfarm population, while the U.S. has 21.3 percent.
The city of Chicago and the Chicago standard metro-
politan statistical area (SMSA) dominate statistics on
the Illinois economy. For example, although III inois's
black population of 12.8 percent is not significantly
different from the U.S. average of 11.1 percent, 98.4 per-
cent of lllinois's blacks are urban residents — as
opposed to the overall U.S. figure of 71.7 percent.
Although the Chicago SMSA tends to distort the nature
and distribution of the state's population, the area's
economic base is one of the major factors contributing
to the diversification necessary for Illinois to be repre-
sentative of the national economy.
The Labor Force
Illinois is close to the overall U.S. in labor force participa-
tion, for both sexes and in both urban and rural settings.
In Illinois 79.5 percent of urban males over age sixteen
are active in the civilian labor force; nationwide the
figure is 77.6 percent. Rural male labor force participa-
tion is also comparable — 74.7 percent for Illinois and
73.2 percent for the U.S. Similar parallels hold between
this state and the nation for females, although the varia-
tions among the other forty-nine states are significant.
Illinois tends to have statewide employment rates lower
than comparable rates for the entire U.S., with the ex-
ception of the latter part of 1975 and during January
1976, when the Illinois unemployment rate did exceed
that of the U.S. The diverse nature of the Chicago SMSA
industrial complex explains in some measure why the
state labor force is less susceptible to the shocks and
whims of select industrial goods markets than are the
labor forces in states with production concentrated in
a few industries.
The distribution of the labor force by major occupation
in Table 1 illustrates that the relative weights of workers
in most occupations approximate those of the aggregate
U.S. This is reinforced by the range in values among the
other states, reflecting economic specialization else-
where. The percentage of clerical workers is higher for
Illinois than for the nation as a whole. This can be traced
to the presence in the state of many national corporate
headquarters, insurance and financial centers, and
regional trade centers. The relatively fewer proportions
of both farm laborers and farm foremen are indicative of
the mode of farm organization in Illinois, where farming
is dominated by highly efficient family units coupled
with sharecropping.
The labor force can be identified more specifically by
industry employment. In Table 2 we have consolidated
the U.S. Department of Commerce's distribution of em-
ployed persons by twenty-nine industries to seventeen
such industries. Manufacturing is decidedly important
to the Illinois economy, even more so than for the U.S.
as a whole. Transportation is also important to Illinois.
The different employment weights are indicative of the
sophisticated statewide transportation network, which
also serves the national economy. Household services
are not as integral to the Illinois economy as to the
economies of those other states where custom, con-
centrations of impoverished workers, and minimal em-
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ployment opportunities work together to maintain
relatively larger numbers of servants and other house-
hold workers. On the whole, the distribution of the
Illinois labor force among major occupations parallels
that of the U.S.
Gross Product Accounts
Businesses in the private sector utilize inputs to generate
the economic goods and services that are their produc-
tive outputs. Although by specification the dollar value
of outputs in any year is equal to the dollar value of
inputs, the units of physical measurement are signifi-
cantly different. The skills and effort of labor plus capital
investment are inputs; output is the total of myriad,
diverse products and services. A skilled welder can
work on ships' plates, grain elevators, or tractor frames.
Although essential cross sections of the Illinois labor
force may approximate those of the aggregate U.S., it
does not necessarily follow that the general character-
istics of output should also be parallel. The mix of final
products could be significantly different.
The basic measure of output at the national level is
gross national product (GNP). The analogous measure
for a state's economy is gross state product (GSP). Re-
cent estimates of lllinois's GSP facilitate comparisons
with the overall national economy, although comparable
information is not available for many other states.
The mix of goods and services produced in an
economy can be classified in a variety of ways. One
familiar method is to group output according to (1) goods
and services produced for domestic consumption, (2)
investment goods and services produced by the private
sector, (3) government purchases of goods and services,
and (4) the impact of the foreign trade sector on the
economy. Since goods flow in two directions between
economies, the term "net exports" frequently is used to
mean the value of exports minus the value of imports.
The exports of any state are relatively more important
to that state's economy than is the export sector of the
U.S. economy as a whole. The United States is a vast
"common market" made up of fifty diverse states.
Although the term "export" may sound awkward in
reference to shipments made across Illinois borders to
other states, nonetheless the goods do leave the Illinois
economy. In 1967 Illinois shipped 78.7 percent of its
estimated physical product to other states and to foreign
countries. In turn, many physical components of these
products had previously been manufactured in other
states, and some of these exported Illinois products
eventually find their way back into the state in other,
refined forms. When the component parts, materials,
and finished goods shipped into Illinois from else-
where in 1967 are subtracted from the value of gross
exports in that year, the state registered a net positive
balance in external trade that represented 26.9 percent
of estimated total GSP. By contrast, the aggregate gross
exports overseas by the U.S. accounted for only 5.8 per-
cent of national product in 1967. and in that year the net
balance of trade between the U.S. and the rest of the
world was only 0.6 percent of GNP.
The bulk of Illinois trade is with other states, but
Illinois is also a relatively significant exporter to the
rest of the world. Food products, nonmineral oils, and
machinery such as farm implements and construction
equipment are significant elements of total U.S. exports,
and Illinois excels in each of these areas. Illinois ranks
Table 4
THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR: VALUE-ADDED BY
INDUSTRY GROUP, 1972 (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Illinois U.S.
Table 2
PERCENTAGE LABOR FORCE DISTRIBUTION
BY OCCUPATION, 1970
Employed Persons
Age 16 and Over
Professional, technical, and kindred workers
Administrators and managers, except farm
Sales workers
Clerical and kindred workers
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers
Operatives, except transportation
Transportation equipment operatives
Laborers, except farm
Farm laborers and foremen
Service workers, except private household
Private household workers
Farmers and farm managers
first or second among the fifty states (depending on
annual variations in commodity prices) in the value of
products shipped overseas. In the importance of trade,
then, Illinois is not a microcosm of the United States.
Rather, Illinois stands out as a key commerce state.
A second method for the study of output is to value produc-
tion by major sector regardless of domestic, interstate,
or foreign destination. Table 3 illustrates the percent-
age composition of gross product by sector for Illinois
and the U.S. for two selected years. Similar weights
are apparent for most sectors. Agriculture is the most
volatile element in III i nois's total product, reflecting
the state's specialization in corn, soybeans, and hog
raising. Over the past decade, the transportation, com-
munications, and utilities sector has assumed relatively
more importance at the national level than in Illinois.
Manufacturing continues to be the dominant sector in
the economy, accounting for almost one-third of total
gross product for both Illinois and the U.S. An analysis
of the industries in the manufacturing sector therefore
is imperative to a comparison between the economies of
the state and the nation.
The Manufacturing Sector
Recent information allows us to compare value-added
— the market value of output minus the cost of materials,
component parts, and supplies purchased from others —
in seventeen manufacturing industries plus a miscel-
laneous category (see Table 4). This is an important
comparison in evaluating whether the Illinois economy
is a microcosm of the nation's economy, because in so
many states manufacturing is specialized in regard to
the location of raw material, unique transport facilities,
or complementary industries We leave the final judg-
ment to the reader, but the relative contributions by
thirteen of the eighteen industrial categories as illus-
trated in Table 4 would seem comparable between
Illinois and the entire U.S.
Five manufacturing industries do deviate significantly
in their relative contributions to state and national manu-
facturing. Historically four of these industries have been
less important to total Illinois manufacturing than to the
overall U.S. economy: lumber and wood products; trans-
portation equipment; textile mill products; and apparel
and other textile products. The smaller relative contribu-
tions by these industries are offset by the greater im-
portance of machinery, except electrical, to the Illinois
economy. Each of these five manufacturing industries
has components, and the details provide some informa-
tion about these "deviant" industries
The few forests in Illinois are concentrated in the
extreme southern part of the state; they do not generate
logging activity that is representative of this industry
nationwide. Illinois also produces proportionately less
than does the U.S. as a whole in three principal components
of transportation equipment: motor vehicles and equip-
ment, aircraft and parts, and ship and boat building
These transportation equipment elements tend to be
highly concentrated in other select states that account
for overall national production. Illinois also is not a textile
state. There is some representation of textiles in Illinois,
but this industry and apparel manufacture tend to be con-
centrated on the east coast.
Table 1
PERCENTAGE INDUSTRIAL DISTRIBUTION OF
EMPLOYED PERSONS, 1970
Persons Age 16 and Over
r<
FViGPd INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENTAND PUBLIC AFFAIRSUNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
1201 WEST NEVADA STREET / URBANA, ILLINOIS 61801
I
c^er N*\M v^^
WGPA ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT RESEARCHUNIVERSITY OF ILLINOISINSTITUTE C^t^RNMENT AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
AS GOES ILLINOIS . . . THE STATE AS A POLITICAL MICROCOSM OF THE NATION
James Przybylski
AUGUST 1976 43
The old saying has it that in presidential elections "as
goes Maine, so goes the nation." While this statement may
have once been valid, over the last forty years the bell-
wether nature of the state of Maine has been open to serious
challenge. In fact, in the last ten presidential elections
Maine has cast its electoral vote for the losing candidate
six times. The question of which state most closely follows
national patterns in presidential elections is an interesting
one, however, especially in this presidential year. If one
could find a state in which national presidential returns
were closely mirrored over a period of years — and if one
had some idea why this state-national parallelism existed —
that state's returns would provide not only a clue to the
national outcome, but also some reasons for it.
One of the likeliest candidates for the "microcosm"
state in presidential elections is the state of Illinois. In the
twentieth century, Illinois has cast its electoral votes for
the winning candidate in every presidential election except
1916, when the Republican, Charles Evans Hughes, won
the state's electoral votes over the Democrat, Woodrow
Wilson. Illinois's popular vote percentages have also
closely paralleled those at the national level during the
twentieth century. In fact, since 1928 percentages won by
the various presidential candidates in the state have never
been more than five percentage points from the corre-
sponding national figures; in some elections, the two
figures have been almost identical (see Figure 1 and
Table 1). 1
Even during the first quarter of the twentieth century,
when popular vote figures in Illinois were somewhat biased
toward Republican presidential candidates, the presi-
dential figures never differed by as much as 8 percentage
points from the national figures. The average difference
for this period was 5.6 percent. Indeed, looking back into
the nineteenth century, Illinois's popular presidential
election returns have closely paralleled national figures
since the emotion-laden election of 1860, just before the
James Przybylski is assistant professor of political science, Northeast
Missouri State University
' The data for Table 1 and Figure 1 are drawn from Congressional Quarterly's
Guide to U S Elections (Washington, D C Congressional Quarterly, 1975),
pp 265-99 The Illinois county figures in Table 2 are drawn from four sources:
Samuel K Gove. Illinois Votes. 1900-1958 (Urbana: Institute of Government
and Public Affairs. University of Illinois, 1960), Illinois Secretary of State,
Oflicial Vote for the years 1960-72, Walter Dean Burnham. Presidential
Ballots. 1836-1892 (Baltimore Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), and Edgar
Robinson, The Presidential Vote. 1896-1932 (New York Octagon Books,
1970)
Civil War. The mean Democratic percentage for Illinois
for the entire period from 1870 to 1972 differs from the
national mean by only 2.1 percentage points.
The means for presidential elections for the periods
1876-92, 1900-24, and 1940-60, appearing in Table 1,
will give the reader an impression of relative partisan
strength during these time spans. Most political scholars
view these three periods as eras of partisan stability in
American history. The other time periods are eras of
partisan instability. The period from 1860-72 involved the
Civil War and Reconstruction. The 1896 election and the
1928-36 elections took place in times of partisan realign-
ment, the former bringing the Republicans to national
dominance and the latter making the Democrats the
national power. Finally, the post-1 960 era has been a period
of partisan instability, not clearly explained as yet
Given that presidential election results in the state have
so closely resembled those at the national level for so
long, it certainly appears that Illinois is a political micro-
cosm of the nation — if only in this very limited sense. One
must then ask the more fundamental question of why this
is the case. Could it be that the underlying social and
economic base of Illinois is an almost perfect miniature
of the nation which leads it naturally to mirror the nation
in presidential voting?
Such a view gains support from a recent study which
concludes that, in recent years at least, the Illinois economy
has been almost a duplicate of the national economy. 2
But the inquiry must be broadened. To proceed along these
lines, one must show not only that Illinois's economy has
duplicated that of the United States since at least the turn
of the century (which apparently it has), but also that the
state has mirrored the nation on such politically relevant
social characteristics as religion, country of ancestry,
and class status over this same period. As it turns out.
this is only partially true. Rather, as will be shown, Illinois
has achieved its status as a bellwether state not by exactly
mirroring the underlying social and economic base of
the nation, but by achieving the proper balance of these
characteristics — and of other structural characteristics
such as electoral laws and party organizational strength —
that have allowed the state to reflect national patterns
during different historical epochs.
Illinois is, of course, one of the largest states in the
2 See Robert N Schoeplein with Hugh T. Connelly, The Illinois Economy:
A Microcosm of the United States? (Urbana: Institute of Government and
Public Affairs. University of Illinois. 1975). and Robert N Schoeplein,
"Illinois and the United States Some Economic Parallels," Illinois Govern-
ment Research no 42 (March 1976).
Table 1
DEMOCRATIC PERCENTAGE OF THE TWO-PARTY VOTE
FOR PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES AND ILLINOIS.
1 860-1 972 a
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NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SETTLEMENT (1880)
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Terre Haute
Northern Settlement
Southern Settlement
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Definitions from Richard Jensen, The Winning of the Midwest (Chi-
cago University of Chicago Press, 1971), and V O Key, Jr., American
State Politics (New York: Knopf, 1956).
appeal cut across sectional and ethnoreligious lines.
Roosevelt would have been expected to have an especially
strong impact on a state such as Illinois, with its highly
urbanized working-class population compared to the
nation as a whole, and, as Table 1 indicates, the Democrats
did increase their strength greatly in the state during and
after the 1930s
A closer look at the Illinois data indicates the nature of
Roosevelt's appeal. In 1928, Smith carried only one of the
urban counties (St. Clair), while in 1936 Roosevelt suc-
ceeded in carrying them all In fact, despite the increased
statewide Democratic vote between 1932 and 1936, only
19 of III inois's 102 counties showed an increase in the
percentage of Democratic votes between those two years.
Virtually all the counties that gained Democratic votes
between 1932 and 1936 were in or adjacent to the most
urbanized counties in the state. The only exceptions to
this urban movement to the Democrats were St. Clair
County (East St. Louis), which remained virtually stationary
after becoming the most Democratic county in the state,
and Sangamon County, home of the Illinois state capital,
with a relatively small industrial base. (The 1929 Census
of Manufactures shows Sangamon County as the least
industrialized among the urbanized counties in Illinois )
Franklin Roosevelt did have some followers in rural
areas where organized labor was strong. An indication of
this is seen in the voting figures from Franklin County,
where the United Mine Workers has been an important
force. This county showed a Democratic increase after
the 1930s; since then it has been one of the most con-
sistently Democratic counties of the state (see Table 2).
It appears, then, that after the 1 930s social class became
the dominant theme of American politics. One would
expect the working-class-based Democratic Party to be
favored over the more middle-class-based Republican
Party in lllinois's highly urban and industrialized setting.
This has not been the case. The Democrats did gain in
Illinois as a result of the New Deal, but the Republicans
have continued to hold a slight advantage in presidential
politics in Illinois as compared to the nation — at least
until the very recent past. Other forces besides the
basic working class-middle class cleavage have ob-
viously been at work
Other Factors
The older sectional and ethnoreligious factors certainly
still have an effect on lllinois's presidential politics. Rural
northern Illinois has continued to be a Republican bastion,
while the Democrats have seen their already tenuous foot-
hold in southern Illinois gradually slip away as they have
directed their appeals at urban working populations whose
religious, ethnic, and racial composition is quite different
from the old-stock white Protestant populations of southern
Illinois. Most of lllinois's black population is concentrated
in the Chicago and East St. Louis areas, and this tends to
increase the social distinctiveness of these urban Demo-
cratic strongholds from the rest of the state. This helps
to explain the continuing Republican strength in downstate
urban as well as rural areas.
Some other socioeconomic factors have probably also
had some effect on the nature of Illinois presidential politics.
The state's population has had a somewhat higher median
age level than does the nation as a whole. Since older
populations have tended to favor the Republicans, this
may have helped the party in the state. The most recent
census, however, shows age distribution in Illinois to be
virtually identical with that in the nation, lllinois's black
population is also now at virtually the same percentage
as the national figures, reducing the earlier Republican
advantage. On the other hand, the median family income
in Illinois has remained higher than that of the nation —
a factor that might favor the Republican Party, since tradi-
tionally more prosperous populations have tended to
support it.
To understand Illinois presidential politics, however,
one must go beyond the socioeconomic makeup of the
state. As pointed out earlier, for example, Pennsylvania's
Republican strength in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries must be at least partially attributed to
the organizational abilities of its Republican leaders.
The disfranchisement of blacks in the South in the late
nineteenth century was certainly a factor in the weakening
of the Republican Party in that region, overriding underlying
socioeconomic forces. Such structural factors certainly
do influence the political makeup of a state; the question
is one of their relative importance in affecting political
events. Whatever their degree of importance, there can
be little doubt that the structures a state sets up for
organizing and expressing the vote can have a profound
effect on that vote.
In the case of Illinois, both major presidential parties
have maintained strong organizations throughout the
twentieth century; signs of weakness have appeared only
immigrant status were very important in determining elec-
toral outcomes; this was particularly true in the election of
1896. The factors that influenced the outcome of this
election continued to affect American politics until the late
1920s, and thus it is clear that religion and immigrant status
were quite important during the first thirty years of the
twentieth century Even since then, giv.en the stability of
partisan attachments in many areas, one could expect these
factors to continue to affect the political system.
Outside the South prior to 1896, old-stock American
and some older immigrant groups who were members of
pietistic Protestant faiths (such as Methodist, Baptist,
and Congregationalist) tended to line up with the Repub-
lican Party against the Catholics and nonpietistic Prot-
estants (such as German Lutherans). Generally of immigrant
stock, Catholics and nonpietistic Protestants tended to side
with the Democrats. These latter groups resided primarily in
the urban centers of the North, although there were some
rural pockets of German Catholic and German Lutheran
strength in parts of the Midwest. The effect of the rural,
nativist appeal of Democrat William Jennings Bryan, a
pietistic Protestant, in the 1896 presidential campaign was
to alienate a large share of the urban, newer immigrant
populations from the Democratic Party. Bryan's campaign
had little effect on the Republican leanings of the northern
pietistic Protestants. Ironically, his great appeal in the South
left the country more sectionally divided in terms of voting
patterns after 1 896 than it had been before. The Democratic
Party took on a distinctly southern orientation, which lasted
into the late 1920s, while the Republican Party was strength-
ened in the industrialized North and, therefore, in the nation
as a whole.
During the twentieth century Illinois has contained rela-
tively higher proportions of urban, Catholic, and foreign-
stock populations than has the United States at large.
Since these groups were those most alienated by the nature
of the Democratic Party after 1896, one might expect
that Illinois would be somewhat more Republican relative
to the rest of the country between 1896 and 1928 (when the
Democrats nominated a Catholic of immigrant stock,
Alfred E. Smith) than it was before the turn of the century.
As shown in Table 1, Illinois did become more Republican
after the turn of the twentieth century than it had been before;
it also became somewhat more Republican relative to the
country as a whole during the first quarter of the century.
Further, a closer look at the data lends some support to
the notion that the drop in Democratic voting was partic-
ularly severe in areas of Catholic immigrant-stock con-
centration such as rural Clinton County and urban Cook,
Rock Island, and Peoria counties. (Compare the 1876-92
mean Democratic vote with the 1900-24 mean in Table 2 )
It would appear, then, that in Illinois the desertion of the
Democratic Party by peoples of Catholic and immigrant-
stock background added to the party's woes in the early
twentieth century.
In 1928 the Democrats made a strong effort to bring
these Catholic, foreign-stock populations back into the
party by running one of their coreligionists, Alfred E.
Smith of New York, for president. A large majority of these
populations were located among the urban working class.
Some have argued that the New Deal coalition of Franklin
D. Roosevelt had its roots in the 1928 presidential election.
Recently, others have argued that the 1928 election should
probably be viewed as a phenomenon separate from the
New Deal realignment.
The Illinois data lend some support to this more recent
argument. In urban Macon County, with its predominantly
Protestant, old-stock working population, Democratic
percentages fell significantly from those generally achieved
in the first quarter of the twentieth century, while in rural
Clinton County, with a heavily Catholic population, there
was a significant jump in Democratic votes in presidential
elections (see Table 2). Thus it appears that rather than
becoming the beneficiary of a massive working-class move-
ment, in 1928 the Democratic party gained Catholic,
foreign-stock votes, while losing Protestant working-class
votes.
The New Deal and Class Voting
With the coming of the Great Depression in 1929 and the
emergence of Roosevelt's New Deal between 1932 and
1936, the older sectional and ethnoreligious cleavages
took a back seat to the new working class-middle class
cleavage that has since come to characterize American
politics. However, the older patterns did not die. One can
still see the Republican-Democratic split among rural
northern and southern populations, and Catholics and
persons of more recent foreign ancestry still show a
Democratic bias compared to more Protestant, old-stock
Americans. Since the 1930s, however, the issue of class
seems to have become more salient than the older issues.
Roosevelt's appeal after 1932 was directed primarily
at working-class populations that tended to be concen-
trated in large urban areas. Of course, his supporters
included a large part of the Catholic and foreign-stock
populations that had been drawn to Smith, but his broad
Figure 1
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Virginia. Sentiment for the Confederacy was much less
prevalent in these states than in the states of the Deep
South; each of them contained areas of traditional Re-
publican strength. Given this background, it is not sur-
prising that during the first quarter of the twentieth century,
when Civil War political divisions were still very much a
part of American politics, southern Illinois was politically
competitive in presidential elections, while northern Illinois
remained a Republican stronghold.
Regional patterns of the presidential vote during the
height of the New Deal period, from 1940 to 1960, illustrate
the continuing political division between northern and
southern Illinois. This division continued in a more subdued
form until 1972, at least in rural areas. In 1964 the most
strongly Democratic counties, with the notable exceptions
of urban Cook (Chicago) and Rock Island (Rock Island-
Moline) counties, were generally found in southern Illinois,
while nearly all the Republican counties were found in the
northern part of the state. In 1968 the southern candidate,
George Wallace, drew over 10 percent of the vote in twenty-
seven Illinois counties. All but one of these counties
were areas of original southern settlement.
In 1972, the regional cast of voting in Illinois (as in the
nation) was largely washed away with the overwhelming
defeat of the Democrat, George McGovern, in Richard
Nixon's landslide. Although most of the twenty-six counties
in which McGovern received at least 40 percent of the
vote were found in southern Illinois (he carried only
Jackson County), the counties he lost by the smallest
margins were generally either urban in character or were
coal-mining areas of some union strength, such as Franklin
County in southern Illinois.
While much of northern Illinois has been a Republican
bastion during the twentieth century, southern Illinois has
not been the Democratic bastion that the American South
has been. This fact serves to explain why the state as a
whole had a Republican bias prior to the New Deal It
also explains why rural portions of the state have retained
this bias.
Ethnoreligious Factors
Other socioeconomic factors besides region are also im-
portant in determining voting behavior. As has been docu-
mented, in the late nineteenth century religion and
quite recently. Such organizational strength is found in
the low degree of split-ticket voting that has characterized
the state's elections. Organizational strength is also evident
in the state's closed primary system, which made it
extremely difficult to cross party lines until 1972. The
state's strong .party organizations are also evident in the
use of the party column ballot, which facilitates straight-
ticket voting and helps keep partisans in line. These
structures both reflect strong major party organizations
and encourage their continuation. The relatively high
turnout in Illinois elections compared to the nation also
indicates the ability of the party organizations to turn out
their followers.
A closer look at the party organizations in Illinois is
instructive. The Democratic organization has been very
powerful in Chicago and East St. Louis, but quite weak
downstate. On the other hand, Republicans, while lacking
the centralized party structure that has characterized the
Democratic organization, have maintained stronger party
organization than the Democrats downstate and have had
a strong organization in the suburban areas of Cook County
as well. Here is another reason why the Democrats have
been weaker in Illinois presidential voting than one might
expect from socioeconomic data. They have not maintained
a downstate organization strong enough to pull sufficient
numbers of potential Democratic voters to the polls —
perhaps a factor in the inability of the Democrats to maintain
their majorities in downstate urban areas after 1936
Another structural factor probably helped the Repub-
licans maintain their relative strength until at least the mid-
1960s. That was the failure of the state legislature to re-
apportion legislative and congressional seats on the basis
of population, resulting in more legislative and congressional
strength for Republican-leaning rural areas of the state
than their populations would otherwise allow them. In
terms of presidential politics, there were relatively more
Republican than Democratic officeholders to mobilize the
party faithful on election day. Of course, the Supreme Court
decisions of the 1960s requiring population-based appor-
tionment have changed this situation.
In the early 1970s, some weakening of both parties'
organizations has been evident, in Illinois as in the nation.
In 1972 Republican candidates for president and U.S.
senator carried the state by lopsided margins, while
Democrats captured the governor's chair and the secretary
of state's office. In Cook County, a Republican wrested
control of the state's attorney's office from the Democrats.
In the 1976 Democratic presidential primary, Jimmy Carter
won despite the party organization's efforts to elect an
uncommitted slate, and a black Democratic antiorgani-
zation candidate won renomination to Congress from
Chicago.
Nevertheless, the party organizations in Illinois still
appear to be quite powerful. Split-ticket voting appears
to occur less frequently in Illinois than in many other
states, and turnout still appears to be somewhat above the
national average. The state Democratic organization
showed a good deal of muscle in the 1976 primary, when
it succeeded in deposing the antiorganization incumbent
Democratic governor. Given this high degree of organi-
zational strength, it appears unwise for either a Democratic
or a Republican presidential candidate to take the state
for granted.
The addition of the eighteen-year-old vote is a recent
structural change that could also influence Illinois
politics. Because age distribution in the state is very
much like that in the nation, state and national voting
returns should be affected in about the same way by this
factor. Certainly the bonanza which the McGovern forces
expected in 1972 by the addition of this group did not ma-
terialize, but there do appear to be localized effects in
areas where the eighteen-year-old vote has been mobilized
effectively. For example, three of McGovern's strongest
counties in Illinois were areas with large college student
populations. He succeeded in carrying Jackson County
(Southern Illinois University) and drew better than would
have been expected in normally Republican Champaign
County (University of Illinois) and DeKalb County (Northern
Illinois University).
Conclusion
It appears that while lllinois's socioeconomic base gives
the Democrats an edge in presidential voting, generally
the Republicans have been able to more effectively
mobilize their potential following in the state. This has
made Illinois quite competitive in presidential elections,
and it has closely mirrored the presidential voting patterns
of the nation. Where changes presently occurring in state
and national politics will lead is open to speculation.
Some say that the parties are decomposing as viable
political organizations. Others feel that a somewhat changed
New Deal cleavage will again emerge. Still others foresee
a period of instability until the parties find new cleavages
that are relevant to the present political period. All these
changes will lead to a different kind of presidential politics.
With these changes, lllinois's presidential voting patterns
may diverge from those of the nation. For now, the state
remains a national electoral microcosm
(
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As they become increasingly apparent, ditferences among
local governments in levels of expenditure are beginning to
be a prominent policy concern. To the extent that expendi-
ture levels reflect policy commitments and/or service levels,
variations among them also reflect unequal levels of
policy benefits. To local officials interested in raising
levels of service in their communities, the existence of
these differences often serves as an arguing point in
efforts to obtain more state aid and to persuade the state
to take action to reduce differences in levels of expendi-
tures among localities. Many state officials are beginning
to adopt the view that state government should ensure
some minimally acceptable level of government services
in each of its localities. However, the issue of equalization
remains controversial. In addition to the conflict which
usually revolves around questions of equity and unequal
distribution of state funds, this issue also involves the
right of local officials to autonomously formulate and im-
plement policy independent of state action.
In light of the implications of these expenditure differ-
ences, this study examines the extent of diversity in ex-
penditures for various policy areas for all Illinois counties
and for Illinois municipalities above 10,000 in population
for the period 1957-72. The extent of diversity of expendi-
tures for a set of municipalities above 25,000 popula-
tion is then examined for the period 1942-72. The focus
throughout is upon whether there has been any change
in the extent of inequality over the respective time peri-
ods. A limited examination of why some policy areas
evince more diversity than others is also undertaken.
The Issue
The issue of inequality in expenditure levels has been a
subject of continual debate in state and local politics,
particularly in such areas as education and public wel-
fare. Those who argue for the maintenance of inequality
usually defend the right of different communities to estab-
lish different benefit levels. These differences may be in
response to unique needs of a community, or may re-
flect some communities' desires to devote more resources
to one area — education for example — than to other
areas. Proponents of equalization, on the other hand,
argue that differences in service levels not only tie resi-
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dents to their neighbors' policy preferences, but also
perpetuate inequality of opportunity in society. In the
case of the poor, differences in service or benefit levels
which stem from the average wealth of the community are
even more restrictive, because poorer individuals lack
the resources to move to communities with higher service
levels. For example, in regard to police services there
has been a significant difference in per capita expendi-
tures between cities like East St. Louis and Highland
Park, and this difference has persisted over time. In 1 957 the
per capita expenditures in this area by East St. Louis and
Highland Park, respectively, were $6.78 and $9.97. In 1972
the respective per capita expenditures were $22.57 and
$29.04. These differences become even more striking
when the expenditure levels are compared to crime rates.
In 1972 the number of serious crimes per 100,000 people
in East St. Louis was 9,401, while that in Highland Park
was only 2,089. This illustrates that very often differences
in levels of service are due not to variations in local needs
or conditions, but to variations in local wealth. It is differ-
ences like these which are at the base of the equity debate.
This debate has led to increasing awareness of the dif-
ferences in expenditure levels among cities. The equity
debate has also prompted some action by the federal
government in such areas as welfare payments to the
states, and by state governments in such areas as
education aid to localities. The attempt has been to equal-
ize expenditure and service levels of local governments.
The federal government and the states have also sought
to encourage common minimum standards for the per-
formance of such local services as sanitation and sew-
erage.
At the local level, the equity debate has been accom-
panied by some poorer governments seeking additional
funds to improve their service levels relative to other lo-
calities. In Illinois this general issue of equalization has
been most prominent in the area of education, where
many attempts have been made to distribute state funds
in a way which will result in equalization of expenditure
levels. In general, the efforts of the federal government
and the states in the area of equalization have usually
been more indirect, involving the encouragement and
occasionally the mandating of common minimum service
levels for local governments.
The concern in this analysis, however, is not a compre-
hensive or historical review of what efforts toward equal-
ization have been made by various levels of government.
Rather, what is examined is whether the sum total of ac-
Table 1
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION IN PER CAPITA
EXPENDITURE LEVELS, ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES
AND COUNTIES, 1957-72
Category of
Table 2
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF PER CAPITA
EXPENDITURES, ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES
OVER 25,000 POPULATION, 1942-72
Category of
covered here, there have been state-mandated minimum
salary ranges for both police and fire personnel. These
standards have probably led to a great deal of similarity
in expenditure levels in these two areas.
The second possibility is that even though a policy may
be largely locally administered and locally delivered,
standard guidelines or norms for the policy area are en-
couraged at the state level. This also acts to produce
great similarity among cities in their policies and subse-
quent expenditure patterns This explanation seems to
account for the pattern of police and fire services, for
there have been strong efforts to produce common norms
in these services across the state. In contrast, health and
library service levels are more matters of local discretion.
Given variations in tax bases and in population needs and
desires, there is likely to be more diversity in expenditure
levels in these areas. Together, these two explanations
seem to account for the relative lack of diversity among
cities' expenditures for police and fire services.
Conclusions and Possible Remedies
While there has been considerable discussion about the
homogenization or standardization of policy in American
society, and many have wished to reduce inequalities of
policy benefits among different governments, the evi-
dence examined for Illinois does not indicate a trend to-
ward such equality — at least not on the basis of the
indicator used here. The coefficient of variation as an
indicator of per capita expenditure levels is particularly
important because it deals with the average levels of
benefits available for distribution by officials in each local
government. The evidence suggests that the hope for
greater equality cannot rely on any ongoing tendencies
within the state.
What, then, are policies which might serve as remedies
for the inequality among localities which now exists?
There are essentially four remedies for this situation, and
they are worthy of a brief review. The first two are to equalize
either the service-cost conditions or the tax bases of local
governments. One of these options would entail pursuing
policies resulting in an equivalent quality of life in each
community, with the greatest assistance provided to the
neediest areas. The second would involve producing equiv-
alent tax bases in each locality by controlling the location
of industries and businesses. Both of these are impractical,
and would require more coercion than would probably be
accepted in this society.
The third option would be to give localities more auton- C
omy to extract additional revenue from their existing re-
source bases. This possibility is usually associated with
home rule. In Illinois, with one of the strongest provisions
of any state, a major goal of home rule is to reduce state
control over local taxation practices. Even though a de-
gree of independence of tax activity is possible for Illinois
home rule units, such independence is an inequitable and
unlikely method for correcting disparities in tax revenues
among local governments. It would be inequitable be-
cause those localities with the greatest service or expen-
diture needs are usually those with the poorest tax bases.
Although poorer localities would be free to set very high tax
rates or seek new taxes, their tax bases would remain un-
affected. In addition, if such high tax rates were achieved,
much of the existing tax bases of these localities would
probably flee, producing even greater disparities
The final option is that of attempting to reduce dispari-
ties in expenditure by relying on state-level taxation and
policies to distribute state aid. This is the intent of the
Illinois school aid equalization program. This method
seems the most likely means to reduce inequalities in
total expenditure levels. The state has the ability to levy
taxes which are not as easily avoided as are local levies,
and to tap sources which are unequally distributed across
municipalities. But such a policy cannot provide for total
equity in specific expenditures unless the state regulates
all of the functional activities of its subunits, and insists
that rich areas place a ceiling on their spending rates.
Given present conditions, the state aid mechanism can
at least benefit the neediest localities and support those
^=-
activities which are vital to local well-being. This method \
seems the most likely means to reduce inequalities in ex-
penditure levels. The state has the ability to levy taxes
which are not as easily avoided as are local levies. Also
provided by this method is a central point from which to
pursue a coordinated process of equalizing revenues and
matching these revenues to cost and service conditions.
It appears that, given present conditions, it is the latter
means which would have to be used to remedy disparities
in expenditure levels among localities.
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CASE LOAD PRESSURE AND FELONY TRIAL COURTS: COOK COUNTY
Peter F. Nardulli and Kathleen Proch
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The effects of heavy case loads upon the operations of
criminal courts in Illinois, as well as in almost every other
state in the nation, have been the subject of much concern
for over fifty years. Indeed, much of the existing empirically
oriented,research on criminal courts attempts to outline
the effects of case load pressure upon various aspects
of court operations'. Criminal court practitioners (judges,
prosecutors, public defenders, and other courtroom per-
sonnel) are usually portrayed as overworked officials
adapting to adverse conditions and doing the best they
can to administer criminal justice fairly and efficiently.
As pervasive as the notion of case load pressure has been,
however, the effects of variations in this pressure on the
operations of criminal courts have not been examined
rigorously and systematically Coupled with this situation
are recent challenges to traditional views on criminal courts.
Many contemporary criminal justice researchers question
the relationship between case load pressure and criminal
court malfunctioning, as well as the utility of resolving
criminal court problems by simply increasing court man-
power. In their view, case loads provide a convenient
explanation — a "nonreactive cause" — for. what takes
place in criminal courts. That is, unlike judges or prose-
cutors, case loads cannot respond to accusations.
Here, elements of this controversy are addressed. First,
a brief overview of the historical development of the case
load controversy is given, with particular emphasis upon
Illinois and Cook County. Then, the results of a limited
empirical examination of the effect of variations in case
load pressure upon the operations of Cook County felony
trial courts are reported. These results show that variations
in case loads have no impact upon some of the most im-
portant aspects of trial court operations. An explanation
for these findings is presented which focuses upon several
unique institutional features of criminal courts. Some em-
pirical evidence is also offered for this view of trial
courts. Finally, implications of these analyses for court
reform are considered.
Historical Perspective
The first serious examination of criminal courts in Illinois
was the Illinois Crime Survey, first published in 1929 by
the Illinois Association for Criminal Justice. The major
focus of the case load problem as discussed in this work
was on Cook County courts. In the county system at that
time, trial court cases often took over three months to
complete; only 19 7 percent of all defendants initially
charged with felonies were convicted. Over 81 percent
of these convictions were the result of guilty pleas. Of
Peter F Nardulli. Ph D . J D , is assistant professor, Institute of Government
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those convicted, 21 percent were given probation, while
another 25 percent were given sentences of less than one
year in confinement. To the crime survey researchers, these
figures indicated gross inefficiency and massive malfunc-
tioning in the criminal court system — due, at least in part,
to the volume of cases it processed. In 1928, trial court
judges handled an average case load of 750. The re-
searchers argued that this work load was far too high to
process cases effectively. Many potentially culpable de-
fendants had their cases dismissed by prosecutors be-
cause of insufficient resources. In addition, case load
pressures forced judges and prosecutors into plea bar-
gaining with defendants. This, it was argued, accounted
for the high guilty plea rates and relatively light sentences.
The Illinois Crime Survey was just one of many such
studies conducted during the 1920s. Most reported simi-
lar results and advocated similar reforms, prominent
among them proposals to increase criminal justice re-
sources to combat the case load problem. Since these
ground-breaking crime surveys, other studies have
reached similar conclusions. Their major contentions
were aptly summarized in the 1968 report of the Presi-
dent's Commission on Law Enforcement. It stated: "The
final and most serious problem of urban and suburban
courts is the enormous volume of the crime and delin-
quency cases that come before them. . . . Partly in order
to deal with volume, many courts have routinely adopted
informal, invisible, administrative procedures for han-
dling offenders." The commission, along with most other
contemporary students of criminal courts, advocated large
increases in criminal court resources to combat the prob-
lems attributed to volume.
More recently, similar conclusions were drawn by the
Chicago Bar Association in its 1975 Program for Action.
A study of the criminal justice system in Cook County
led the association to advocate major reforms. It found that
because case loads were high, trial preparation by
prosecutors and public defenders was hasty and in-
adequate. Moreover, while some guilty defendants went
free when delay discouraged witnesses, other defendants
remained incarcerated for many months, only to be found
not guilty at trial. In short, the system was ineffective,
inefficient, and undignified. These observations were
followed by recommendations that the number of judges,
bailiffs, clerks, prosecutors, public defenders, and pro-
bation officers be increased sharply.
As is evident, the bar association's proposals and the
state legislature's actions are clearly within the mainstream
of traditional thought on criminal justice reform. It must
be recognized, however, that while traditionally much
reliance has been placed upon increases in court resources
to reduce plea bargaining and dismissal rates, the effect
of increased resources upon courtroom operations has
never been documented. In fact, there is scattered evidence
which indicates that significant increases in resources
have little influence upon courtroom operations. If the
Illinois Crime Survey data and those of crime surveys in
other states are examined, it is clear that, as far back as
the 1920s, dismissal rates, guilty plea rates, and court
delays have been similar in urban and rural jurisdictions —
despite vastly different case load problems. One study
showed that in Connecticut, trial rates (the proportion
of cases disposed of by trial) of about 10 percent have
been relatively constant since the late 1880s.
More recently, it has been demonstrated that dramatic
changes in the ratio of manpower to case load have not
had much impact upon the dispositional process. In
Connecticut, for example, a 1971 change in jurisdiction
laws almost halved the case load in some superior courts.
Even though there was no reduction in manpower in
these courts, neither was there an appreciable increase
in the trial rate.
Cook County Felony Case Loads
One important aspect of the case load controversy is the
effect of case load levels upon guilty plea rates, dismissal
rates, and sentences in guilty plea cases. A sample of
81 6 felony cases disposed of during 1972-73 in the Criminal
Division of the Cook County Circuit Court was examined in
this light. During this period the size of judges' monthly
dockets varied a good deal. These cases were analyzed
to determine whether they were processed differently
in months when dockets were light from months when
dockets were heavy. From January 1972 to June 1973
judges' monthly dockets varied from a low of 109 to a high
of 559 cases, with a mean of 283 cases. To simplify the
analysis, months in which cases were disposed of during
this time were categorized according to whether individual
judges' dockets were high, medium, or low. The criteria
used in this categorization are reported in Table 1, which
also shows the number of cases disposed of in each of
the three categories.
Since there was a good deal of variation in case load
pressure during the time when the sample of felony cases
was taken, one would expect markedly different court
outputs in each of the three periods. If the expectations
of traditional researchers are correct, dismissal rates and
guilty plea rates will be higher in months when case
loads are high than in months when they are low. When
case loads are low, it would be expected that prosecutors
and judges would be under less pressure to secure guilty
pleas and more able to pursue cases to trial. Sentences in
guilty plea cases during months with low case loads are
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Table 1
JUDGE CASE LOAD AT DISPOSITION
January 1972-June 1973
Range
of Case Loads
Number of
Cases in Sample
Cumulative
Frequency
Low
Medium
High
109-239
242-313
314-559
200
198
200
334
66 6
100
expected to be higher than sentences during months with
high case loads; presumably, judges and prosecutors
have stronger bargaining positions when case loads are
lower.
It should be noted that meaningful results cannot be
arrived at by a simple comparison of guilty plea rates,
dismissal rates, and sentences at different levels of
case loads. Many factors other than case load pressure
affect the criminal process. The seriousness of the offense,
the weight of the evidence gathered, the predispositions
of the judge, the type of defense counsel, relevant charac-
teristics of the defendant, and many other factors influence
the outcome of a case, and they must be taken into account.
By statistical manipulation through multiple regression
analysis, extraneous factors can be controlled while
analyzing a given factor of prime interest. In this study,
multiple regression was used to assess the impact of
case load upon case outcomes while controlling for such
extraneous factors as case seriousness, weight of the
evidence, and type of defense counsel. What will be re-
ported is the impact of variations in case load pressure
upon a typical armed robbery case involving a typical
defendant and handled by a typical defense counsel,
prosecutor, and judge. It should be emphasized that while
guilty plea rates, sentences, and dismissal rates would be
different if another type of offense were used, the dif-
ferences attributable to variations in case loads would
not vary.
1
The results of the regression analyses are shown in
Table 2. With extraneous factors controlled, the effects
of different levels of case load pressure upon case outcomes
were found to be negligible and statistically insignificant
(that is, the observed differences were so small that
they could be solely due to chance). Consider the first
row of numbers, which reports, for high, medium, and low
levels of case load pressure, the probability of a typical
Table 2
IMPACT OF CASE LOAD PRESSURE
ON PREDICTED OUTCOME
OF A TYPICAL ARMED ROBBERY CASE
Case Load Pressure
Low Medium
Predicted proportion of guilty pleas 74% 72%
Predicted proportion of dismissals 18% 18%
Predicted sentence after a guilty
plea (months) 55.7 58.5
High
70%
18%
61.2
armed robbery case's resulting in a guilty plea. These
probabilities, expressed as proportions, may be viewed
1 For a detailed discussion of factors affecting the disposition of cases
in Chicago felony courts, see Peter F. Nardulli. The Courtroom Elite:
An
Organizational Perspective (Cambridge. Mass.: Ballinger, forthcoming
1978)
as roughly corresponding to the average guilty plea rates
for typical armed robbery cases in each of the three
categories. As evident from the figures, differences in
these average rates are minimal. Even these slight
differences are not in the expected direction — guilty
plea rates are marginally higher when case load pressure
is low than when it is high.
The figures reported in the second row of Table 2 are
the predicted probabilities of a typical armed robbery
case's being dismissed in each of the three categories.
There are no differences at all in these figures, again
contrary to what traditional criminal justice researchers
would expect. Finally, the third row of the table reports
predicted sentences for a typical armed robbery case.
Here again the predicted differences are contrary to what
traditional researchers would predict, and these differences
are too small to be statistically or substantively significant.
The results reported here indicate that, as shown by
other recent studies, differences in case loads do not
appear to affect case outcomes to any major degree.
Cases disposed of during months when case loads are
low are apparently disposed of in the same manner as
in months when case loads are high.
Levels of Operation
One explanation for these findings has to do with utilization
of court resources. Traditional researchers assumed that
criminal courts were operating at or beyond capacity
levels. Given such overutilization, it is logical that increases
in case loads would affect case outcomes. Despite the
constant cries of overburdened officials, even the most
casual observer in the Cook County felony trials courts in
1972-73 would have noted much idle time. Indeed, a
Chicago Sun-Times study published in 1973 estimated
that a criminal court judge in Cook County spends an
average of only two-and-three-quarters hours a day on
the bench. During the time of this study, judges worked
somewhere between three and five hours per day. Such
a situation is not unique to Cook County. Studies in Con-
necticut and elsewhere have indicated that some judges
spend as little as one to three hours on the bench each
day.
Courts as Organizations
The observation that, as elsewhere, there is considerable
excess capacity in the Cook County criminal court system
leads to a second important point. Almost 60 percent of
all trial court cases in Cook County result in guilty pleas,
and these pleas account for 80 percent of all convictions.
If plea bargaining and other less publicized, informal,
"administrative" procedures are largely due to case load
pressure, why are they so pervasive in times of excess
capacity? The answer to this question can be found in a
new and different way of looking at criminal courts.
Many contemporary scholars are beginning to view criminal
court operations in much the same manner as they view
the operations of any organization; criminal courts are
perceived to handle their case loads much as a welfare
agency or health clinic handles its work. Of course, as
organizations go, the "court organization" has several
unique aspects, which help to explain why administrative
shortcuts exist in periods of excess capacity.
Most of the court organization's work is performed by
two sets of work groups (courtrooms) — preliminary hearing
courts and trial courts. In each work group, cases are pro-
cessed by a set of criminal justice officials — a judge, a
prosecutor, and a public defender or private defense
counsel — who, working together over an extended period
of time, develop close ties and common understandings.
Unlike most organizations, where power and discretion
are vested in the upper levels of a hierarchy, in the court
organization, power and discretion are vested in the work
groups. The judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel
control virtually every important aspect of a case's disposi-
tion: The prosecutor initiates charges and has the power
to drop or amend them, as well as the power to recommend
sentences. The judge also has the power to dismiss
charges. In addition, he is responsible for ruling on motions,
for passing sentence on convicted defendants, and, often,
for determining guilt or innocence. Among other powers,
the defense counsel can raise and argue legal motions
and appeal adverse rulings.
Besides their almost monopolistic power, courtroom
work groups have another important characteristic vital
to understanding why administrative shortcuts exist
during periods of excess capacity. That is, it is in the self-
interest of those who control the dispositional process —
the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel -
to handle their cases expeditiously. A defense counsel
generally is paid the same whether a case goes to trial,
is dismissed, or a guilty plea negotiated. Generally low
fees in criminal cases make it imperative that these at-
torneys turn over large numbers of cases with minimal
expenditure of resources. Most private attorneys could
probably not afford to provide every client with a truly
adversary defense.
Similarly, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders
are interested in expeditious dispositions. Each day they
have a set number of cases to handle. The less time they
devote to each, the sooner they will be able to complete
the daily call. Hence, except for very serious or highly
publicized cases, these officials have a built-in incentive
to handle cases quickly and informally; this incentive
exists whether there are two or two hundred cases on
the daily docket. This personal incentive to expeditiously
handle cases is reinforced by the view, widely held by
most criminal justice practitioners, that most defendants
in the trial courts are factually guilty of something. In
their view, the question posed by most cases is not, did
the defendant do it, but, what do we do with the case
now that we have it?
To summarize, if one regards courts as organizations,
the existence of informal administrative procedures, such
as plea bargaining, during times of excess capacity can
be explained by the nature of criminal court work groups
and participants' perceptions of their clients. It is in the
interest of the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel
to informally dispose of most cases and, because they
have the power to realize these ends, expeditious methods
are dominant even during slack periods.
This explanation, however, raises a variety of questions.
If in fact criminal courts do operate like organizations,
then changes in case loads cannot be irrelevant to court
operation. In order to exist over an extended period of
time, an organization of any type must be responsive to
its environment. General Motors, for example, must respond
to changes in demand if it is to remain competitive. Like-
wise, the court organization cannot be indifferent to the
public, and changes in case loads are a loose indicator
of demand for services by the public. Increased case
loads are evidence of either increased crime or increased
public propensity to report crime. Thus, if the criminal
court system operates like other organizations, it would
be expected to respond to demands for increased services
by increasing its output. This is especially true if, as has
been alleged here, the court system can accommodate
more cases than it does presently
Response to External Demands
To analyze whether the court organization responds to
external demands for increased services by increasing
its output, the average number of indictments each judge
disposed of during 1972-73 was examined for each of
the three categories of the two case load variables. Regres-
sion analysis again was used, this time to determine the
number of indictments in a given month that a judge would
be expected to dispose of in each of the three case load
categories (high, medium, and low). For high case loads,
thirty-one indictments were disposed of during the month;
for medium, twenty-eight; and for low, twenty-three. These
differences were in the expected direction (the greater
the case load, the greater the number of indictments dis-
posed of), and they were statistically significant. For ex-
ample, the predicted number of indictments disposed of
by a judge in a month when case loads were considered
high was almost 50 percent greater than the number in
a month when case loads were considered low. Thus,
while guilty plea rates, dismissal rates, and sentencing
structures were not affected by changes in case loads, as
most traditional researchers had thought, those who
control the dispositional process do seem to respond to
perceived external demands for increased services by
giving the public "more of the same."
Policy Implications
The policy implications embodied in traditional criminal
justice research were quite straightforward. To alleviate
such problems as plea bargaining, high dismissal rates,
and lenient sentences, criminal court resources must be
increased. Experience in Cook County and elsewhere,
however, shows that the problems plaguing the American
criminal court system are not so simple, nor are their
solutions.
The analysis undertaken here has no straightforward
policy implications, but it does suggest areas where
changes might be fruitful. First, the fundamental problem
facing criminal courts may be simply one version, albeit
unique, of the classical bureaucratic problem. That is,
a small cadre of individuals — charged with the respon-
sibility for performing a given task, vested with the power to
perform it, and subjected to few external constraints —
has utilized the resources under its control for its own self-
interest. Increasing the resources of such a system merely
makes the pursuit of this self-interest easier. This is not
to say, however, that additional resources will not be
needed to bring about a truly adversary criminal justice
system. Before such resources will produce favorable
results, however, fundamental changes in the power struc-
ture within courtroom work groups should be made. More
specifically, power needs to be decentralized, and ad-
versary relations among the participants need to be insti-
tutionalized
Although these goals seem very abstract, several steps
could be taken to achieve them. First, charging, dismissal,
and sentencing powers could be stripped from the court-
room work groups An independent charging board could
be set up to evaluate cases referred by the police. The
board could refuse to initiate charges in some cases,
utilize diversionary programs in other cases, and send
others into the felony court system. Cases sent to the
court system would then be assigned to a criminal court.
The sole function of these courts would be to decide the
guilt or innocence of the defendant. If guilt were determined,
the case would be sent to an independent sentencing board
which would then impose sentence in accordance with
set, though flexible, criteria. Such a process would virtually
eliminate plea bargaining and many of the sentencing
disparities which result from the bargaining process and
the propensities of the participants. To ensure that the
determination of guilt or innocence is made in an adversary
context, an incentive system could be introduced in-
volving financial inducements to prosecutors and defense
counsels for their successful handling of a case.
These ideas are, of course, merely rough suggestions
for improving the criminal court process. Many problems
would need to be worked out and refinements introduced
before they could be implemented. Also, their use would
require the addition of a significant number of resources.
Although these are only tentative suggestions, they have
been developed after five years of observation and analysis
of the criminal court system in Cook County and elsewhere.
During the period of this study it has become very apparent
that the greatest impediments to change in the system
are the vested interest which criminal court participants
have in the present structure and their power to resist
external interference. Nothing less than a fundamental
restructuring of the power and interest structure within
criminal courts will bring about a criminal justice system
approximating the ideal embodied in Anglo-American
notions of due process.
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In recent years the deteriorating condition of local roads
and bridges, pointed up by bridge failures causing deaths
and many injuries, has become a concern in Illinois and
many other states. Serious as this problem is, it should be
viewed in a broader context, one raising fundamental
questions of public finance and political organization.
In particular, the viability of small governmental units such
as townships is being questioned: Can they raise adequate
revenues and administer the services under their control
effectively 9
The local road and bridge problem was addressed in
a study of 186 townships in ten western Illinois counties
undertaken during 1975-76 ' The study region is depicted
in Figure 1, In this article, issues deriving from the basic
question raised above are examined in light of information
gained during the course of the project, particularly from
personal interviews with local road commissioners. The
advantages and disadvantages of several approaches
to solving the problem are then examined.
Method of Financing
A major dimension of local road and bridge conditions
is the method of financing services. Of special concern
is that with recent increases in the prices of construction
materials, revenues available for providing services have
lagged behind required expenditure levels. To complicate
the problem, like many local governments, townships in
Illinois in general have not made effective use of improved
management practices that might allow existing resources
to be used more efficiently.
In light of the scarcity of revenues available for making
capital improvements, especially in road districts where
structures have been allowed to deteriorate, commissioners
are now faced with hard decisions regarding the most
effective method for delivering needed services. (In
Illinois, road districts are technically distinct from town-
ships, with the road district commissioner responsible for
Norman Walzer is visiting associate professor, Institute of Government
and Public Affairs, on leave from the Department of Economics, Western
Illinois University
' See Barbara W Solomon and Norman Walzer. Rural Roads in Illinois:
Township Administration and Finance (Urbana Institute of Government
and Public Affairs and Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station, 1977) The
project was funded through the agricultural experiment station under Title
V of the Rural Development Act of 1972.
preparing the budget and maintaining the roads However,
the budget must be approved by the township board )
Existing road district budgeting systems make use of
a number of funds, including a road and bridge fund, a
bridge improvement fund, and a gravel fund. Partitioning
the levies into these components makes it difficult to
compute the unit cost of providing alternative types of
roads and bridges.
Local real estate taxes provide a major source of revenue
used for the road and bridge fund. In 1974, property taxes
represented 41.7 percent of the total revenue. Recently,
legislation was enacted altering the method of assessing
farmland. Exactly how this will affect the revenue available
to local governments is not yet known. However, the ration-
ale for the legislation was to hold down property taxes
on farmland or at least make them consistent with the use
of the land for agricultural purposes. In this light, one might
well expect that changing the assessment procedures
will have the effect of either raising tax rates or reducing
levies.
Road districts also receive operating funds through a
state revenue-sharing program based on motor fuel
taxes (MFT). MFT funds are raised through a tax on each
gallon of gasoline sold. Because the tax is levied on a
per gallon basis rather than as a percentage of sales,
recent increases in gasoline prices have not meant addi-
tional revenue. In fact, measures to save energy through
reducing consumption may decrease revenues further.
Because of the nature of rural road traffic, however, a corre-
sponding decrease in road usage would not be expected.
A final issue concerns the management capability of
local governments as small as road districts. Since in
Illinois townships road district budgets must be approved
by the township board of trustees, the level of funding
ultimately rests with the board. This means that in cases
in which the board does not rely heavily on the judgment
of the road commissioner, a significant part of the manage-
ment function has been transferred to the board. A com-
missioner faced with such a board probably is inclined
to concentrate on keeping as many roads and bridges
operational as he can and to postpone large capital
projects such as bridge replacements.
Facets of the Problem
Virtually all local public officials have difficulty in measur-
ing the quality of services they provide. Since they cannot
determine the desired level of service through the market
process, they turn to standards suggested by outside
experts. Road and bridge conditions can be rated by
engineering standards, and by comparing the deficiencies
against these standards, road commissioners can select
the projects that should be undertaken. However, it is not
always possible to undertake a required project; in recent
years inflation has been ravaging road district budgets.
At the same time, larger, heavier farm machinery has been
placing greater strain on both roads and bridges. To
complicate matters, the movement of urban residents into
the countryside has increased traffic and raised the ex-
pected level of service.
The ten-county, 186-township area in western Illinois
was studied to determine both the extent of the road and
bridge problem and the practices followed by local road
commissioners in providing services. Information provided
by the Illinois Department of Transportation showed that
during the early 1970s more than 60 percent of the rated
roads in the study region had barely adequate, poor, or
very poor surface conditions. Only one-third of the bridges
have been rated in western Illinois, but of these less than
half are above minimum tolerable limits. More than one-
quarter do not meet minimum standards. Wide variation
in road and bridge conditions was evident among the
districts; as will be discussed below, conditions depend
on both the resources of the road district and how it is
administered by the commissioner
The road and bridge issue is highlighted by the in-
adequacy of many local bridges to accommodate school
buses. One estimate is that, statewide, more than half
of these bridges are capable of bearing less than nine
tons — the weight of a loaded school bus. Incidents in
which a bus has to stop at a bridge, discharge students,
and then reload on the other side are being related with
increasing frequency. Another inadequacy of many local
bridges is their narrow width, preventing modern farm
machinery from crossing even when a bridge is structurally
sound. A short-term solution adopted for some bridges
has been to remove the side rails, allowing the machinery
to overhang the sides. Slow-moving farm machinery can
pass with reasonable safety, but automobiles and other
vehicles moving at higher speeds are exposed to greater
risks, especially in poor weather conditions.
Perhaps the severity of road and bridge conditions can
be best understood in terms of the cost of upgrading.
Estimates in 1975 by county highway superintendents in
western Illinois indicated that bringing roads to adequate
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(though less than desirable) standards would cost an
average of $27, 100 per mile. The cost of upgrading roads
on a per capita basis was $731. The estimated cost of
bringing bridges in western Illinois to standards con-
sidered adequate by the county highway superintendents
was $43,700 per unit, with a total cost of $47 million. These
estimates assume that 5 percent of the bridges could be
closed without imposing serious hardship and that 15
percent would not need repair.
Without doubt, resources from outside the road districts
will be required if a substantial repair and replacement
program is to occur within the reasonable future. The costs
cited above are based on conservative estimates; if
desired standards were sought, they would be much
greater. Although rural residents are entitled to access
to adequate basic services such as emergency medical
treatment, educational facilities, and fire protection, roads
with low traffic volumes may simply be too expensive to
maintain at high standards.
Another dimension is the current "return to the country-
side" trend, with residents employed in urban areas opting
for small acreages in the close hinterland. With this rise
in the number of commuters, increased demands are placed
on rural roads. Often, however, tax rates and revenues
do not rise proportionately with the value of the land in
its new use. Interviews with local commissioners suggest
that the former urban residents expect better roads than
do those who have grown up in the rural areas. The
newcomers create pressures on road commissioners for
road maintenance expenditures on the roads where they
live.
Management Practices
Judging from detailed interviews conducted with thirty
road district commissioners in the western Illinois study
region, management practices vary considerably. The
overall impression from the interviews is that the commis-
sioners are dedicated public servants who work within
fairly tight financial constraints but who are very concerned
about providing roads in the best condition possible, given
the resources available. Many expressed dismay at the
impact of recent price increases on future road maintenance
costs.
The average road commissioner in the study area has
very little formal training in financial and administrative
practices. His knowledge about road construction has
been gained primarily from his experience on the job.
Some commissioners worked for the previous commissioner
and "inherited" the position by running for election when
the incumbent retired. In many cases, commissioners face
town boards reluctant to increase tax levies even though
road budgets are being squeezed by the rising prices
of construction materials
Most of the road commissioners are full time (70 per-
cent), but more than half the total (62 percent) have addi-
tional employment. On the average, the commissioners
in the study area had slightly more than eleven years
experience, were fifty-three years old, and had attended
but not completed high school. The average full-time road
commissioner received an annual salary of $7,581 in
1975. Less than one-third (30 percent) indicated that they
employ part-time help.
Because of differences in demand for road use, road
district management practices vary by size of district
and by region within the state. As of 1975, the townships
in western Illinois were slightly below the state average in
minimally passable. Certainly closing roads or bridges
is not a popular option politically since it is difficult to
find a rural road on which no one resides or that someone
does not find useful as a shortcut. To reduce the number
of roads on a rational basis, traffic volumes would have
to be examined and roads with extremely low volumes
would become candidates for closing. Presumably, some
landowners would suffer a capital loss due to reduced
access, and they might have to be compensated. If a
roadway is convenient (but not essential) for access to
farmland, farmers might be given the opportunity to assume
its upkeep as a private road.
If this option were chosen, however, a transportation
network plan would have to be devised to provide access
by emergency vehicles. In addition, consideration must
be given to maintaining reasonably efficient access,
with rural roads connecting major highways given priority.
Without question reducing the number of roads or bridges
will not be easy, but given the present situation the pos-
sibility at least should be raised.
IMPROVED MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
The commissioners interviewed in western Illinois generally
expressed frustration in discussing their financial needs
with the town boards. Most felt a need for a greater aware-
ness by the board concerning road conditions and expendi-
tures required to remedy deficiencies.
The management practices discussed above show a
relatively simple operating framework: based on his per-
sonal knowledge of the roads, the commissioner develops
a work program and carries it out until funds have been
depleted. Motor fuel tax monies pass through the county
highway superintendent's office, and the superintendent
coordinates both the purchases and work programs of the
commissioners in his county. In western Illinois, cooperation
between the county and the townships appears to be fairly
common. In the opinion of the township commissioners
interviewed, cooperation with the county superintendent
is very beneficial both because lower prices for materials
can be obtained when larger volumes are purchased and
also because infrequently used machinery can be shared
among townships.
Herein may lie a major cost-saving improvement for
townships statewide, one that could be introduced without
significant changes in the existing framework. Periodically
there is a movement for consolidation of townships on
grounds of efficiency. The reply from road commissioners is
that districts of approximately fifty miles of road are ap-
propriate for an essentially one-person operation. If the
districts were consolidated, the less frequently travelled
roads in more remote sections of the district would not
receive adequate attention. According to those opposing
consolidation, because some road district tasks (such as
snow removal) are labor intensive during critical times,
the quality of services would decrease if district size
were increased.
Perhaps the greatest potential for cost saving lies in
additional cooperative use of large machinery already
owned by the districts. The price of motor graders, bull-
dozers, and large trucks has increased to the point that
commissioners are almost unable to replace existing
equipment. Several of those interviewed indicated that
they were purchasing used equipment whenever possible.
Although the maintenance cost is higher, the initial outlay
is less. If consolidation of road district operations is not
a viable option for political or other reasons, then certainly
a greater sharing of equipment by townships is feasible.
Bulk purchasing of supplies and materials also can lower
costs.
This discussion is not intended to dismiss the possible
benefits of consolidating small contiguous road districts,
especially if a number of roads and bridges could be
eliminated. The objective might be to achieve a size that
could be administered by a full-time commissioner and
a full-time assistant without purchasing new equipment.
If this policy were adopted, the quality of less travelled
roads might be reduced. Given tight budgets, however,
it does not seem unreasonable to intentionally maintain
roads with low traffic volumes at lower quality than more
frequently used roads. The important consideration is
that there be an adequate number of well-maintained roads
with year-round surfaces so that an efficient transportation
system is provided and emergency vehicles can operate
without major delays.
Such a program would require long-range planning by
both road district commissioners and county superin-
tendents. In fact, achieving an efficient transportation net-
work may require planning at a regional level — for ex-
ample, a multicounty area. The significant consideration
is that without alternative funding arrangements, many
road districts may be at a critical point: either the number
of roads and bridges must be decreased or the quality
at which they can be maintained will deteriorate
TIGHTER CONTROLS ON USAGE
Most commissioners interviewed felt that heavy machinery,
trucks, and loaded school buses cause serious road
damage, especially during spring thaws. At present,
weight limits are posted by the commissioner, but enforce-
ment is virtually nonexistent. Under this situation, a road
can be damaged severely because of a few trips at the
wrong time. Given the limited resources for maintaining
township roads, commissioners felt that they needed
additional powers enabling them to close roads to traffic
as needed or to limit their use by heavy vehicles such
as loaded school buses. The exact procedure for enforcing
limited access would have to be established, although
one measure could be to close certain roads to all
but local residents for short periods.
Controlled road usage could do much to lower costs
and to provide better facilities for the general public.
Money saved by this approach could be used to rebuild
the roads that are troublesome each year. Presumably,
over time the number of roads that could be kept open
all year would increase.
General Observations
The problem of local transportation networks is multifaceted
and difficult to summarize. Some view it as an example
of government units being too small to provide necessary
services efficiently. This view has fostered attempts to
consolidate townships smaller than a certain population
or assessed valuation. Others point to townships as one
of the few arenas where citizens have direct input into
how their tax dollars are spent. As might be expected,
this latter view is held by many local officials who look
upon consolidation as leading to "big government" un-
responsive to citizens' wishes. Aside from the ideological
dispute, the road and bridge problem is serious and de-
mands immediate attention. While poor-quality roads can
be travelled at slower speeds and at possibly higher vehicle-
operating costs, deteriorated bridges do not allow this
option.
construction to understand the extent of funding needed
to maintain them adequately. One commissioner indicated
that his proposed budget had been reduced repeatedly;
road maintenance had suffered to the extent that several
large agricultural producers revealed a willingness to
pay higher real- estate taxes to finance road improvements.
This problem is significant given that recently the maxi-
mum allowable tax rate (with referendum) has been in-
creased. Although the taxing power exists, a timid town
board might be reluctant to take advantage of it.
The practices followed by commissioners, particularly
those with tight budgets, can be characterized as a form
of crisis management. Rather than developing a long-
term program of road construction and maintenance, com-
missioners are prone to solving immediate problems such
as repairing an impassable road or a seriously defective
bridge After the urgent problems are remedied there is
little if any money left for a long-term road-upgrading
program.
Because of the financial exigencies, in some instances
the local commissioners have turned to makeshift repairs
such as using a discarded railroad tank car with the ends
removed to replace a culvert. In some townships, bridges
are renovated by using parts from abandoned structures.
While programs of this type reduce costs, they have in-
herent dangers and are not necessarily the most effective
long-term solution. For example, the replacement parts
used to renovate bridges may have been seriously weak-
ened over time from previous use.
The situation is so serious in some districts that bridges
have been closed. While it may be desirable to have
fewer bridges, a long-range plan for traffic flow should be
adopted to assure an efficient road system in rural areas.
Based on such a plan, certain roads and bridges could be
closed if necessary. However, closing a bridge selected
only because of its deterioration from past usage does not
seem to be an efficient approach.
Possible Solutions
Few obvious and simple solutions exist to the road and
bridge problems described above. However, several kinds
of approaches are possible, some by road districts di-
rectly and some by other levels of government.
ADDITIONAL REVENUE
An obvious solution to the road and bridge problem is to
raise additional funds. At issue, however, is the source
of these funds. The main revenue source, the property tax,
has long been criticized as being inequitable and not
as responsive to economic growth as are other revenue
sources such as income and sales taxes. Moreover,
in the case of local roads and bridges, the taxpayers
most likely to receive benefits are those residing on the
farms. Therefore a tax on agricultural production or some
other base might be more acceptable than the property
tax. Because rural roads are used extensively in farming
operations, the tax used to provide the transportation system
ideally should be incorporated into the cost of producing
agricultural output and passed on to consumers.
In 1976, town boards in Illinois were empowered by the
state legislature to levy the property tax for road and bridge
purposes at .66 percent (sixty-six cents per dollar of as-
sessed valuation) with referendum; the previous rate was
33 percent. Thus additional taxing power at the local
level exists if the town board is able and willing to com-
municate its needs to the electorate. Certainly any reason-
able solution to the problem will require that this revenue
source be used to the fullest extent possible.
The state's interest in an adequate rural transportation
network stems both from the need to provide roads for
residents and, given the importance of agriculture to the
Illinois economy, to transport farm produce At present,
the state provides assistance for the maintenance of local
roads and bridges through motor fuel tax reimburse-
ments to local governments. A road district's share of these
funds is based on road mileage within the district and is
reimbursed to the districts through the county superin-
tendent of highways. Strict standards are in effect governing
both the uses of MFT funds and the standards that roads
must meet in order to qualify. The rationale behind this
tax is that the more gasoline purchased, the more driving
and maintenance there is to be done on roads.
The present MFT is 7.5 cents per gallon of gasoline
sold, with exemptions for nonroad users, which means
that farmers usually qualify for refunds. The interesting
situation is that wide, heavy farm equipment is one of the
main causes of the local road and bridge dilemma. Certainly
one could argue that farmers should be given rebates to
the extent that the tax is used to finance major highways,
but the argument is less effective in the case of local
roads. This is not to deny that a relatively small portion
of the total gasoline used by agricultural producers is
for road traffic. Perhaps more attention should be paid,
however, to including the cost of maintaining local roads
within the cost of raising food
One way to raise additional MFT revenue would be to
tie this tax to the price of gasoline rather than to the
quantity sold Assuming constant use, gasoline price in-
creases would generate additional revenue Moreover,
by increasing the price of gasoline, higher taxes might
assist in conservation. With the rising costs of constructing
and maintaining roads, the justification for a tax based
on the number of gallons sold independent of the price
per gallon is unclear.
Two recent changes in Illinois law should ameliorate
the road and bridge problem. First, taxing limits for building
and maintaining road surfaces have been increased,
allowing town boards to raise additional revenue if voters
can be convinced of the need. Second, beginning July 1,
1977, the state began distributing money from a $15 million
fund to townships that are levying at their maximum rates
without referendum. While this amount may be small
compared with the estimated needs, it does represent a
beginning.
Finally, the bridge problem may be severe enough that
federal funds are needed. Although since 1970 a federal
bridge inspection program has been in effect and funding
has been provided for bridges on secondary highways,
these monies have not been available for the majority of
locally maintained roads. However, federal revenue-sharing
funds provided to townships can be, and have been, used
for road maintenance purposes Bridges are primarily
one-time expenditures with minimal annual maintenance.
If special bridge reconstruction funds were made available,
presumably most districts could provide normal mainte-
nance.
REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ROADS
Another approach to the problem is to eliminate unneces-
sary roads and bridges; this method may be implemented
inadvertently as bridges collapse and roads become
road mileage and number of bridges to be maintained.
The average road district in the state included 51.2 miles
of roads and thirteen bridges, while in western Illinois the
average was 48.9 miles and eleven bridges. A closer
examination reveals that more of the western Illinois
districts contained earth and gravel roads than did districts
statewide; correspondingly, fewer districts reported paved
and bituminous roads. Thus, minor deviations in western
Illinois commissioners' practices and procedures would
be expected from those followed statewide. Over half
the road commissioners in the study area (57 percent)
reported that at least 40 percent of the bridges in their
districts needed repair. The comparable figure statewide
was 63 percent.
Because the commissioner is an area resident and a
frequent traveler in his district, he has firsthand knowledge
of local road conditions. Although the commissioners
indicated that they make fairly regular patrols of district
roads, little formal monitoring of conditions was evident.
Several of those interviewed admitted that their work pro-
grams were determined at least in part by complaints of
residents about the condition of the road on which they
live.
One of the most surprising findings is the informal nature
of identifying work to be undertaken in the upcoming year.
Selection of which roads and bridges are to be repaired
or reconstructed is not based on an analysis of the least
cost to bring structures to a satisfactory condition. Further
discussions with county highway superintendents in the
region reinforced the notion of the absence of a sophisticated
procedure for choosing among road maintenance projects.
Presumably, at some point it becomes cheaper to rebuild
a road than to patch with gravel. When commissioners
were asked about the cost of maintaining specific road
sections, most exhibited little detailed knowledge about
unit costs.
A tendency was noted among several commissioners
to follow a work program of upgrading several miles of
roads each year with a bituminous surface. With continuing
price increases of bituminous-related materials, continua-
tion of this program may be in jeopardy. In wealthier
districts bituminous surfaces may be feasible and de-
sirable. Unfortunately, the wealthier districts may not be
the same as those in which the costs of construction and
maintenance are the greatest. In determining the type
of surface and the quality at which a road can be maintained,
accurate cost information is necessary. More detailed
record-keeping practices and analyses of amounts spent
on individual road sections could be useful in obtaining
greater returns for the funds available.
The overriding concern many commissioners raised in
discussions was that inadequate funds are available to
provide the road quality they consider desirable. Several
reasons may account for this concern. First, in some in-
stances the condition at which the commissioner sought to
maintain roads simply may have been beyond the resources
of his district. Also, very little attention was being given to
objective standards in the road maintenance program;
rather, the selection of work was based on the commis-
sioner's knowledge of and preferences for road conditions.
The bridge situation was handled somewhat differently.
Many of the bridges had been rated, and in selecting proj-
ects this objective assessment of their condition was
considered. The commissioners had a much clearer picture
of the need for improvements of bridges than roads. Bridge
safety is perceived as critical because a failure can result
in injury or loss of life. However, those commissioners with
serious bridge problems (not all districts had major de-
ficiencies) appeared to be frustrated due to a lack of funds.
In addition to the possibility that unrealistic quality stan-
dards have been set, a number of commissioners felt that
the town board was unwilling to raise taxes to provide the
funds needed for road maintenance. This view was ex-
pressed most frequently in districts where the road com-
missioner's budget was routinely reduced by the town
board. Certainly in some cases the problem stems from
the board's lack of responsiveness to the objectives and
financial needs expressed by the commissioner; wide
variation was found in western Illinois. In some road districts
the commissioner's proposed budget is accepted almost
automatically. In these districts the transportation facilities
appeared to be more than adequate, and the road commis-
sioners were optimistic about their jobs.
Other commissioners complained that the board tended
to respond to voters' pressure to keep tax levies low. The
feeling expressed by these commissioners was that the
town board was not knowledgeable enough about road
Figure 1
TEN-COUNTY WESTERN ILLINOIS STUDY AREA
Given the critical condition of bridges and the great
cost in rehabilitating them, a long-term bridge replace-
ment program is needed, at least for essential routes in
rural areas. There is little question but that a feasible
solution to the local road and bridge problem is going
to require a-combination of actions by governments at
different levels. Certainly townships must use their taxing
powers to the fullest extent as well as examine carefully
the need for the number of roads and bridges they are
trying to maintain. Beyond this, an effective solution,
especially to the bridge problem, may very well require
assistance from higher levels of government.
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ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES: WHERE HAVE ALL THE VOTERS GONE?
Oliver Walter and Albert Karnig
Politicians often lament the declining importance of
local government in the United States. They point to
an ever-growing, more inclusive federal government
as evidence of the passing of government at the grass-
roots level. But judging by statistics from the last
twenty years, Illinois municipalities, at least, can
hardly be considered dead or even slightly ill.
Thanks to the home rule provisions of the new consti-
tution and to increased revenue from sources such
as the state income tax and the federal revenue-
sharing programs, city governments are more active
than ever before. Since 1957, municipal expendi-
tures per capita have increased nearly 300 percent,
the number of city employees has increased approxi-
mately 40 percent, and municipal taxes have increased
from about $40 per capita to nearly $139 per capita.
Despite the fact that Illinois municipalities are
both taxing and spending at previously unsurpassed
rates, there is evidence to suggest that the voters. ?*£ ,/On
living in these cities are not particularly concerned*^ ^age
Data for all three decades were collected either by
or for the editors of the Municipal Year Book, and
descriptions of the national studies can be found in
this annual publication.
1 Table 1 lists the turnout
averages for all reporting cities. In 1975, fifty-five
of the fifty-eight cities in Illinois over 25,000 returned
questionnaires on municipal voting rates and twenty-
eight of the forty-one in 1961 did so. The Year Book
included cities with populations over 10,000 in 1930;
these cities were included for the 1935 figures if
they had reached 25,000 by 1970. 2 Two averages
are given. The first is the percent of those eighteen
and over (twenty-one and over for the two earlier
periods) who voted in city elections for mayor, council,
£«and/or commissioners. The second average is the
/^pejsg.entafie of those registered to vote who in fact
?g djcbvotjjf In the remainder of the paper we will be
rererrir^J to the former percentage.
f the problems of comparing these initial aver-
contemporary figures is that they have been
about which specific politicians direct their loca'J^ Q^jconffiiuted using different bases. As stated, the 1975
governments. Using Illinois cities with populatio
greater than 25,000 in the 1970 census as a base,
we found that the average voter turnout in the 1975
municipal elections was only 27 percent of those
eighteen years and older. Furthermore, judging by
data from 1935 and 1961, there has been a rather
precipitous decline in electoral participation. Table
1 presents the statistics for the three decades.
Table 1
VOTER TURNOUT IN ILLINOIS MUNICIPALITIES
OVER 25,000 IN POPULATION IN 1935, 1961, and 1975
1935 1961 1975
Percent turnout of those of voting age
Illinois and the Nation
The decline in voter turnout has been dramatic.
In the mid-1930 election, turnout was nearly 60
percent. Less than thirty years later, turnout had fallen
16 percentage points, and forty years later, the per-
centage of those going to the polls was less than
half of what it had been in the 1930s. Another inter-
esting aspect of the decline can be found in a com-
parison of the Illinois figures to national municipal
averages. Illinois averages were substantially
higher than the national in 1935 (Table 2), and con-
tinued to be higher than the national average in 1961 ;
but by 1 975 the Illinois figures were three percentage
points below the national average. Of course, a partial
explanation for the low national average was the
turnout in the South. Prior to the voting rights legis-
lation of the mid-1960s, both formal legislation and
informal social practices served to hold down regis-
tration. For instance, in Birmingham, Alabama, only
24 percent of those over twenty-one were registered
to vote in 1935. However, when the southern states
are excluded from the computations, Illinois municipal
voting participation is still 10 percentage points
higher than the average in the first time period and
remains slightly higher in the second. By 1975,
Illinois was 5 percentage points below the non-
southern average.
Because Chicago is by far the largest city in the
state, turnout averages are presented separately
in Table 2. Just as with the remainder of the state,
municipal voter participation has declined in Chicago,
and although the figures are not presented separately,
turnout for the 1 975 mayoral election was at its lowest
point in fifty years.
The fall in urban voting participation has gone on
despite factors which would seemingly lead to greater
participation. Voting studies have consistently shown
that participation is quite highly related to education.
For instance, in the 1976 national presidential elec-
tion, 90 percent of those with a college education
said they voted, while 60 percent of those with less
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shown that television has replaced newspapers as
the basic source of information about politics. For
instance, in the University of Michigan's biennial
national survey, two-thirds of the 1976 sample said
they relied most on television for news about politics
and current events. Less than one-fifth said they relied
most on newspapers.
The impact of television has been twofold. First,
although both newspapers and television provide
entertainment for their readers and viewers, entertain-
ment nearly excludes all else on television. Even
national news shows are seldom if ever in prime time,
and on local news shows, municipal politics only
infrequently receives the attention given to the weather
or the tribulations of some child's pet. Exacerbating
the problems is that television is very frequently not
specific to the community. For instance, the amount
of coverage given by the Chicago stations to politi-
cal matters in Harvey or Oak Park is miniscule. This
means that most individuals rely for political infor-
mation on a medium which is nearly devoid of infor-
mation concerning the operation of local government.
Second, television has had a nationalizing influence.
Of course, both newspapers and television give pri-
mary play to happenings at the national level, but
whereas newspapers may carry stories of local poli-
tics on the second and third page, television news
seldom goes beyond the first page. Politically rele-
vant news on national television, then, tends to be of
a national variety.
Interestingly, television, while helping to nationalize
the political focus of the American people, certainly
contributed to the increased cynicism and alienation
shown in the public opinion polls cited earlier. The
Vietnam War and Watergate scandal were vividly
presented on national television and doubtless had
a strong impact on political thinking.
EXTENSION OF VOTING RIGHTS
Finally, it should be noted that the ratification of the
24th and 26th amendments to the United States
Constitution and the passage of the 1965 and 1975
Voting Rights Acts had the effect of increasing the
number of persons eligible to vote. Although the
greatest impact of these measures was in the South
(i.e., the anti-poll tax amendment, the abolition
of the literacy test, and provisions of the Voting Rights
Acts calling for federal registrars), the adoption of
the 26th amendment which enfranchised those from
eighteen to twenty years of age had an impact on
Illinois. Young adults are not as apt to register to
vote and, once registered, they are not as likely to
actually go to the polls on election day. The reasons
underlying the poor turnout among the young —
failure to meet registration deadlines, weak political
party identification, and so forth — need not concern
us here. But it is worthy of mention that enlarging the
electorate to eighteen-year-olds has had an unfavor-
able influence on the percent of eligible citizens who
vote in elections. For instance, data from the Univer-
sity of Michigan's national election survey show that
the turnout rate for those over twenty-one was almost
40 percentage points higher than for those under
twenty-one. The young may be the most idealistic
about and committed to various issues of public
policy. Regrettably, they are also the least prone
to cast ballots in public elections.
Though the eighteen-year-old vote may have been
one of the reasons for a general decline in voter
turnout, it should not be overemphasized. The
eighteen- through twenty-year-old group is a small
minority of the total electorate, and even if they had
not been eligible to vote in 1976, voting turnout would
only have increased by about 1 percent.
Conclusions
In sum, we suggest that the decline in voter partici-
pation has come in two waves. Between 1930 and
1950 there was a significant shift away from a
perceived dependence on the federal government. In
part, this was due to changes in relative spending
patterns at the two levels of government. At the same
time, developments in the mass media shifted the
American citizen's interest away from the local news
in his local newspaper to national events on nation-
wide television. The second wave in declining voter
participation came in the 1960s with the national
increase in political apathy and distrust, much of
it due, no doubt, to Vietnam and Watergate. Further
changes in national law brought into the potential
electorate persons who were not likely to vote. If
we are correct, the reason that only one in three po-
tential voters cares to participate has little to do with
the performance of urban governments. Forces
beyond municipal government changed the political
environment and made the decline inevitable.
ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT RESEARCH ISSUES STILL
AVAILABLE
The following Illinois Government Research news-
letters are still in print and are available from the
Institute of Government and Public Affairs.
No. 1
"Legislative Hearings on County Problems,"
January 1959
No. 2
"Legislative Study of Urban Affairs," April
1959
No. 3 "Lake Michigan Water Diversion," June 1959
No. 4 "The 1958 County Elections," September 1959
No. 5 "First Manager, First Month: An Illinois City's
Experience," November 1959
No. 7 "The Employment Systems of the State of
Illinois," May 1960
No. 9 "The 1960 County Primaries," January 1961
No. 10 "The Illinois Congressional Representatives
and Agricultural Legislation, 1954-59," June
1961
No. 11 "Administrative Reorganization in Chicago,"
September 1961
Table 4
PERCENT OF ILLINOIS VOTER TURNOUT
FOR SELECTED PRESIDENTIAL, CONGRESSIONAL,
AND MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
Mid-*
1930s
Early*
1960s
Decline from
mid-1930s to
early 1960s
Mid-*
1970
Decline from
mid-1960s to
mid-1970
Presidential
Congressional
Municipal
82
60
59
77
59
42
5
1
17
64
40
27
13
19
15
*
Specific dates for presidential elections were 1936, 1960, 1970; for con-
gressional elections, 1934, 1962, 1974; for municipal elections. 1935. 1961.
1975.
Table 5
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING
CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT*
Percentage
remain even when other characteristics such as region
and socioeconomic status are controlled. In the 1975
survey, the national average turnout for nonpartisan
cities was 29 percent and for the partisan cities 37
percent. The manager cities had an average of 26
percent, the commission cities 33 percent, and the
mayoral cities 39 percent. The commonly accepted
explanation for these differences is that reform
characteristics (nonpartisan elections and the
manager form of government) tend to reduce political
competition by at least making it more difficult for
political parties to compete and by reducing the
sphere of politics through the introduction of a profes-
sional manager. Regardless of the explanation's
substance, voting turnout does vary with the char-
acteristics.
In Illinois a substantial number of cities have
adopted reform characteristics since the 1930s.
Sixty-five percent had the mayoral form in 1935, while
today less than 40 percent use this method of city
government. There has also been a 1 6 percent decline
in the number of commission cities. In 1935 only
one of the municipalities studied here had a city
manager. Today, fourteen of the thirty-one for which
we have comparable data have adopted the manager
plan. The number of cities with partisan elections
has also decreased from 39 to 19 percent.
If structural changes have led to a diminution of
voter turnout, we would expect to find that the re-
lationships between structure and turnout discussed
above were valid in the 1930s, and, moreover, ought
to be present in the current decade. Table 3 shows
that the presence or absence of national party des-
ignations on the municipal ballot was not and is not
related to voter turnout in Illinois. Of course, polit-
ical parties can be active in nonpartisan cities and
inactive in partisan. Unfortunately, we have no way
of determining the extent of party activity during the
1930s, and therefore all we can conclude is that
formal designation is of no discernible import as
Table 3
VOTING TURNOUT BY GOVERNMENTAL
AND ELECTORAL CHARACTERISTICS, 1935-75
No.
"3
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TEAM POLICING AND POLICE SERVICES: AN EXPERIMENT THAT WORKS
Peter F. Nardulli
Since the turn of the century, when reformers first began
to critically examine police departments, which were
relatively new municipal agencies, reform agendas have
revolved around the organizational structure of depart-
ments and the recruitment of personnel. In recent years
this narrow focus has shifted to a concern with how avail-
able police resources are used. There has also been in-
creasing interest in empirically examining the effects of
different deployment strategies. Earlier reformers were
much more concerned with implementing their ideas than
with evaluating the impact of those ideas. The reasons for
this shift are undoubtedly many and complex.
One important reason, however, seems to be the reali-
zation that earlier reform programs simply did not have
the intended impact. Since the 1950s, especially in urban
areas, there have been marked changes in police de-
partments throughout the United States. Many long-
standing reforms have been implemented, at least to a
degree. Yet, during this same period, when the costs of
policing have increased dramatically, crime has sky-
rocketed, police-community relations have reached crisis
proportions in many ghetto communities, and police
graft still persists in many cities.
A second, more general reason lies in the current drift
of American politics. Gone is the sixties' mentality that
more is better. It has been replaced with a skepticism
about the ability of government to do much about many
social problems. Political leaders in the 1970s have been
slow to initiate any new far-ranging social programs or
dramatically increase existing ones. While this has led
some bureaucrats to simply retrench, others have re-
sponded by rethinking traditional practices, trying out
new and innovative approaches, and attempting to deter-
mine "what works."
Buoyed by this movement, and supported by funds from
the federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
police departments throughout the country have examined
and experimented with various deployment strategies.
One of the most innovative and potentially useful strate-
gies has been labeled team policing. According to a
recent Urban Institute report, over sixty cities have experi-
mented with different versions of this program. Cham-
paign, Illinois, is one such city. Since May of 1977 it has
Peter F. Nardulli, Ph.D.. J.D., is assistant professor, Institute of Govern-
ment and Public Affairs and Department of Political Science, University of
Illinois. The author wishes to thank the Champaign Urban High Crime Pro-
gram, and especially Neil Weisman and Gary Spear, for supporting this
research. He also wishes to thank Chief William Dye for his support as well
as Lt Thomas Whipple and Sgt. Robert Soucie for their cooperation and
assistance in collecting the necessary data from the records of the
Champaign Police Department
utilized a team unit in what is termed the Northend, a
racially mixed, largely working class community. The
unit was supported by the city of Champaign and the
Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. This report is an
analysis of the effect of this program upon a number of
different indicators of police performance: citizen evalua-
tions of police services, attitudes toward the police, fear
of crime, clearance rates, and crime rates.
Before turning to the desfcn. results, and meaning of
this study, however, a fewfwords need to be said about
team policing as a deployrftgnt sfetegfi
TEAM POLICING DEFINED
.•c
*
' 2
The notion of team policing, irf*tts rfl»st elementary form,
is not new. Fundamentalist is^grev^ion to the way police
have been deployed j>*Enc©ind''&nd small American
towns and cities for de^&des^TheajViodels of team polic-
ing currently being suggested a% somewhat different,
however, from these earlier forms. Moreover, there are
many operational variants of this strategy. Nonetheless,
it is possible to outline some of the basic attributes of
team policing, as well as the expected benefits of such
programs.
Basic Attributes
There are at least two ways in which team units differ
from traditional patrol units. One includes organizational
characteristics, the other concerns their approach to
crime deterrence.
Among unique organizational characteristics of team
policing one could include such things as geographic
exclusivity, a community-service orientation, decentral-
ization of authority and functions, and enhanced roles for
patrolmen. Thus, team units — composed of stable
groups of officers — are expected to be fully responsible
for providing all police services, usually on a twenty-four-
hour basis, to a given geographic area. This includes
the performance of most routine investigative tasks, tradi-
tionally performed by a centralized detective division.
The only exceptions are emergencies and instances for
which highly skilled expertise is required.
Through the community-service orientation, team units
attempt to reduce police isolation in urban neighbor-
hoods; it is an extension of the old "cop on the beat" con-
cept. Team members are normally equipped with mobile
radios and are expected to do a certain amount of foot
patrolling. The idea behind this focus is to initiate positive
contacts with citizens, to enable officers to become familiar
with their beat and its residents, and to permit community
members to know and relate to their police officers. It
is hoped that such an orientation will reduce citizen
hostility, engender positive cooperation, and facilitate
the work of the police.
Along with the added responsibilities given team units,
the individuals comprising each unit are generally given
greater authority than in normal patrol units. Such de-
centralization of authority is thought to be a crucial tool
in making the police more sensitive and responsive to
local community needs. It is also expected to result in
better utilization of individual officers, since the team
supervisor is expected to become more familiar with the
strengths and weaknesses of each officer in the course
of identifying problems and developing programs to
solve them.
A final organizational characteristic of team policing is
the enhanced role of individual officers. Besides normal
patrol functions, team officers are expected to take on
some investigative tasks and participate in team plan-
ning and decision making. In addition, they are often
trained in crisis intervention and are expected to take part
in various phases of an overall community relations pro-
gram. Such responsibilities are in stark contrast to the
narrower functions traditionally vested in patrol officers.
They are expected to result in more well-rounded and pro-
fessionally fulfilled officers who are able to respond
more effectively in a wide variety of situations.
Traditional police thinking about crime deterrence can
be traced back at least to noted police authorities such
as William Parker and O. W. Wilson who contended that
the police should focus on reducing the opportunities for
crime rather than on the motives for crime. This required
a two-tailed strategy: educate the public in the funda-
mentals of crime prevention ("harden" the targets of
crime) and enhance police presence. Of these two strate-
gies, the latter received, by far, the most emphasis. The
pat police response to increases in crime was always a
cry for an increased number of police and added latitude
to take a more aggressive, proactive orientation. It was an
article of faith that such enhanced police presence would
increase the probabilities of a criminal being appre-
hended, thus increasing the costs of criminal activity.
This, in turn, would lead to reductions in crime.
The crime deterrence philosophy inherent in team
policing is also based upon the notion of increasing
the costs of committing crimes and hardening the objects
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of crime through education in crime prevention. The real
theoretical difference between the traditional and the
team approach lies in how team units attempt to increase ( i
apprehension probabilities in order to increase the costs
of crime. Instead of an increased police presence, the
team strategy relies upon increased availability and utili-
zation of information, a tactic strongly recommended by
a recent Rand Corporation study of the criminal investi-
gation process.
Increased information is expected to come from two
sources. First, long-term assignments to designated geo-
graphic areas should lead to greater territorial familiari-
zation by officers. They should be more familiar with
trouble spots as well as troublemakers. They should also
be in a better position to know what is normal and what
is not in different settings. This will allow them to make
more efficient use of their time and other resources.
Secondly, the team strategy's emphasis upon knowing,
relating to, and maintaining positive contacts with com-
munity members is expected to increase the flow of infor-
mation from the community. This is considered invaluable
because community members have access to much in-
formation not accessible to police officers and not forth-
coming where hostile relations exist.
More effective use of available information is expected
in a team program for a number of reasons. First, the
linkage of the investigative and patrol function in the
team unit is expected to mitigate interunit competition
and jealousies, resulting in a freer exchange of informa-
tion and insights among individual officers. Secondly,
the decentralization of authority in the team is expected
to permit greater flexibility in responding to informational
insights, gained from whatever source. Finally, unlike the
situation in traditional settings, where assignments are in li
planned flux and responsibility can be shifted across
departmental units, the team is accountable for its own
beat and is more likely, therefore, to make full use of all
information that comes its way.
Expected Benefits
Because of its potential advantages over more traditional
forms of police deployment, team policing has been
warmly endorsed by such groups as the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice
and the National Advisory Commission. Benefits are ex-
pected to accrue to the community served, to members
of the team, and to the sponsoring department.
From the community perspective, the service orienta-
tion of team policing, its emphasis upon positive and
continued interactions with citizens, its ability to respond
to local needs, and its focus upon officer fulfillment are
all expected to improve the quality of services and make
citizens feel more secure in their person and home. This
in turn is expected to create a more positive image of
the police and increase the flow of crime-related infor-
mation to the police. The more positive image and in-
creased information, in conjunction with the increased
capacity of the police to deal with crime-related infor-
mation, are expected to result in greater arrest proba-
bilities and, ultimately, reduced crime rates.
The primary potential benefit of team policing for team
members is increased job satisfaction. Wider discretion,
increased responsibility, and more positive contacts with /
citizens are expected to result in more well-rounded (#,
officers who are more satisfied with their jobs. This is
Fear and Perceptions of Crime
While actual crime rates are important indicators of a
police program's impact upon the crime problem, people's
perceptions may be just as important. If, for example,
crime is stable or decreasing but people perceive it to be
increasing, it may well have many of the same adverse
effects upon their lives as if crime were, in fact, in-
creasing. They will curtail their social life, relate to
strangers more cautiously, and invest in various, perhaps
unnecessary, home or car modifications.
For this reason, two questions were asked to gauge the
impact of the team unit on residents' perceptions of
crime. The first dealt with whether the respondent felt
crime had increased, decreased, or remained the same
over the past twelve months. The second concerned how
safe the respondent felt walking alone at night. Tables
3 and 4 report the breakdowns for these questions. Table
3 reveals the most distinct change. While the feelings
of respondents in the control group are quite stable, a
substantial proportion of those in the target area feel
that crime has decreased since the introduction of the
team program. Moreover, the change in the proportion
who felt crime has decreased in the target area is
significant beyond the .001 level. The changes are not
as marked in Table 4, but further examination reveals
that the proportion of people feeling unsafe (not safe
at all or somewhat unsafe) increased in the control
group, from .59 to .65. This change was statistically
significant beyond the .05 level, but it was not registered
among target-area residents. Thus it appears that the
team unit has had a stabilizing effect in this area.
These two questions were broken down by the same
four population subgroupings used earlier, but no con-
sistent patterns emerged. Thus the observed changes
were fairly widespread.
Clearance Rates
In many regards the impact of the team program upon
clearance rates (the proportion of cases "solved" by
police) is one of the most, if not the single most, crucial
aspect of this analysis. It is generally accepted today
that, given limited resources, the most effective way the
police can directly impact upon crime is by increasing
the costs of committing crime (i.e., increasing the appre-
hension rate). Thus the impact of any deployment strategy
upon clearance rates should be carefully assessed.
Table 5 shows that with regard to four of the five crimes,
clearance rates in the experimental area went up while
those in the control group went down (tests of statistical
Table 3
TREND OF NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME IN PAST YEAR
Experimental
Group
Control
Group
Before After Before After
Increased
Decreased
Remained the same
21.2%
132
656
100%
(378)
19.3%
21.7
59.0
100%
(487)
19.7%
5.5
747
99%
(487)
22.2%
7.9
69.8
99%
(378)
These positive findings raised a further point of inquiry.
An analysis of the data collected in the preex pen mental
surveys revealed that mean scores on the service evalua-
tion questions (SE 1 to SE 4) were significantly lower
(beyond the 001 level) in the target area than in the con-
trol group. The postexpenmental surveys: however, reveal
that for SE 3 and SE 4 (the more general evaluative ques-
tions) there were no significant differences between the
target group and the control group. Thus it is clear that
one effect of the program has been to lead people who
have traditionally felt discriminated against to begin to
feel that they are getting equitable treatment.
There is also evidence to suggest that this impact is
more than just perceptual. It has often been noted by
students of urban police that, due to racial tensions and
mistrust, members of minority groups are less apt to call
the police for assistance than are whites. The presurveys
showed this to be true for Champaign's Northend as well.
The postsurveys show that this previous, statistically
significant difference has disappeared as calls per
household rose from .175 to .243. The latter figure of .243
is not significantly different from the .22 figure recorded
in the control group. Moreover, further analyses showed
that this increased tendency to call the police in the tar-
get area is wholly due to increased requests from black
households.
In an effort to determine where the evaluative changes
had taken place, the two target samples (pre and post)
were broken down by different population subgroups:
race, annual household income (below and above
$5,000), age (below and above forty-five), and whether
or not the respondent had occasion to call the police
during the six months prior to the survey. This analysis
showed that changes have occurred largely (SE 4 being
the lone exception) among whites, those above the
poverty line, those forty-five or older, and those who had
not had contact with the police. With only two exceptions,
these results were not paralleled in the control group,
where the few changes that did occur were sporadic.
Attitudes toward the Police
Nine different questions (A1 to A9) were asked to gauge
respondents' attitudes toward the police:
A1 — Champaign policemen have a tendency to accuse
people of things they didn't do.
A2 — In general, Champaign policemen are of below
average intelligence.
A3 — Generally, the Champaign police really try to help
people who are in trouble.
A4 — In general, Champaign policemen have a tendency
to use force on people for no reason at all.
A5 — Champaign policemen are brave.
A6 — Champaign policemen generally don't give a
person a chance to explain.
A7 — In general, Champaign policemen are dedicated to
their job.
A8 — In general, Champaign policemen try to act like
big shots.
A9 — Generally, the Champaign police are trouble in-
stead of help.
Again each was scored so that the most positive score
was 5.
Table 2 shows the findings from this analysis; the pat-
tern is quite similar to that reported in Table 1. In the
Northend positive changes were reported for seven of
expected to lead to more positive attitudes among team
members and better service delivery. As for the depart-
ment, closer contact between supervisors and patrol
officers should lead to greater mutual understanding,
better cooperation, and more efficient uses of available
manpower. Decentralized planning and deployment are
also expected to enhance police responsiveness to
community needs, enabling them to make more efficient
use of their resources. In short, service delivery should
improve.
TEAM POLICING IN CHAMPAIGN
The Champaign team-policing program, like the program
of any operational unit, is a variant of the general model.
While it is small (fourteen officers), it has all of the basic
attributes of a team program. All team members are
volunteers; they are equipped with mobile radios and
special insignia, and they are encouraged to engage in
foot patrolling. Before going into the field, they participated
in an intensive training program focusing upon partici-
pative management, planning, goal setting and evalua-
tion, human relations, follow-up investigations, selective
crime enforcement, use of crime analysis information,
crime prevention education, and physical security ap-
plications. The team unit held several community meetings
during its early existence and conducted an active crime
prevention campaign.
Evaluating the Program
There is almost always a difference between the ex-
pected and actual impact of social programs. This impact
should always be evaluated empirically. What follows is
a somewhat limited evaluation of Champaign's team-
policing program. It is a condensed and modified ver-
sion of a fuller evaluation performed for the Champaign
Urban High Crime Program to comply with the Illinois
Law Enforcement Commission's policy of examining
the effectiveness of programs it supports. Because of
limited resources the program's impact upon individual
officers and internal departmental matters could not be
gauged.
To examine the impact of the program upon the com-
munity, two types of police performance data were col-
lected. One category included general measures of
citizen satisfaction with the police — citizen evaluations
of police services and attitudes toward the police. The
second category included crime-relevant measures of
police performance, such as fear and perception of
crime, clearance rates, and crime rates.
To collect the data two sets of surveys were conducted,
and a significant amount of police records data was
collected, employing a quasi-experimental design. The
records data were crime-related information collected
for selected periods before and after the team program's
implementation. The surveys included both crime- and
noncrime-relevant measures of police performance. The
first set of two surveys was conducted in February 1976,
four months before the program became operational. One
survey was administered to a sample of approximately
500 people living in the "target area" (i.e., the Northend
of Champaign); a second was administered to a sample
of approximately 500 people living in Champaign out-
side the target area (the control group). Twenty months
later a second set of surveys was conducted using the
same instrument and the same sampling design.
Evaluation of Police Services
Four main questions (SE 1 to SE 4) were asked to gauge
respondents' evaluations of police services;
SE 1 — How would you rate the speed in responding to
calls for assistance of the Champaign Police De-
partment (excellent, good, fair, not very good,
poor)"?
SE 2 — How would you rate their courtesy (excellent,
good, fair, not very good, poor)?
SE 3 — On the whole, would you say the service provided
to you and your household by Champaign police
is excellent, good, fair, not very good, poor?
SE 4 — Compared to Champaign as a whole, do you think
police protection in your neighborhood is much
better, about the same, worse, or much worse?
Each of these four questions was scored from 1 to 5, with
5 being a positive score.
Table 1 displays the mean service evaluation score for
each of the four evaluative questions. The meaning of the
data in this table is unequivocal. While citizen evalua-
tions in the control group were relatively stable (one
went marginally up, one went marginally down), those in
the target area went up on each measure. Moreover, the
positive changes were not just marginal, two were above
the .001 level of probability and one was above the .01
level.
Table 1
MEAN SERVICE EVALUATION SCORES IN BASIC SAMPLES
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SMALL TOWNS, BIG GRANTS:
FEDERAL AID AND NONMETROPOLITAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT^IN ILLINOIS
Alvin D. Sokolow
Nonmetropolitan communities in Illinois and elsewhere
in the past few years have become new or greatly expanded
participants in federal grant programs — perhaps the
single most important development in small town govern-
ment and policymaking for many decades. Once seen as
fiercely independent and hostile to the intervention of
outside forces, rural and other small governments are
becoming increasingly dependent on various forms of
federal aid. If not always welcomed enthusiastically by
local officials, this new dependence is at least accepted
for the community benefits it brings.
The trend has been especially striking since 1972,
when the "no strings" money of the General Revenue
Sharing (GRS) program began to flow to virtually all
counties, municipalities, and townships. Other grant and
loan programs for small towns and rural communities
have been established or enlarged since that time. Local
governments in these places still make less use of federal
aid than those in bigger and more urban communities But
their reliance on outside funds has increased dramatically
in the 1970s, according to U.S. Census of Governments
data. For Illinois cities and villages under 50,000 popula-
tion as a group, the percentage of total general revenues
derived from federal sources shot up from less than 2 per-
cent in fiscal 1972 to almost 10 percent in 1977. The com-
parable trend for municipalities over 50.000 was more
stable during this period, increasing only from 12 percent
to 18 percent While the 1960s may be remembered for
their big city and metropolitan focus, the 1970s could very
well be labeled as the decade of the small town.
The increasing reliance on federal aid raises some im-
portant questions about the performance of local govern-
ments in small communities. Certainly there are impacts
on local policymaking and administration, but are they
negative or beneficial'' Does fiscal dependence on
federal programs lead to the loss of community political
autonomy, for example? Or are governmental operations
directly improved and officials stimulated further to
tackle their problems with local resources?
These are appropriate questions for Illinois. Despite
its urban reputation, this state has a substantial non-
metropolitan population and numerous small municipali-
ties and rural localities About two million persons (18
percent of the state's population) live in the seventy-nine
counties (as of 1970) located outside Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas (SMSA). mostly within the borders
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of more thgc 70(lsma£l cities and villages. These places
have a new vitality and attractiveness today, marked by
recent pqikulaWon ir^rease or stabilization because of
the
rever^S of£§any-$Jecades of rural to urban migration.
Between {$70 and f§76 nonmetropolitan areas in Illinois
experienced a 2 percent increase in population, largely
due to net immigration, while the SMSAs actually lost
population by almost 1 percent.
This report is a brief examination of the federal aid trend
among nonmetropolitan communities in Illinois, partic-
ularly the grants that flow directly to small municipal
governments. It is based on a field study of the recent
experiences of ten cities and villages in east central
Illinois. Initially, though, we review the statewide pattern
of federal aid to nonmetropolitan jurisdictions.
THE STATEWIDE PATTERN
No matter how rural or small, there are no incorporated
cities or villages in Illinois today that do not receive one
or more forms of federal aid. At minimum, each munici-
pality receives GRS funds. The importance of this one
program in bringing small jurisdictions into the federal
grants system cannot be overstated. Enacted in 1972 as
the keystone of the Nixon Administration's attempts to de-
centralize federal aid, GRS provides quarterly and almost
unrestricted payments to virtually all general purpose
local governments in the nation — municipalities, coun-
ties, and townships. Most rural municipalities and town-
ships, as a result, received their first direct federal grants
in 1972 And many shortly thereafter began to tap other
federal sources, as a variety of new or enlarged programs
were opened to small communities.
Table 1 lists the seven grant programs that now account
for the bulk of federal aid to cities and villages in non-
metropolitan areas of Illinois. Both block grant and project
grant programs are represented on the list. Block grants
include GRS, CETA, and some community development
programs; they distribute funds on an ongoing basis to
eligible agencies according to set formulas. Local re-
cipients in effect are "entitled" to particular payments,
and their use is relatively unrestricted. In contrast, project
grants generally involve competitive applications by
local agencies for one-time spending on specific projects.
Features of both types of programs are involved in the
community development grants administered by HUD.
While the great majority of such funds are distributed by
formula to big entitlement cities and counties located pri-
marily in metropolitan areas, small cities compete for
"discretionary" grants
Under the seven programs listed in Table 1, a total of
about $5.3 billion was distributed to Illinois municipalities
and other local governments from 1971 through 1978.
About 17 percent ($925 million) of this amount went to
units in nonmetropolitan areas. This was slightly less than
the nonmetropolitan share of lllinois's- population, about
18 percent.
The seven grant programs represent a relatively new
nonmetropolitan direction for federal assistance to
municipalities. Five of the programs were established
within the past eight years, while the other two date from
the 1960s but have been expanded in recent years Two
have eligibility requirements that specifically favor small
governments — the Farmers Home Administration loans
and grants to communities under 10,000 population and
the "small cities" or discretionary part of the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. The CDBG
program clearly illustrates the new small town emphasis.
In 1974 it replaced a series of categorical grants admin-
istered by HUD including urban renewal and model
cities. Only twelve of the sixty-four nonmetropolitan
municipalities funded by CDBG (both entitlement and
discretionary grants) from 1975 through 1978 had par-
ticipated in the earlier HUD programs, as compared to
thirty-seven of fifty-four metropolitan cities.
It should be pointed out that Table 1 concentrates on
the
"big money" programs and does not tell the full story
of federal assistance to small Illinois municipalities.
Although involving relatively small amounts, other grant
programs have had numerous nonmetropolitan recipients.
They include grants for park acquisition and develop-
ment, ambulance purchases, and local fire equipment
and training.
In addition, police departments in many nonmetro-
politan communities have received criminal justice
grants (funded by the Department of Justice and admin-
istered by the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission and
regional LECs) for equipment and training.
Despite their greatly increasing use of federal aid,
cities and villages receive less than a majority of total
grant funds that flow to nonmetropolitan communities.
County governments are also major users of federal aid
— more because of their traditional role in the delivery
of state and federally mandated and supported services
such as roads, welfare, health, and courts, than because
of any recent aggressiveness in pursuing grants. School
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districts also receive substantial federal funds. Other
recipients include regional planning commissions, other
regional agencies, and nonprofit agencies involved in /"?
social services. Township governments in Illinois have v
"
not joined the grantsmanship ranks to any appreciable
extent, other than to receive automatically their GRS
entitlements.
TEN MUNICIPALITIES: THE FIELD STUDY
For a more intimate view of the federal grants process at
the community level, field research was conducted in May
and June of 1979 in ten small cities and villages. All of
the municipalities are under 10,000 population, and all
are located in nonmetropolitan and primarily agricultural
counties in east central Illinois. Two criteria guided the
selection of the sample from among the more than 140 in-
corporated municipalities in fifteen counties:
— The degree of participation since 1971 in the four major
project or competitive programs — Farmers Home Ad-
ministration, EDA, EPA, and CDBG discretionary grants
Based on the number of separate grants or loans re-
ceived, five "high" and five "low" municipal recipients
were selected. 1
— Varied population size. Two communities each repre-
sent five separate population categories, ranging from
under 1,000 population to 5,000-9,999 population as
of 1975.
The sample thus consists of five pairs of municipalities
in varying population categories, with each pair including
one high and one low participant in major grant programs.
Table 2 identifies the ten sample municipalities (pseudo-
nyms are substituted for the actual names) according to ^—
their estimated 1975 populations, form of municipal (1
government, and per capita measures of community
wealth. The project grants received by the municipalities
since 1971, including funds from federal sources other
than the four major programs, are also listed. All of these
cities and villages, of course, are GRS recipients, and in
recent years all have had some experience with temporary
employees placed by the CETA program. An effort was
made to select two municipalities within each high-low
pair with similar community characteristics in addition
to population size Each of the three smallest categories
includes communities in the same county, while the four
larger municipalities are all county seat towns. Some
significant per capita wealth differences within pairs,
however, could not be avoided.
By no means can these ten municipalities be regarded
as a statistically representative sample for all of lllinois's
790 nonmetropolitan cities and villages. For one thing,
most of these east central towns are relatively prosperous
compared to the majority of nonmetropolitan communi-
ties throughout the state. Yet, the sample does contain
a range of local situations, which permits a more reveal-
ing analysis of municipal grant experiences than would
be possible with just data on statewide grant distributions.
' The selection of the high grant communities was initially based on the
receipt of at least two grants from among the four project grant programs
Later, during the course of the field research, it was discovered that the
original information was incomplete and that two of the low grant munic-
ipalities had actually received two grants apiece The basic high-low dis-
tinction was still maintained, however, as these two low municipalities
received fewer grants overall than the comparable high municipalities
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Yet none of the four grantsmen in the ten community
sample occupied such a position. They were:
— In Clearwater, the half-time director of community de-
velopment (CD) for the city who also served half-time
as executive of the local chamber of commerce,
— The chief of the rural fire district in Summerville,
— Acorn's city clerk, and
— The mayor (village president) of Simplicity,
The clerk and the mayor were elected municipal officials,
while the fire chief and CD director were appointed. Of all
these positions, that of the CD director most closely ap-
proximated in formal responsibilities the job of a full-time
municipal executive. But his background was in business,
and neither he nor any of the other identifiable grantsmen
had any specific training or experience in professional
city management or planning.
Only a few of these grantsmen actually sat down and
wrote entirely all of the proposals their municipalities sub-
mitted to federal programs. Assistance for this task, in-
cluding the necessary information gathering, came from
outside agencies — a county planner in one instance
and, more frequently, the engineering firms employed on
local projects, the Illinois Department of Local Govern-
ment Affairs, and a regional community college.
More than compensating for the absence of professional
expertise was the time, energy, and interest the four
grantsmen devoted to the job of pursuing federal aid for
their communities. All were informed about changing
federal programs or knew where to get such information,
and they doggedly handled the numerous local actions
required for grant applications and administration. In
some respects they were probably more effective than
either local professionals or outside consultants could
have been. Three of the four were members of the local
political establishment, long-time leaders with solid
reputations who could readily sell others — particularly
municipal councils — on the desirability of obtaining aid
for specific projects
Furthermore, they were able to move quickly to make
use of sudden opportunities and to broker local resources
to extend the benefits of federal aid. When EDA told the
Summerville fire district that it was eligible for a public
works grant for a new station but had only ten days to
submit complete plans and specifications, the fire chief
persuaded his board to hire an engineering firm to come
up with the documents from scratch. Acorn's city clerk
saw the leveraging potential when a local farmer died
and left the community $60,000 to purchase land for a
park. He persuaded the executors of the estate to release
the money for development of the park, put together a
successful proposal for a LAWCON grant for land acquisi-
tion, and helped arrange for the volunteered labor and
donations of various community groups to construct park
facilities, including a swimming pool and ball diamond
With the exception of the CD director in Clearwater,
grantsmanship was not formally an aspect of the positions
held by these officials. Rather it was a self-defined role,
a long-term assignment the grantsmen themselves took
on because they had a genuine interest in achieving com-
munity improvements, the necessary time, considerable
drive and perseverance, and probably no little ego. As
a member of a family who had been associated with the
volunteer department for more than forty years, Summer-
ville's fire chief was an empire builder who seized upon
the opportunity provided by grant funds to expand facili-
ties, equipment, paid personnel, and skills of his depart-
ment In the little village of Simplicity, the $25-a-month
mayor came into office in 1965 with the intention of build-
ing a sewer system to replace the town's septic tanks.
Starting before the clean water mandates of state and
federal governments were widely applied, it took him
thirteen years to accomplish this goal as he persevered
through numerous grant delays, cost increases, and plan
changes. The clerk of Acorn was a retired businessman
who set out to pay back the community for a good life.
He saw the clerk's position as extending beyond its formal
record-keeping responsibilities; it was an opportunity to
bring new resources to the town
Few if any of the other fire chiefs, mayors, and clerks in
the ten municipalities saw grantsmanship as an important
or even justifiable part of their jobs. One clerk pointed out:
There are all kinds of grants available, and it takes somebody
who knows something about this. I don't have the time in my
office I do work with the Department of Local Government Affairs,
and I think the city should utilize their services more. But I don't
make the rules, I just administer them.
Why then does the grantsmanship role appear as at-
tached to certain positions in only some of the communi-
ties in the sample? The field research did not dig deeply
enough to offer a solid explanation. Possibly these were
idiosyncratic happenings — the emergence of the right
person at the right time. But several clues suggest that
less random factors may have been at work. The interest
and support of business leaders, especially the top
officials of banks and savings and loan institutions,
seemed to lie behind the activity of several of the grants-
men. Strong support by a town's economic dominants,
however, cannot guarantee that one or another official in
local government will voluntarily take on the role. More-
over, informal grantsmanship is vulnerable to political
change. Nonetheless, while professionals in municipal
government may be more able to provide long-term con-
tinuity in grantsmanship. in a small town the greater ad-
vantage seems to come to the local, volunteer grantsman
backed by his position in the community.
Opposition and Conflict
One expected distinction between the high and low grant
municipalities failed to materialize. Leaders in the low
grant communities were not necessarily more opposed to
the use of federal aid than those in the high grant cities
and villages. In fact, not one of the persons interviewed
in this study criticized the local acceptance of grants on
philosophical grounds, despite the traditional small town
dislike of federal spending and actions. In their hearts
they may have been unhappy about the expansion of
grant programs, but on pragmatic grounds they were only
too willing to accept the aid. One official rationalized the
acceptance in these terms:
My attitude and that of the planning commission is that there is a
lot to do in this town In principle I agree that federal grants are
not good. If nobody in Chicago and Cook County wanted the HUD
money this would be fine, and we could cut back federal taxes.
But this city doesn't have a local tax base to support all the im-
provements that are needed. We may not like taking federal
money in principle. But why send the money just to Lincoln and
Springfield? We are paying for it with our own tax dollars
Table 2
THE TEN COMMUNITY SAMPLE: FEDERAL AID EXPERIENCES IN 1971-78
General Data
HIGH GRANT MUNICIPALITIES
Project Grants _ General Data
LOW GRANT MUNICIPALITIES
Project Grants
5-9,999 Population
Clearwater — Delavan County (county seat
7,500 population CDBG — $900,000
Commission
$230 p.c. sales tax
$5,053 p.c. income
FmHA loan — $2.5 million
EPA — $25,650
LAWCON— $21,000
Ambulance
3-4,999 Population
Summerville — Mansfield County (county seat)
4,200 population EDA — $200,000
Commission (fire district)
$183 p.c. sales tax FmHA loan — $1.15 million
$4,519 pc income EPA — 2 projects
$1.7 million; $66,000
Ambulance (fire district)
Portland — Esther County (county seat)
9,700 population EPA — $239,000
Commission
$178 p c. sales tax
$4,637 p.c income
Stream City — Stream County (county seat)
4,800 population EPA — $30,000
Commission
$253 p.c. sales tax
$4,240 p.c. income
2-2,999 Population
Acorn — Daniel County
2.200 population
Aldermanic
$237 p.c sales tax
$4,614 p c income
EDA— $186,000
FmHA loan — $190,000
EPA— $808,000
LAWCON — $33,000
Ambulance
Arnold — Daniel County
2,100 population
Village
$263 p.c. sales tax
$5,303 p.c. income
EPA— $15,000
Ambulance
1-1,999 Population
Nativity — Crossbow County
1.500 population
Commission
$122 p.c sales tax
$3,832 p.c income
FmHA grant — $50,000
EPA — 2 projects
$247,000; $10,000
EDA— $115,000
Ambulance
Grassland — Crossbow County
1 ,400 population EPA — $447,000
Village EDA— $142,000
$258 p c sales tax
$4,012 p c. income
Under 1,000 Population
Simplicity — Stream County
600 population
Village
$218 p.c. sales tax
$4,047 p.c. income
FmHA loan/grant -
$877,000
EPA — $800,000
Ambulance
Topton — Stream County
600 population
Village
$46 p.c. sales tax
$3,149 p c income
FmHA loan— $138,000
EPA — $5,025
Note: Community and county names are pseudonyms For definition of high and low grant communities see footnote 1
General Data Key Project Grants Key
1975 estimated populations (approximate) CDBG — Community Development Block Grant (HUD)
Form of municipal government FmHA — Farmers Home Administration loans or grants (USDA)
1976-77 per capita sales tax revenues for municipality EDA — Economic Development Administration
1974 per capita personal income for community EPA — Environmental Protection Agency
LAWCON — Land and Water Conservation grant
Ambulance — Ambulance Grant (DOT)
large fiscal reserve because of a municipally owned gas
and electrical distribution system. Local officials thus
were better able than those in other places to turn to local
revenues for major projects. The village of Arnold paid
for a $500,000 improvement to its water system in 1978
by issuing bonds based on the revenues of the system.
Grantsmanship was further discouraged in these rela-
tively wealthy communities because officials believed
they would not be eligible for federal aid. The belief was
probably valid, as the Farmers Home Administration,
CDBG discretionary, and EDA programs generally favor
communities that are unable to raise funds elsewhere or
that have high indicators of poverty or unemployment.
Levels of wealth, however, did not uniformly distinguish
between high and low grantsmanship and grant use
among the municipalities in the sample. In the case of
the largest and smallest population categories, the high
grant municipality in each pair was actually the more
prosperous in terms of sales tax revenues and personal
income.
Political Leadership
Four of the high grant communities had a recognized
grantsman — a person in government office who aggres-
sively and willingly sought federal funds. No such persons
occupied public positions in the low grant communities.
This was the most critical difference between the two
groups of municipalities.
Recognizing a community need that could be tackled
with federal aid is only the first step; there is also the hard
work involved in identifying the appropriate program,
building local support, and applying for the grant. The
grantsmanship process for small towns, many commen-
tators have insisted, is a complex and frustrating one,
what with extensive information gathering, paperwork,
and time requirements. Nonmetropolitan local govern-
ments generally lack the expertise to compete with larger
units for grants, the usual solution is to employ city
managers, planners, or other full-time professionals or
to rely completely on consultants, regional planning
agencies, or other sources of outside expertise.
k
Two sets of questions guided the field research. One
involved the grantsmanship process and the differences
between high and low participants; the other concerned
the local impacts on government and policymaking of in-
creasing dependence on federal aid. Open-ended inter-
views — conversations, actually — were conducted with
one to five knowledgeable persons in each community,
including municipal clerks, mayors, council members,
municipal attorneys, cooperative extension personnel,
bankers, and other businessmen. Other interviews were
held with grant administrators in state and federal agen-
cies, staff members of the Illinois Department of Local
Government Affairs, and regional agency executives. In-
formation sources also included recent issues of news-
papers published in most of the communities, municipal
records, and federal and state agency files.
VARIATIONS IN GRANTSMANSHIP
Different levels of grantsmanship generally distinguish
between the high and low federal aid recipients in the ten
community sample. Two sets of factors help to explain
the variations. These may be characterized as "perceived
need," on the one hand, and "political leadership," on
the other.
Perceived Need
Many cities and villages seek project grants to help deal
with specific public needs. Typically these fall into one or
a combination of three categories: (1) improving basic in-
frastructure such as sewers and water supply, (2) stimulat-
ing economic development, or (3) enhancing such public
amenities as parks and recreation facilities. In an objec-
tive sense, all communities have such public needs. The
difference, however, is in the intensity with which the
need at a particular time is perceived by public officials,
and what they decide — or don't decide — to do about it.
Perceived needs are stimulated in various ways, some
unrelated to local government officials and residents. A
crisis, such as a water shortage, quickly draws attention,
wells in two of the municipalities went dry in recent years,
and the communities qualified for expedited loans and
grants from Farmers Home Administration. A more com-
mon instance of externally imposed needs involves the
water quality standards established by the state EPA,
which forced most municipalities in the sample to seek
federal and state funds from the same agency. In most
cases, however, aggressive grantsmanship was the result
of locally inspired views of desired projects. Sometimes
these views were helped along by seeing what a federal
grant had bought a nearby community, such as a new
water tower or an attractive community building.
Two variables that influence local perceptions of need
are the timing of public projects and relative community
wealth. In at least three of the municipalities with low
records of grant use and grantsmanship — Stream City,
Arnold, and Grassland — officials from 1971 to 1978
believed that their communities were in good shape,
governmentally and economically. Two of these communi-
ties had just completed major infrastructure improve-
ments, thus eliminating some of the potential for grants-
manship at the time federal programs were beginning to
focus on nonmetropolitan jurisdictions.
All three of these low grant municipalities were also
financially well off, as compared to the high grant cities
and villages. Sales tax revenues were relatively high, and
municipal debt was low. Grassland had accumulated a
Table 1
FEDERAL AID AND NONMETROPOLITAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ILLINOIS, FY 1971-78
By the same token, few significant controversies were
generated directly by any of the grantsmanship activities
in the ten communities studied. There were conflicts
associated with some of the projects to be funded with
the grants, but -these did not directly concern the munic-
ipal decision to apply for aid. Wastewater treatment
projects funded by EPA grants, for example, often were
controversial because of the complex and lengthy series
of local actions required between initial application and
construction. A common problem was the required 25 per-
cent local share of funds. In one community an initial bond
issue failed, and in another higher utility rates were turned
down. The proposed site of the treatment lagoons in one
town was opposed by residents of the neighborhood. In
still another community, council members disputed the
validity of pledges made by merchants to match a federal
grant for downtown improvements
As in small towns everywhere, there was frequent grip-
ing about the paperwork requirements and shifting cri-
teria of federal programs. These difficulties were men-
tioned most often by officials in the low grant communities.
From the viewpoint of the four grantsmen in the sample,
however, the difficulties were more annoyances than
serious obstacles. Two of these officials indicated:
Sure there is a ponderous amount of paperwork. But we are getting
damn well paid for the paperwork; we're getting the grant money
You go to other cities and they say there is too much red tape
I am glad they feel this way, because it means much more money
for the rest of us There are lots of headaches with these programs,
but they work. After we get one grant, we go after the next one.
One possible explanation for the minimal opposition to
federal aid programs recorded in this research is the
initial grant experiences of most of the small municipali-
ties with their GRS checks. Because of its simple pro-
cedures and minimal requirements, GRS caused few
problems for local officials and may have helped soften
local hostility to federal programs in general.
SOME IMPACTS
If grantsmanship did not cause much controversy in
these communities, the effects of federal aid did not go
unnoticed. Most of the public improvements so funded
were highly visible and appreciated. They included new
or improved wastewater treatment facilities, enlarged
water systems, repaved streets, parks, and municipal
buildings • .
Other effects of federal aid are more long-term and not
as easily observed. At least some limited changes in local
government organization and procedures were noted in
several of the high grant communities. The city of Clear-
water, for example,- .as a direct result of its CDBG grant
and the work of its grantsman CD director, began to re-
organize its planning and building code functions. Ac-
counting and budgeting procedures were changed in
several of the small municipalities which had received
Farmers Home Administration loans, because of the need
to repay the loans. Elsewhere, intergovernmental coop-
eration between separate municipalities was enhanced
In one case two towns jointly obtained an ambulance
grant. A more common example was the receipt of multi-
junsdictional grants for police and fire training and com-
munications equipment.
Such management and administrative changes are
hardly startling developments. A far more profound im-
pact would involve the loss of political autonomy, or the
capacity to handle local problems with local resources,
as small communities become increasingly dependent
on the funds provided by federal programs. This did not
appear to be the case in the five high grant communities,
where federal aid in some cases actually stimulated the
use of local resources. Acorn's example in combining a
grant with local funds and donated labor to construct a
new park was notable. Similar public-private combina-
tions were reported in other communities, including Clear-
water where the costs of administering the CDBG grant
were reduced because planning commission members
volunteered to supervise housing rehabilitation efforts.
Summerville, Acorn, Arnold, and Nativity all had non-
profit community foundations or development corpora-
tions that worked on local projects in conjunction with —
or independently of — federal grants. Two of the munici-
palities that went into the ambulance business with the
assistance of grants subsequently began to levy tax rates
to support and expand the service. The record shows that
local initiative in these few communities was actually en-
hanced by the use of federal aid.
CONCLUSION
For nonmetropolitan municipalities in Illinois, federal
grant programs are becoming the dominant funding
source for major public improvements. The small cities
and villages, however, do not share equally in the new
federal largesse, as this study suggests. Much of the aid
is still in the form of categorical or project grants, despite
the appearance of GRS and other block grant programs,
and aggressive grantsmanship is still a necessary step
to obtaining the big dollars. Grantsmanship in the small
Illinois municipality is very much a variable circumstance,
more dependent on the personality and initiative of in-
dividual officeholders than on definite and continuous
municipal policy. As a result, community need — objec-
tively defined — may have little bearing on the relative
amounts of federal aid sought and received by different
cities and villages This is an issue of equity and the
design of federal grant programs that goes far beyond the
confines of this limited study
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Passage of the 1974 Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act presaged a minor revolution in intergovern-
mental relations for the cities of Illinois. Under the new
Community Development Block Grant program, Title I
of the act. many Illinois communities received their first
substantial federal assistance for urban development and
revitalization while other cities saw massive increases
in their federal aid receipts. The 1974 housing and com-
munity development legislation also heralded a new
era of reduced federal red tape and involvement with an
increased scope of local choice and decision making
The Community Development Block Grant program is
now in its fifth year, following one major legislative revi-
sion in 1977, and communities have accumulated a large
stock of benefits and experience under this new federal
arrangement. This study, based on an analysis of some
fifteen medium and large size cities in Illinois, docu-
ments the development and impact of the community
development program, and the response of Illinois cities
to this effort.
The beginnings of a block grant approach to commu-
nity development can be traced to President Richard
Nixon's efforts to replace 129 separate categorical grant
programs with six programs of "special revenue-sharing."
The original proposal for urban development would have
combined funding for urban renewal, Model Cities, hous-
ing rehabilitation, and neighborhood facilities into a
single annual grant with only limited restrictions and
federal review
The special revenue-sharing arrangement sought to
reach three general goals. First, the program would elim-
inate so-called grantsmanship at the city level, whereby
some communities receive high levels of federal aid
simply because of their ability to file applications and
please federal bureaucrats. Urban development assis-
tance would be linked to local need defined in a con-
sistent and objective manner. Federal aid would also be
provided in regular, annual installments so that cities
could be certain about funding local programs. Second,
the new program would be characterized by reduced
federal review and oversight. The Nixon administration
proposal eliminated all applications and merely sub-
jected spending to post-audit review. Finally, local
choice was to be maximized with all decisions on spend-
ing priorities and development strategies made by city
hall. The general goals of the Nixon administration were
shared by many national and local political leaders. The
Heywood T. Sanders is an assistant professor at the Institute of Government
and Public Affairs in spring 1980 he will take a leave of absence to work
in the Washington office of HUD
actual mechanisms for accomplishing them led to a great
deal of disagreement.
WHYSjAND^VHTOEFORES OF THE 1974 ACT
The firJtcgoaP% guarantee of federal financial assistance.
involvei^the dual
rJEiestions
of who was to receive regular,
annualjSid ai*d ba& much aid each jurisdiction would be
granted Th*g197d act eventually created
two parallel,
yet di^&ict ct&ograjns: an entitlement program
and a dis-
cretionary gSnt ijjjogram Under the entitlement program,
regulaf»assistance is provided for the central cities in
metropolitan areas with populations of 50,000 or more.
Federal entitlement aid is provided to "urban counties"
where the county population exceeded 200,000 and the
county government is legally authorized to perform com-
munity development functions in its unincorporated areas.
New units of local government may enter the program
when new metropolitan areas are declared or when their
population exceeds 50,000.
Cities which do not meet the population and metropoli-
tan requirements for the entitlement program are able to
compete for funds under the companion, discretionary
program. While the program regulations and application
requirements are the same for both programs, localities
in the discretionary program are required to compete for
federal aid on an annual basis without the assurance of
support provided for entitlement jurisdictions.
The issue of funding was perhaps the most difficult for
the Congress and the Nixon administration to deal with.
Some legislators favored an immediate shift to funding
based on an objective needs formula. Others endorsed
a
"grandfather clause" called hold-harmless which based
assistance on a community's previous level of federal
aid.' Both groups differed on the components and mea-
surements of funds distribution. The final law called for
a complex merging of hold-harmless funding with a for-
mula-determined amount based on city population size,
number of poor persons, and number of overcrowded
housing units. 2 Where the previous level of funding ex-
ceeded the formula amount, localities received three
years of funding at the earlier levels. For the next three
years their assistance was to be reduced by thirds so
' The "hold-harmless
"
amount is based on a city's average annual funding
for fiscal years 1968 through 1972 in the following federal grant programs
urban renewal, neighborhood development program, section 312 rehabili-
tation loans open space, water and sewer, public facilities, neighborhood
facilities, and Model Cities
2 In the calculation for funding under the 1974 formula, the measures are
weighted as follows: population, 25, housing overcrowding. 25, poverty.
5
that by 1980 their federal aid would be based exclusively
on the formula. Table 1 illustrates the impact that this
"phase down" would have had on the funding for Bloom-
ington, Illinois. From close to $2.2 million in aid during
the early years of the program, Bloomington's funding
was programmed to drop to only $555,000. Where the
hold-harmless level was less than the formula amount,
cities were to receive increasing levels of aid for the first
three years, and full assistance based on the needs for-
mula for the following three years. Thus in Joliet. again
as shown in Table 1, with a hold-harmless sum of $149,000,
funding gradually increased from $295,000 in fiscal 1975
to the full formula level of $1,069,000 in 1977.
Table 1
ANNUAL COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FUNDING —
ESTIMATED AND ACTUAL— ILLINOIS EXAMPLES
(in thousands)
City 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Funding Decrease
Bloommgton
(1974 estimate) $2,169 $2,169 $2,169 $1,630 $1,093 $ 555
(Actual) 2,169 2,169 2,169 1,665 1,223 866
Funding Increase
Joliet
(1974 estimate) 304 720 1,098 1,116 1,116 1,116
(Actual) 295 656 1,069 1,222 1,251 1,528
Stable Funding
Peoria
(1974 estimate) 2,115 2,115 2,115 2,047 1,979 1,911
(Actual) 2,115 2.115 2,115 2,145 2,190 2,444
The 1977 Revisions
Despite the general endorsement of formula-based assis-
tance by cities, Congress, and the Nixon and Ford ad-
ministrations, the gradual elimination of hold-harmless
funding threatened a number of communities (particu-
larly in the Northeast and Midwest) with substantial de-
creases in aid. Their cause was a major focus of congres-
sional debate in 1977, and the result was a major revision
in the formula for distributing federal community develop-
ment dollars. Cities now have their need determined by
two different formulas with the dollar amount of aid deter-
mined by the larger value. In addition to the 1974 formula
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based on population, poverty, and housing overcrowding,
an alternative formula was devised which includes in-
dices of housing age, poverty, and population growth (T
lag.
3 The general result was a substantial increase in aid v
to older declining localities, including many in Illinois.
The community development program currently pro-
vides for aid on an annual entitlement basis to twenty-
five Illinois cities. Four communities have regularly elected
not to participate in the program: Berwyn, Cicero. Oak
Lawn, and Des Plaines. Two cities entered the program
after its inception. Kankakee's participation began in
1976 when that community was declared part of a metro-
politan area. Mount Prospect initiated its program in 1978
when its population was judged to have passed the 50,000
level.
The entitlement process also benefits five Illinois urban
counties (Cook, DuPage, Lake, Madison, and St. Clair).
In many cases these counties "pass through" federal
assistance to smaller cities and villages within their boun-
daries while undertaking only limited projects themselves.
Finally, some cities which do not qualify for entitlement
aid but which had previously participated in federal pro-
grams receive a modest (and declining) level of commu-
nity development support. Such locales as Carbondale,
Danville, and DeKalb receive some entitlement aid. but
this will decline to zero by 1980 although these cities re-
main eligible for assistance under the discretionary
program.
Federal vs. Local Control
The early proposals of the Nixon administration called for
absolutely no federal review of planned community de-
velopment activities While localities would be required to
provide a statement of objectives and planned spending. Jfl
these declarations would not be subject to prior federal ^^
review. Congress generally favored a more substantial
local plan of action, submitted in a specified application
form, and subject to federal review. This issue reflected
a continuing concern over the appropriate role of the na-
tional government in community development action —
whether it should support the activities of local govern-
ments in achieving local goals and objectives, or whether
national purposes demanded a statement of national ob-
jectives and a limitation on local choice.
As enacted, the community development program pro-
vides a blend of national insistence and local discretion.
While cities must file an annua! application, the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development is required to
review and decide on funding within a 75-day period
Applications held beyond 75 days are deemed automati-
cally approved. At the same time the grounds for disap-
proval are both limited and clearly specified by the legis-
lation. HUD is obliged to approve an application unless
local "facts and objectives (are) plainly inconsistent"
with available information on community needs, or local
activities are
"plainly inappropriate to meet the needs
and objectives identified by the applicant." HUD is also
allowed to review individual program activities for their
eligibility under the law and their conformance with na-
tional objectives. Concern with local divergences from
national goals prompted a major shift in the program regu-
lations in March 1978. While the 1974 act required that
local programs provide "maximum feasible priority" to
3 The formula added in 1977 places the greatest emphasis on old housing
(weighted .5), followed by poverty (.3), and population growth lag (2)
(
Springfield provide examples of the phase down situa-
tion. The high levels of aid in both cities continued from
1975 through 1977 with regular reductions until the 1980
formula level is reached. Peoria illustrates a third variant
where the level of previous activity and the calculations
of the formulas balance out to essentially stable funding
from 1975 through 1980.
For the entire state of Illinois, the relative balance of
gainers and losers is quite favorable. Six cities which
did not receive any funds under the categorical system
are now block grant recipients. Another eleven cities now
receive more on an annual basis than they had previously,
with some dramatic increases Only two cities (Peoria
and East St. Louis) are receiving roughly the same amount
of aid as under the categorical grants. Finally, four cities
(Bloomington, Rock Island, Rockford, and Springfield)
have seen their federal aid dollars decrease. Their appar-
ent loss is, however, something of an accounting artifact,
resulting from a late start in the urban renewal program.
Even their reduced 1980 funding will represent an in-
crease over their historical level of participation in federal
community development efforts.
CONCLUSION
While the community development block grant program
must be considered a net financial bonus for Illinois cities,
it is not without some negative aspects. The formula sys-
tem for distributing assistance may reduce a variety of
inequities and provide a guarantee of federal aid, but its
effect is to impose a ceiling as well as a floor on federal
dollars. The community which is successful in spending
its money and operating its programs may be unable to
benefit financially from its success, while other communi-
ties with less effective programs continue to receive their
"entitled" federal dollars For the urban centers of Illinois,
this is a particularly serious weakness. Historically sur-
passed by eastern urban centers in the contest for federal
aid. Illinois communities must now attempt to alleviate
long-standing problems of housing and neighborhood
deterioration with a relatively fixed and inadequate level
of aid. It will be many years before Peoria and Joliet can
reach the same level of physical improvement and neigh-
borhood revitalization that New Haven and Boston have
already achieved The block grant system has succeeded
in securing the participation of almost all eligible Illinois
communities In a marked departure from the limited em-
ployment of categorical grant programs, communities are
enlarging the scope of local governmental responsibility
to include issues of housing and community revitalization.
This increased contact with the federal government is
also altering the character and outcomes of local deci-
sions One jurisdiction (DuPage County) has lost its en-
titlement funding for 1979 due to limited achievements
in rehabilitating and developing housing Other commu-
nities may well find their local needs and desires in con-
flict with the intent and goals of the national government
with the unpleasant probability of losing their recently
gained federal largesse
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programs benefiting low or moderate income persons.
HUD now identifies the national concern with the commu-
nity development needs of the poor as a singular objec-
tive. Cities are now required to indicate on their annual
submittals the proportion of project funds directed to low
and moderate income areas and persons. Where the pro-
portion of benefits to this income group falls below 75
percent, HUD subjects the entire application to a more
stringent review of program eligibility and benefit. The
increased HUD concern with program benefit has caused
at least some anxiety among local officials although there
have been almost no cases in Illinois where cities were
forced to substantially alter their plans and programs.
The final objective of the Nixon administration's new
federalism was an increase in local choice decision-
making discretion. To some extent the requirement of an
annual application limited total freedom for cities. Local
choice is also constrained by the inclusion of a specific
list of eligible activities within the final legislation The
broadest scope is allowed for physical development ac-
tivities, including land acquisition, disposition, and re-
location. Substantial freedom is also provided for the
construction of new public facilities (where these benefit
a specific neighborhood rather than the entire city), and
public works, such as streets, sewers, lights, and side-
walks. The program also allows a number of approaches
to assist private individuals in rehabilitating housing. The
most restricted eligibility involves "soft" public service
activities. These are limited to areas where other commu-
nity development functions are to be performed, where
the service is determined to be "necessary and appropri-
ate" and not otherwise available from city government,
and where other grant assistance for the service is ap-
plied for and denied The clear intent of the Congress was
a concentration on physical improvements. Although a
Senate-supported limitation on public services spending
(to 20 percent of the annual entitlement) is not included
in the final legislation, HUD implicitly accepts such a
restriction on total services funding when it reviews local
applications.
As with most federal grant programs, local support for
a broader and less restrictive set of activities proved to
be irresistible. The 1977 revisions to the original provi-
sions allowed for greater freedom in providing housing
rehabilitation assistance with eligibility for economic
development activities and for projects carried out by
nonprofit neighborhood organizations. The tendency to
gradually increase the breadth of program eligibility and
the scope of local choice is endemic to federal aid efforts
as recipients seek to increase their own flexibility in
spending. It is likely that this path will continue to be
followed as the entire community development block grant
program is reconsidered and reviewed in 1980
THE FLOW OF AID DOLLARS TO ILLINOIS
The experience of Illinois communities demonstrates how
the shift from categorical assistance to a block grant ap-
proach has affected such issues as equity and need in
federal aid. From 1949 until 1974, federal community de-
velopment efforts were dominated by the urban renewal
and neighborhood development programs. Urban renewal
required a strong local commitment, both because cities
were required to submit applications for each individual
project they sought to undertake and because federal aid
required a local contribution of either one-third or one-
quarter of the project costs (depending on the size of the
city) Many Illinois cities failed to get their fair share of
renewal grants. A combination of fear of federal red tape
and
"strings" and a lack of local leadership and resources
often limited local participation in federally aided pro-
grams. Table 2. which indicates federal urban renewal
aid from 1949 to 1974 on a per capita basis, demonstrates
the impact of these local factors on grant receipts. The
table includes only entitlement localities; small commu-
nities and nonmetropolitan areas are not included.
In comparison with the major practitioners of urban re-
newal grantsmanship — New Haven. Connecticut, and
Boston, Massachusetts — Illinois cities received only a
modest level of federal aid. Even the federal aid levels
for Chicago and East St. Louis appear modest in compar-
ison with those for Providence, Rhode Island ($393.75
per capita). Baltimore, Maryland ($250.08 per capita),
Minneapolis ($280.87). and Detroit ($128 56) While Illi-
nois communities were generally gaining less federal
urban renewal aid than other cities in the Northeast and
Midwest, there were also substantial inequities in aid
within the state. Although the poorest city in Illinois (East
St. Louis) received substantial aid. a much wealthier
community (Bloomington) garnered even more on a per
capita basis. Joliet, with substantial problems of popu-
lation loss and urban decay, received less than half the
aid amounts of such places as Elgin and Champaign
The relative disadvantage of Illinois communities in
gaining federal aid was magnified by a problem of timing.
Even those cities that were successful in attracting fed-
eral dollars often initiated their renewal activities much
later than northeastern cities. Cities such as Boston and
New Haven had embarked on vigorous renewal in the
mid-1950s. Bloomington did not initiate a large-scale
project until 1970, as did Peoria. These late-entrant cities
found their federal aid could provide far less since the
costs of land and agency operations were much higher
and federal requirements more stringent than in earlier
periods. Consequently they have been forced to complete
their planned programs with aid under block grants.
The first column of Table 2 indicates that the majority
of Illinois entitlement cities did not even participate in
urban renewal activities. For many suburban localities,
such as Arlington Heights and Oak Park, the housing and
community development problems did not appear to
merit drastic intervention with federal programs. In other
cases, such as Waukegan and Urbana, local opposition
to federal rules and requirements effectively stymied any
local action
Another "snapshot" of federal assistance is provided
by the second column of Table 2 which indicates the aver-
age annual funding (hold-harmless level) cities received
from seven grant programs between 1968 and 1972. A
general image of large inequities in grant receipts is
apparent with Bloomington again the biggest aid win-
ner" in the state. Most cities, however, were able' to gain
at least some federal assistance during this five-year
period. Only Normal, Elgin. Oak Park, Skokie, Kankakee,
and Mt. Prospect remained completely outside the federal
arena. The average level of aid was, however, quite mod-
est. In addition, local participation was generally spe-
cialized, limited to one or two programs of the federal
aid inventory. In Champaign, Rantoul, and Joliet. the
bulk of federal assistance was accounted for by water
and sewer projects. In Urbana, Aurora. Arlington Heights,
Evanston. Waukegan, and Moline, grantsmanship was
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PROPERTY TAXES IN ILLINOIS
A. James Heins
Part I: PROPERTY TAX CHANGES IN ILLINOIS, 1940-77
Until the turn of this century, almost all of the revenue of
the state as well as local governments was derived from
the property tax. Since 1900, however, the state has turned
increasingly to other forms of taxation. In fact, in 1943
state government made its last property tax levy, and for
the last forty-five years sales and income taxes have
financed the rapid expansion of state government spending.
Local government units continue to have to rely, at least
in part, on this form of taxation. The purpose of this study
is to analyze changes in the level and distribution of
Table 1
PROPERTY TAX EXTENSIONS AND PERSONAL INCOME:
SELECTED YEARS 1929-77 IN ILLINOIS
Year
Property
Tax
Extensions*
(millions)
Personal
Income
(billions)
Extensions
as a Percent
of Income
1929
1933
1940
1945
1950
1955
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
$ 350.7
333.4
330.9
366 7
566 5
790.5
1,206.7
1,400 3
1,521.4
1,688 3
2,046.8
2,519.3
2,708.4
3,034.6
3,137.5
3,270.4
3,394,6
3,572.2
3,921.0
$ 7.3
3.3
6.0
10.8
15.3
21.0
26.4
28.9
32.1
38.1
43.8
50.1
53.4
57.7
633
69.4
75.4
81.8
89.4
4 82%
10.00
5 55
3.38
3.70
3.76
4.57
4.85
4 74
4 43
467
5.03
5.07
5.26
4.96
4.71
4.50
4.37
4 39
Source: US Department of Commerce, and Illinois Department of Local
Government Affairs (DLGA).
"
Property tax extensions data are reported by DLGA as being made a
year earlier For example, extensions shown above for 1977 are published
by DLGA as 1976 extensions. The money is actually collected in 1977.
A. James Heins is a professor in the Department of Economics at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign During the summer of 1979
he had a joint appointment with the institute
property taxes in Illinois from 1940 to 1977. It will show the
changing dependence on property taxes by the various
units of local government and relate those changes to
the personal income of those units as well as to other social
and economic attributes.
While the property tax continues to be the major tax
source available to local units of government, its relative
importance is declining. Table 1 shows property tax
extensions for selected years in the period 1929-77. As
a percent of income, extensions in 1976 are lower than
any year since 1955. It should be pointed out that the 1977
extension figure is artificially high because of action taken
in Cook County anticipating replacement of the personal
property tax. Much of the big increase in Cook County ex-
tensions will not be collected. When one notes that those
1977 property taxes account for about 30 percent of all state
and local tax revenues (exclusive of federal aid) compared
with 41 percent ten years earlier, the decreasing reliance
on property taxation is made even clearer.
Table 2 reveals another perspective on property taxes in
Illinois, a comparison of property tax levels in other
states.' Table 2 shows that Illinois property taxes are below
the national average and well below tax levels in Cali-
fornia, Michigan, and New York. Actually, Illinois ranks
only slightly ahead of Texas, 4.2 percent income to 3.6
percent, widely regarded as a low tax state.
Not only -have there been striking changes in the total
property tax burden, the distribution of those taxes among
the counties of Illinois has also changed significantly.
In the sections that follow, the distribution of taxes in 1940
is compared with the distribution in 1977. The emphasis
here is on the relationship between income and property
taxes in the counties, grouped in various ways.
DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND INCOMES —
METROPOLITAN AND RURAL AREAS
Table 3 shows changes in the relationship between property
taxes and income in various metropolitan counties and
rural areas between 1940 and 1977.
Changes in Income
Per capita income in Cook County in 1940 was $958,
significantly higher than the $636 reported in the Chicago
suburban counties. Rural counties reported an even lower
per capita income: $447, or less than half that of Cook
County.
Between 1 940 and 1 977 these rural counties experienced
an annual rate of growth in personal income of 7.5 percent,
increasing more than fourteen times over the period. By
comparison, residents of Cook County experienced an
annual income growth rate of 6.0 percent, less than an
eightfold increase during the same period. From having
less than half of Cook County's per capita income in 1940,
the rural counties achieved an income level of almost 80
percent of that in Cook County in 1977. Undoubtedly these
changes reflect the migration — in substantial measure
black — from rural areas in this and other states into the
city of Chicago. But, they also reflect improvements in the
productive capacity of agriculture and other lines of pro-
duction centered in rural areas.
Looking more closely at the progress of personal income
Table 3
PROPERTY TAXES AND INCOME IN METROPOLITAN
AND RURAL COUNTIES, 1940-77
' These data are actual property tax revenues reported by the US Bureau
of the Census, and differ slightly from Illinois data used in Table 1, which
were based on figures from the Department of Commerce Comparison
of Illinois with other states required use of census data
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The tax level in Chicago suburban counties increased
much faster than that in Cook. From $35 per capita in
1940, the property tax load in these counties increased
to $391 per capita in 1977, better than 98 percent of which
was collected. That represents an increase of more than
elevenfold in property taxes; but since per capita income
increased more than 13 times, the rate of property taxation
out of income actually declined in the suburban counties.
Note the experience in other counties. Per capita
property taxes in rural counties increased almost tenfold
in the 1940-1977 period. But since income levels increased
almost 15 times, the rate of property taxation out of income
has declined substantially, from 6.18 percent in 1940 to
4.36 percent in 1977. Experience in the downstate
metropolitan counties is similar but not quite as marked.
From 5.11 percent in 1940, property tax extensions de-
clined to 3.82 percent of income in these metropolitan
counties in 1977. As of 1977, the level and rate of property
taxation in downstate counties has been significantly
less than that in the six-county Chicago area.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND INCOMES —
COUNTIES BY INCOME GROUPS
Perhaps the most significant features of property tax
changes in Illinois over the period 1940-77 are revealed
in Table 4, which shows the change in the distribution
of property tax burden in counties grouped on the basis
of their income. In 1940 the poorer counties paid a
larger share of their income to property taxes than did
the wealthier counties. In 1977 the opposite was true:
the wealthier counties faced the highest rate of property
taxation.
Before looking further at changes in the distribution
of property taxes, it is instructive to note changes in the
distribution of income among the counties by decile
groups.
The Narrowing of Income Differentials
Table 4 reveals that there was a substantial narrowing of
the income differential between 1940 and 1977. In 1940,
Table 4
PROPERTY TAXES AND INCOME IN DECILES OF
ILLINOIS COUNTIES, 1940 AND 1977
Figure 1:
INCOME DIFFERENTIAL AMONG COUNTIES
Deciles*
Per Per Per Per Tax as Tax as
Cap Cap Cap Cap % of % of
Tax Tax Income Income Income Income
1940 1977 1940 1977 1940 1977
1
Changes in the Distribution of Property Taxes
Table 4 also shows changes in the distribution of total
property taxes among the counties grouped by deciles
of income. Note that the counties paying the highest
portion of their income to property taxes in 1940 were
deciles five, nine, and ten, comparatively the poor counties.
In 1977, the counties facing the highest rates of property
taxation were the first and third deciles and Cook County,
the wealthiest counties. This simple comparison points
up the dominant change in the distribution of property
taxes in Illinois. Property taxes are declining faster,
relative to income, in the poorer counties of Illinois.
This relationship is shown more precisely in Figure 2.
The figure graphs the decile by decile relationship be-
tween per capita income and the property tax-income
ratio for the years 1940 and 1977. In 1940, the trend line
Figure 2:
COMPARISON OF INCOME AND PROPERTY TAX -
(by county)
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Figure 3:
DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND INCOME BY REGION
1940
Key:
Y = Per capita income
T = Per capita property tax
P = Tax as a percent of income
is clearly downward: the higher the income of a group
of counties, the lower the percent of that income paid in
property taxes. The trend line for 1977 is just as clearly
upward: the counties with the higher incomes paid rela-
tively higher property taxes. (The correlation coefficients
for 1940 and 1977 were -0.60 and 0.54, respectively.
Figure 2 also shows equations for the trend lines.)
The character of the trend lines for the two years is
somewhat different, however. The 1940 line is smoothly
downward. The 1977 line appears to be composed of
two segments. Over the range of incomes for the deciles
with the lowest incomes, the relationship is downward;
higher income means a lower relative tax burden. For
the richest six deciles plus Cook County, the line slopes
markedly upward; higher income means a greater tax
burden. The significance of this result is explored in my
Figure 4:
DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND INCOME BY REGION
Key:
Y = Per capita income
T = Per capita property tax
P = Tax as a percent of income
larger study Property Taxes in Illinois. 2 Essentially, it
means that middle income counties tend to pay lower
property taxes relative to income than either the poorer
or wealthier counties.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAXES AND INCOME —
REGIONS
A third way of looking at the issue of the distribution of
taxes and income is depicted by the two maps in Figures
3 and 4. The maps show a regional picture of tax and
income changes between 1940 and 1977. The changes
2 This publication is available free in mimeographed form from the Insti-
tute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, 1201 W.
Nevada Street, Urbana, Illinois 61801
revealed are similar to the changes for income deciles
and metropolitan-rural areas reported above. In all
regions income increased more rapidly than taxes, and
relative property tax burden declined. Moreover, the
decline in relative tax burden was greatest in the poorer
regions of Illinois.
Regional Distribution of Income
Per capita income figures among the regions of Illinois,
as shown on the two maps, underwent a striking change
after 1940. In 1940 the poorest region, Carbondale, had
a per capita income of only 36 percent of that in Chicago,
the richest region. Although Carbondale was still the
poorest region in 1977, its per capita income had in-
creased to $5,582 or almost 68 percent of the $8,240
registered in Chicago. Differentials in the regional dis-
tribution of income have also clearly narrowed.
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The reasons for declining regional income differentials
in Illinois are the same as those discussed earlier.
Migration of people from poor to wealthy regions, and
migration of capital from wealthy to poor regions both
contribute to the economic uplifting of the poor regions
and the narrowing of income differentials.
Property Taxes in the Regions
The changing pattern of property tax distribution among
the regions is similar to that displayed earlier for counties
arrayed by income groups and metropolitan areas. The
poorer regions have experienced greater income in-
creases than the wealthier regions, but property taxes
have not kept pace. And, in all regions, property taxes
have increased at a slower pace than income.
These facts are also made apparent by the maps.
In the Chicago region taxes as a percent of income declined
from 5.5 percent in 1940 to 4.8 percent of income in 1977.
In Carbondale, taxes as a percent of income declined
from 5.4 to 3.1 percent in the same period. If relative tax
burden declined in Chicago, it declined even further in
Carbondale.
The pattern of tax change among the regions between
1940 and 1977 shows up clearly in Figure 5. The display
is similar to that of Figure 2. Data for each of the sixteen
regions are charted on graphs that relate per capita income
to the percent of that income paid in property taxes for
1940 and 1977. Values for each of the regions are denoted
by the number of the region.
The trend lines in Figure 5 reveal the familiar "twist" in
the property tax-income relationship. The 1940 trend line
slopes downward, reflecting the tendency for the poorer
regions to have faced a greater burden of property taxes.
The 1977 trend line slopes upward showing that wealthier
regions of Illinois are now paying a higher percent of
their income to property taxes.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing sections of this paper reveal two important
aspects of property tax change in Illinois over the period
1940 to 1977. One, property tax burden as a percent of
income has declined in all regions of the state and among
all categories of counties. This decline was not continuous.
From a low point after World War II, property tax burdens
increased until a high point in 1972 after which a marked
decline occurred.
The second important change has been a redistri-
bution of burden between richer and poorer regions.
Property taxes as a percent of income tended to be higher
in poorest counties in 1940. The reverse tended to be true
in 1977; taxes were relatively higher in the richest counties.
The relative decline in property taxes everywhere can
be explained by two basic factors. There has been a
modest decline in demand for public services because of
demographic change, principally the reduction in the
school-age population; and there has been a shift in
emphasis to other forms of taxation. Local government has
increased its reliance on utility taxes, sales taxes, and
other minor revenue sources.
The twist in the tax-income relationship between 1940
and 1977 can probably be attributed to redistributional
aid to the common schools. Use of the Strayer-Haig
formula for state aid to education prior to 1973, and the
resource equalizer formula employed since, have effec-
tively increased the share of the education tab picked up
by Springfield. Since almost two-thirds of property taxes
go to elementary and secondary education, this inevitably
gave more property tax relief to the poorer regions of the
state. Since that was clearly an intended result of employing
a redistributive aid formula, the findings of the study clearly
imply that the formula was effective.
Part II: THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY TAXES
IN ILLINOIS IN 1977
During the last several years, and especially since Cali-
fornia's Proposition 13, the property tax has been a hot
topic in our national press. Illinois is no exception. The
purpose of this paper is to describe and evaluate the
distribution of property taxes in Illinois in order that this
issue may be pursued more rationally in the months and
years ahead. The unit of analysis will be the Illinois county,
and the year under consideration is 1977.
Do agricultural counties tend to pay higher property
taxes than nonagricultural counties? What effect has
urbanization had on properly tax burden? Is the burden
of property taxes higher in those counties with many
school-age children? What is the effect of manufacturing
on the distribution of property taxes? Do bedroom counties
pay higher or lower taxes than counties where people
tend to work? How does financial aid from the state and
federal governments affect property taxes? Perhaps most
importantly, what is the relationship between income and
tax burden?
THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The general procedures employed were those of modern
econometric analysis. It assumes that the level of property
taxes in any county depends on a number of economic
and demographic factors. The concept of the level of
taxes was expressed in two ways: (1) property taxes
extended per capita and (2) property taxes extended as
a percent of county personal income. Each of the two
levels of property taxes was then related to a number of
economic and demographic factors to see what effect
variation in those factors would have on the burden of
property taxation in the year 1977.
It should be pointed out that the purpose of these pro-
cedures is to obey the principles of ceteris paribus, to
make "other things equal." This enables us to isolate the
effect on property taxes of each of the factors, even though
those factors fluctuate together in the real world.
The factors employed in the analysis were: 3
Per Capita Income
We know that higher income leads to higher property
taxes; as the income of citizens increases they spend
part of that increased income on public goods. But there
are other questions about this relationship. What effect
does higher income have on the percentage of income
paid in property taxes? Do people in richer counties tend
to pay a smaller percent of that income to property taxes?
Or, is the converse true?
Agriculture
The precise factor used is the percentage of personal
income arising in the agricultural sector. Some have
suggested that the burden of property taxes is higher in
heavily agricultural counties.
3 Details of the technical analysis employed here are shown in the
Technical Note to Part 3 of my larger study, Property Taxes in Illinois
Manufacturing
Here the factor of concern is the percentage of personal
income arising from manufacturing. At first-blush, one
might suppose that more manufacturing activity would
imply less agriculture, and thus would be redundant.
But, that is not so. The percentage of income from agri-
culture in the average county in 1977 was 14.5 percent,
from manufacturing 22.1 percent. That leaves some 63.4
percent of income to arise in the other sectors. Moreover,
agriculture and manufacturing are different than other
sectors of the economy; their products are largely for
export. Products of other sectors — retail trade, utilities,
finance — are largely for consumption in Illinois. Thus,
both agriculture and manufacturing merit separate in-
clusion.
Urbanization
This factor is measured by the percentage of the popula-
tion living in areas defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census
as urban. Urbanization is related to manufacturing and
agriculture by the nature of the production processes
involved. Agriculture requires open space, manufacturing
requires concentrations of people. Beyond that there
is much room for variation. The United States county with
the highest value of agricultural output is Los Angeles,
also a highly urban county. Conversely, in some counties
that are rural agriculture does not dominate.
Age Distribution
This variable is measured by the percentage of the popu-
lation between five and twenty years of age. Public services
— education, health, and even police — are consumed
principally by the young. Since the lion's share of property
taxes goes to these services, one might assume that
counties with a higher percentage of young people would
pay a higher percent of their income to property taxes.
Commuting
Here the question raised is: what is the relationship be-
tween taxes in bedroom counties and taxes in counties
with high employment? The community factor is measured
by the net percentage of the county population working
in another county. This variable ranges from negative
values in counties with a high influx of workers to highly
positive values in bedroom counties. One might suppose
that bedroom counties have fewer production facilities
offering property tax support relative to income defined
by place of residence. On the other hand, fewer public
services may be needed in those counties.
Federal and State Aid
Counties receive varying amounts of aid from the federal
and state governments. What effect does this aid have on
property taxes?
Aid might be used to finance more public services;
economists call this the stimulative effect of grants-in-
aid. Aid might also serve to reduce local taxes; this is
the so-called substitutive effect of aid. This analysis may
provide some insight into this relationship among the 102
Illinois counties in the year 1977.
SOME FINDINGS
The results of the analysis generally show that: (1 ) counties
with higher incomes pay higher property taxes, although
the relationship is not uniform; (2) other things equal,
property taxes are higher in agricultural counties, (3)
property taxes are also higher in manufacturing counties;
(4) young people require higher property tax support;
(5) bedroom counties tend to pay lower taxes than the
counties to which people commute to work; (6) urban
concentration facilities lower levels of property taxes;
and (7) state and federal aid is both stimulative and sub-
stitutive, i.e. of each dollar in aid, 64 cents are spent for
services or other tax relief and 36 cents are returned to
property tax payers.
Let us hold the discussion of income and tax burden
to last and take the remaining relationships in turn.
Agriculture
The technical analysis indicates a strong and positive
relationship between agriculture and the burden of property
taxes. The burden of property taxes — both per capita and
as a percent of income — is higher in counties that depend
more heavily on agriculture.
Part (a) of Graph 1 shows the relationship between per
capita property taxes and the percentage of personal
income earned in the agricultural sector. At the mean
value for all Illinois counties — 14.5 percent of income
from agriculture — per capita property taxes were $273
in 1977. However, in counties that relied more heavily
on agriculture, say 30 percent, per capita property taxes
averaged $301. This represents a tax burden 10 percent
higher than the average. At the other end of the spectrum,
counties that had no agricultural output paid an average
of only $247 in property taxes. Again, it should be remem-
bered that this analysis presumes that other factors
—
income, urbanization, etc. —are being held constant.
Part (b) of Graph 1 shows the effect of agriculture on
property tax burden as measured by the percent of income
paid to property taxes. The results are similar; at the mean
14.5 percent agriculture level, 4.32 percent of income
went to property taxes. At 30 percent agriculture, the tax
percentage increased to 4.73 percent.
At this point, it is important to note that the implications
of these findings are unclear. Some may use the results
to emphasize that the agricultural community is "over-
taxed." However, since that community has a role in
the political process, one could suggest that the results
indicate that agricultural areas tend to demand more
public services financed from property taxes These
services include far-flung rural roads and a long-haul
educational system. A further analysis of the implications
is left to others.
Manufacturing
The study also shows a positive relationship between
property taxes and the importance of manufacturing,
although the statistical relationship is not quite as strong.
(For those interested in statistical details, I again refer
the reader to my larger study Property Taxes in Illinois.
2
)
A graph of this relationship, similar to that drawn for
the agricultural factor, would show that at the mean level
of reliance on manufacturing — 22.1 percent of income —
per capita property taxes again average $273. If reliance
on manufacturing were to be 60 percent of income,
property taxes could be expected to average $302, an
increase of more than 10 percent from the mean. At zero
percent manufacturing, property taxes would average
$256 per capita.
The effect of manufacturing on the percentage of income
paid in property taxes is very similar; manufacturing
counties pay higher property taxes out of income than
nonmanufacturing counties. In counties where manu-
facturing generates 60 percent of personal income,
property taxes average 4.7 percent of income. In counties
with zero percent of income from manufacturing, property
taxes come to 4.1 percent of income.
Note that increases in both agricultural and manu-
facturing activity increase property tax burdens. At first
Graph 1:
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glance this might seem paradoxical. However, as indi-
cated earlier, these sectors are both export oriented, and
part of that property tax may be exported. If so, there
would be a tendency to have higher levels of property
tax in export counties. Note most particularly that property
taxes on agriculture are akin to severance taxes. Viewed
in this light the results reported for agriculture and manu-
facturing are consistent.
Age Distribution
The results for this factor are especially significant. If
nothing else, the conformity with logic suggests some
reasonableness to the procedures used here. The find-
ings are simple and clear: counties with a high proportion
of school-age children tend to pay higher property taxes.
Graph 2 shows the effect of having a high proportion
of people ages 5-20 on property taxes per capita — Part
(a) — and on the percent of income devoted to property
taxes — Part (b). In counties with 25 percent of the popu-
lation aged 5-20, the property tax burden averaged $251
per capita in 1977. If the percent of people 5-20 were 35
percent, the per capita property tax burden would average
$315. This represents a substantial difference. Part (b)
of the graph shows that the amount of income going to
properly taxes increased from 3.88 to 5.16 percent over
the same increase from 25 to 35 percent in school-aged
children.
What are the implications of these findings? It probably
means that if people in a county have a high birth rate and
create a large young population, they will pay for that
condition with higher property taxes. This is hardly a
surprising conclusion. Nor would it appear to be an
undesirable situation, though there are those who would
argue with it.
Commuting
A county that experiences in-commuting tends to have
a higher property tax burden out of income; bedroom
counties reported lower property tax levels. Property
tax levels range from $298 per capita in counties with a
20 percent influx of workers to $228 in counties with an
80 percent outflow of workers. The percent of income
going to taxes ranges from 4.73 to 3.60 over the same
range of commuting expense.
The implications of these findings are certainly not
clear. It must be noted that the tax data employed are
gross data. Property taxes include residential taxes as
well as taxes on business property. There is no way of
telling if the tax on the typical person's home is higher or
lower in the bedroom community. In any case, for those
who believe that attracting industry will lower property
tax burdens, these results — at a minimum — raise a
question.
Urbanization
The results for the urbanization factor are significant.
Urbanization lowers property tax burdens. Compared with
the $273 per capita property tax burden at the average
urbanization value of 43.1 percent, property taxes range
from $309 in the typical 100 percent rural county to $239
in the 100 percent urban county. As a percent of income,
property taxes range from 4.93 percent of income to 3.51
percent of income.
Two reasons for this relationship emerge as most
likely. For one, urban counties rely more heavily on other
revenue sources — utility taxes, parking revenues, sales
taxes — than rural communities. The other is that public
services relying most heavily on the property tax, roads
and schools in particular, are most subject to the econ-
omies of urbanization. Whatever the reasons, people
in urbanized areas tended to pay less property tax in
1977 than their rural brethren.
Federal and State Aid
The effect of aid to local units of government on property
tax levels is clearcut and consistent with economic
notions about the behavior of governments. Increased
aid to local governments has resulted, in part, in increased
services in the typical Illinois county — the stimulative
Graph 2:
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Table 5
PROPERTY TAXES AND INCOME IN 1977
County
merits in property taxation are not clear at this point. The
current governor and legislature will actively consider
legislation designed to limit the growth ot property taxes
in Illinois. Other legislation designed to change the dis-
tribution of property taxes will undoubtedly surface. It
is unclear how the findings of this study may influence
those considerations.
Undoubtedly, people favoring a property tax break
for agriculture will be led to cite these findings as evi-
dence that their burden is constantly too high and in
need of a break. Manufacturers may be led to suggest
that this study supports their contention that the tax
climate is not favorable to the attraction of business to
Illinois. Beyond that, one can only hope that the findings
will afford more reasonable decisions about property
taxes in the years ahead.
NOTICE TO OUR READERS:
From time to time it is useful for editors of newsletters such as this Illinois Government Research to hear from
their readers. They need to hear whether or not their publication is serving a useful purpose for the individual
reader and whether there are comments out there that they ought to be hearing.
We are, therefore, using this opportunity to ask if a recent issue has dealt with a topic in a way that you found
particularly interesting, troublesome, or enlightening. We do not contemplate starting a "Letters to the Editor"
column, but an occasional statement could perhaps be published.
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COORDINATING CETA PROGRAMS IN ILLINOIS:
VS. AUTHORITY
Michael B. Preston
It is further the purpose of this Act to provide for maximum
feasible coordination of plans, programs, and activities under
this Act with Economic Development, Community Develop-
ment, and related activities, such as Vocational Education,
Vocational Rehabilitation, Public Assistance, Self-Employ-
ment Training, and Social Services Programs. . . .
(CETA Reauthorization
Act of 1978)
Prior to 1973 the federal government planned, designed,
and funded manpower programs, and left it up to states
and localities to implement the federal plan. This created
a two-fold dilemma. On the one hand, there were many
who felt the federal manpower programs were not effec-
tive, in part because they were not responsive to state
and local manpower needs. On the other hand, it was
clear that in order to obtain federal funding, state com-
pliance was necessary. The result was that states and
localities frequently chose to go ahead with the programs
but in a manner that met state defined needs first and
federal guidelines second.
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of
1973 (CETA) was designed both to rid the system of its
defects and to increase the effectiveness of state and
local manpower programs. While the federal government
maintained a strong directive role, as well as fiscal
responsibilities under CETA, the program decision-mak-
ing component was given to localities. The states also
shared in this change, because they were given respon-
sibility for program planning in rural sections of the state
not covered by the localities. Moreover, the states were
assigned the important role of coordinating the state
manpower network — particularly non-CETA private and
state agencies.
The purpose of this paper is to describe and analyze
how effective the state of Illinois has been in coordi-
nating employment and training programs mandated under
the CETA legislation. To accomplish this task, we shall
discuss briefly some of the key elements of the legisla-
tion, as well as describe the administrative mechanism
used by the state to coordinate the intergovernmental
CETA system. Second, we shall explain why the ability
of the state to influence other actors in the manpower
system is limited more by political considerations than
by administrative devices.
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CETA LEGISLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
In its original form, the 1973 CETA legislation stressed
a comprehensive, decentralized approach in contrast
to the earlier system of multicategorical programs. The
intent of the legislation was to provide training and employ-
ment for the economically disadvantaged, the unemployed,
and the underemployed, and also meet the goals of
self-sufficiency and improved employment opportunities.
These services were to be delivered through a decentral-
ized, block grant system in which the federal role was
limited to fiscal oversight and monitoring responsi-
bilities The federal government also set the national
objectives, priorities, and performance standards, and
provided technical assistance and research opportunities.
The ultimate goal was the establishment of a federal-
local partnership.
CETA was designed primarily as a manpower training
program (work experience, classroom training, on-the-job
training, and supportive services). In 1974 public service
employment was added in response to nationwide, high
unemployment levels, and the fiscal crisis faced by local
governments. In 1978 approximately $9.9 billion was.
spent on CETA programs, including $2.5 billion on com-
prehensive employment and training services, $1.5 billion
on youth programs, and $5.9 billion on public employ-
ment.
The authority for planning and administering manpower
programs was transferred to so-called prime sponsors.*
CETA grants were to be awarded to the chief elected
officials of each prime sponsor area. The prime sponsors
were then responsible for assessing their own labor
market and training needs, and for developing policies
and goals to meet these needs. They were also to design
their own programs, select their service delivery agents,
and allocate funds for their communities. This authority
made them fairly autonomous actors in the manpower
puzzle.
More problematic from the very outset was the nature
of the states' role. Some public officials favored giving
the states major responsibility for comprehensive plan-
ning and technical assistance. Others felt the states had
been negligent in their earlier manpower responsibili-
ties and that the proposed role would undermine the
concept of local control and decentralization. The CETA
legislation provided a middle ground, directing that funds
be given to the governors for (a) supplementing vocational
Michael B Preston is an associate professor at the Institute of Govern-
ment and Public Affairs and in the Department of Political Science at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
'
Prime sponsors are cities and counties over 100.000 or any combination
of governmental units equal to that number. In Illinois there are twenty
prime sponsors including the balance of state.
education services; (b) coordinating and funding special
statewide manpower services; (c) providing linkages
between prime sponsors and education agencies; (d)
staffing and supporting a statewide manpower advisory
council; and (e) serving as prime sponsor for the balance
of state (BOS), those areas not covered by other units of
government
While the states were given the responsibility of co-
ordination and oversight, they were not given the cor-
responding legislative authority to intervene in local prime
sponsors' program activities nor to force coordination
with non-CETA manpower agencies, A description of
lllinois's manpower system will begin to demonstrate
how this confusion over responsibility and authority has
affected the state's role in the CETA system,
THE CETA SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS*
Figure 1 delineates the divisions in the CETA system and
shows their relationship not only to one another but also
to other parts of the overall manpower system. Five aspects
of the system are of particular importance and deserve
individual consideration.
The Department of Commerce and Community Affairs
(DCCA)
DCCA has assumed responsibility for coordinating and
planning all manpower programs on behalf of the governor
and the state of Illinois. Through its State Manpower Di-
vision, DCCA staffs the Illinois Employment and Training
Council (IETC) and works with the IETC, CETA prime
sponsors, and manpower-related state agencies to catalog
various manpower programs, identify issues to reduce
service duplication, and improve overall performance in
the manpower field.
BOS Prime Sponsor Division
In contrast to the local government prime sponsors
mentioned earlier, which have a good deal of autonomy,
'The information in this paper is drawn primarily from: Illinois Commission
on Intergovernmental Cooperation. The Comprehensive Employment
and Training Act (CETA): A Critical Issue in Intergovernmental Relations,
Research Memorandum No 64, May 1979, Springfield, Illinois. Other
data are drawn from my unpublished manuscript on The Politics of
Manpower in Illinois."
ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT RESEARCH
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
University of Illinois
1201 West Nevada Street, Urbana, Illinois 61801
The Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University
of Illinois is committed to research, service, and teaching in
the area of governmental affairs. As part of this mission
the institute publishes on an occasional basis Illinois Govern-
ment Research. Each issue brings to the attention of concerned
citizens and officials some aspect of public policy research.
Although most items are written by institute staff members,
manuscripts by other authors will be considered for publi-
cation. In each case the views expressed are solely the
responsibility of the author and do not reflect institute policy
or imply institute endorsement.
the rural areas are under the control of the state and are
called the balance of state (BOS). The BOS Prime Sponsor
Division provides advice on goal setting, policies, and
procedures, and makes recommendations regarding pro-
gram plans, provides continuing analysis of employment
and training needs, monitors BOS manpower programs,
and gives objective evaluations of manpower programs.
Because of the diversity in population and geographic
areas, the Illinois BOS has a radically different planning
assignment than do the other prime sponsors.
The Regional Manpower Committees
BOS Advisory Council
Each of the nineteen regional manpower committees (RMC)
has broad-based community representation from business,
labor, elected officials, community-based organizations,
private citizens, and client groups. Their responsibilities
are threefold: planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Each
RMC makes recommendations to the BOS Advisory Council
regarding manpower programs and services that will
best meet the needs of its region. The RMC then monitors
the delivery of some of the CETA titles by doing on-site
visitation, reviewing status reports from the program agent,
and providing technical assistance through the manpower
planner. The third component of the RMC role, evaluation,
has not been fully developed.
Program Agents
The program agent is directly accountable for the range
of services provided to clients in each region and for the
adequacy of services provided for each subcontractor.
The Illinois Employment and Training Council
The IETC is the linchpin of the state's employment training
system. It is a body created to advise the governor with
respect to employment and training policy in the state The
council is composed of representatives of the twenty prime
sponsors, selected state agencies — the employment
service, welfare department, vocational rehabilitation
services, and state board of vocational education. Also on
the board are representatives from labor, business, edu-
cational agencies, and one representative for the BOS
Advisory Council.
One of the basic purposes of IETC is that of coordi-
nation. It is supposed to develop manpower policy guide-
lines, review state agency and prime sponsor plans, and
to submit an annual report to the governor. A basic weak-
ness of the IETC is its inability to influence local prime
sponsor plans. The IETC has been unable to get DOL to
"pay attention" to its recommendations on changes needed
in some of these local plans. One of the problems is
that the DOL has consistently failed to publish plan prep-
aration guidelines in time to allow prime sponsors to
transmit the plans to the relevant agency (in Illinois the
IETC council) for review. In fiscal year 1976 DOL com-
mented on the lETC's recommendations only after the
fiscal year had started. In FY 77 DOL responded promptly
but glossed over the pragmatic problems articulated by
the council.
From an organizational standpoint, then, the state has
established a CETA intergovernmental system to co-
ordinate training and employment policy. The critical
element here concerns the concept of coordination.
on a statewide basis for specific labor market areas. Also,
the report recommended a more efficient information
collection process from individual prime sponsors In
the meantime, an internal problem within the IETC staff
had developed that lessened the effect of these recom-
mendations. Interviews with the staff revealed that the
members of IETC were not completely aware of previous
attempts to make policy to improve coordination. Each
time there was a change in staff leadership or state
administration, earlier data were thrown out, and the IETC
would start from scratch.
In 1978 the council once again reassessed its situa-
tion and concluded that it should be the forum for the
Illinois employment and training community. It would
set basic goals, identify employment and training needs,
and seek improvements in the state's manpower delivery
system. To better coordinate policy, the council sought
to develop a consistent decision-making process regard-
ing employment and training services, to work towards
consistency of those decisions with statewide goals, and
to develop a statewide coordinated plan for services.
It should be pointed out that the IETC has over the years
achieved a small degree of coordination by providing a
forum where the diverse groups that make up the state
manpower network can meet and discuss their differences.
Participation and any subsequent action, however, is
voluntary, and lETC's greatest tool remains the act of
persuasion. In short, the council's uncertain role and the
ambiguity of authority limits its effectiveness as a state-
wide coordinator.
Assumption 3: Coordination can be achieved through
the use of discretionary funds.
Discretionary funds are of several types: 4-percent funds
under section 105; 6-percent vocational education funds
(3.5 million/year); 1-percent linkage funds (4.6 million
in FY 78). While the authorized use of these funds varies,
the overall intent of the discretional funds is to meet
specific state needs in the areas of:
— traditional training and education,
— elimination of unnecessary duplication in service de-
livery,
— technical assistance and information exchange systems,
— collection and dissemination of labor market data,
— and special model and demonstration programs.
These funds provided Illinois with the opportunity to
meet its coordinative role, if used creatively. They might
have been used to design and test innovative programs
that met state manpower needs and which could have
been instituted on a statewide basis.
Instead, lllinois's allocation of its discretionary funds
has been very casual. The state has done very little to
evaluate the use of its 6-percent discretional funds and
has been criticized by the Department of Labor for this
deficit. Its use of 4-percent funds has been even less
exemplary. A report from the National Governors' Associa-
tion showed that the average state allocation to other
state agencies was 45.8 percent of the funds received.
For Illinois the figure was 65.8 percent. Such an over-
commitment of funds to state agencies lends credence
to the assertion that the procedure for distributing the
funds was based more upon political considerations than
upon legislative criteria. The DOL has given Illinois a
rating of "serious problems" in its use of 4-percent funds
noting administrative deficiencies in its personnel system,
affirmative action, and grievance plans. Moreover, the
state has not seized the leadership opportunity available
to it to promote creative and innovative programs within
the manpower field
State officials, on the other hand, have argued that
federal funding is inadequate. They argue that in FY 78,
the prime sponsors in Illinois received $419 million in
funds to run their programs; the state $12 million. Only
$3.5 million of the 4-percent funds were specifically
designated for use in the development of a coordinated
manpower network. Compared to other state adminis-
trative funds these are small. In the final analysis, they
argue, the level of funding controls the scope of the man-
power effort.
Assumption 4: Illinois has the political and adminis-
trative support needed to develop a comprehensive
manpower policy.
The state has not developed a comprehensive manpower
policy to date and is not likely to do so in the immediate
future. The IETC has neither the political nor adminis-
trative support needed to develop such a policy. Politically,
the IETC has suffered from role ambiguity and has not
received strong support from either DOL or the governor's
office. Their request that local prime sponsors make
certain changes in their policies and programs have not
been supported by DOL. As a result, prime sponsors
often do not share their reports with DCCA nor do they
change their programs according to state directions. The
state has no direct authority or veto power over these local
program decisions
From an administrative standpoint, the frequent re-
organizations of the GOMHD has meant low morale and
high staff turnovers. These staffing difficulties have led
IETC to
"reinventing the wheel" with each change in
administration. A comprehensive CETA policy is not
likely where political support is lacking and adminis-
trative expertise is limited
This brief review of the assumptions made by the National
Manpower Commission on the role of the state as coordi-
nator of statewide CETA programs suggests that the role
is founded more on administrative rationality than on
political feasibility. Indeed, the basic reason why the
state is not a more effective partner is because the federal
CETA legislation did not really design an effective, authori-
tative, or financially sound role for the state.
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE
The Illinois Employment and Training Council has de-
veloped what is known as "Action Agenda 80," a response
to the desperate need for statewide employment and
training coordination in Illinois. The report contains five
policy recommendations. The first deals with the issue
of coordination of resources. IETC sees itself collecting
and analyzing data which describe the current allocations
for employment and training programs and then reviewing
the planning processes, strategies, and effectiveness of
each. In this process, IETC believes three things will be
accomplished: 1) employment and training resources
will be measured in terms of dollars and services provided,
2) the services provided will begin to be related to specific
employment and training problems, and 3) the services
delivered will actually address the problem they were
created to solve.
COORDINATION
One aspect of coordination is the identification of common
elements in a system or program. It does not aim at the
elimination of unique elements. Nor does it imply the
definition of one common objective or that only one ap-
proach is correct Finally, coordination does not pre-
suppose the elimination of all duplication since, in
many instances, duplication is appropriate and necessary
in the area under consideration here, coordination includes
the identification of common goals and objectives among
the various pieces of manpower legislation and man-
power related programs. Thereafter, it attempts to inter-
relate the mix and delivery of services towards these
common objectives without sacrificing individual program
goals or requirements. From an administrative standpoint,
the coordination of manpower and related programs should,
therefore, be pursued only where it will result in improved
services or an increased benefit from available resources.
The CETA legislation gave the states the important role
of coordinating CETA programs. Indeed, the prestigious
National Commission for Manpower has suggested several
reasons why the position occupied by the states in this
area of coordination is so critical.
First, many manpower programs are planned, admin-
istered, and operated by state agencies. Second, the
State Manpower Service Council (IETC in Illinois) can
review and recommend to all manpower agencies within
the state how their services could be more effectively de-
livered. Third, special CETA grants to the governor pro-
vide funds to encourage and assist coordination efforts
throughout the state. Finally, under CETA the state is
responsible for assuring the cooperation of all state
agencies in developing and implementing comprehensive
manpower services.
This suggests that the states could or ought to be
effective partners in the CETA intergovernmental'system.
But the assumptions underlying each statement do not
conform to the reality of the situation in Illinois (or in other
states for that matter). We shall examine each of these
assumptions below.
Assumption 1: States have the legislative and financial
authority to coordinate the state's manpower agencies.
In an attempt to carry out their mandate, the Governor's
Office of Manpower and Human Development (GOMHD)
allocated funds to the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) for an
appraisal of the CETA system. The bureau concluded that
there were major legislative and administrative barriers
among agencies in the manpower network that reduced
coordination. One such barrier is different or inconsistent
definitions of important terms like target populations,
fiscal years and planning cycles, program guidelines,
bases for program monitoring and evaluation, program
terminology, and reporting forms and procedures. The
problem is compounded by the fact that there are other
state agencies in the manpower network, such as the
Illinois Bureau of Employment Security (BES), the Illinois
Department of Labor (IDOL), the Division of Vocational
Rehabilitation (DVR), and the Department of Public Aid
(DPA). All are funded by federal revenues, but each uses
a different definition of client eligibility, units of service,
and substate regions.
The fact that each agency has different federal funding
requirements is a further indication of the fragmentation
that exists at the state and federal level. The DPA's WIN
program is funded under HEW with legislative authori-
zation under the Social Security Act; DVR is also funded
under HEW, but a different division. Bureau of Employ-
ment Security (BES), IDOL, and CETA all receive funds
from the federal DOL but from different divisions. For
example, BES is funded under the Wagner-Peyser Act
while CETA's funds are from general revenues. This
diversity in lines of authority and funding creates diversity
and inconsistency at the state and local level.
The basic problem with this assumption, then, is that
while the state has the authority to initiate action, its
ability to influence state agencies and other actors in
the manpower network is hampered by a multiplicity of
eligibility requirements and a confusing array of funding
sources.
Assumption 2: The Illinois Employment and Training
Council is an effective mechanism for coordinating
statewide manpower programs.
In Illinois, the IETC serves as the coordinating arm for
the statewide CETA network. The State Manpower Services
Division acts as staff for the council. The function of the
IETC, as stated earlier, is to advise the governor, the
state, CETA prime sponsors, and other employment and
training providers on coordination, commitment, and utiliza-
tion of manpower resources. However, the lETC's role as
coordinator of statewide manpower policy has been,
since its inception, somewhat uncertain.
One reason why the IETC has not been more influential
is that instead of making recommendations concerning
the special CETA statewide grants as planned, or recom-
mending statewide manpower policy, it has allowed itself
to be used for routinely approving GOMHD (DCCA) de-
cisions. Part of the explanation for the council's actions
is that DCCA has not provided adequate staff so that
the IETC could gather reliable data on which to base
decisions.
The lETC's annual report for 1978 indicates that the
council is clearly aware of these problems and has made
recommendations to the governor toward their resolution.
The inability of the IETC to establish a comprehensive
manpower policy has been especially hampered by high
staff turnover and low staff morale. Frequent reorganiza-
tion of the GOMHD and changes in leadership at the top
of the agency has meant a loss of morale and expertise.
The lack of a well-defined purpose has also seriously
hampered the lETC's ability to establish a comprehensive
statewide CETA policy.
A review of lETC's activities since its inception will
help to demonstrate this Following the first program year
(July 1, 1974-June 30, 1975), a questionnaire was given
to those state agencies that had manpower-related ser-
vices in order to discover their budgetary levels and
functional roles. The results of the survey pointed up
deep-rooted problems of coordination. In 1976 policy
recommendations were made in selected problem areas,
such as labor market information systems and job place-
ment coordination. Inadequacies in these areas, it was
believed, resulted in unnecessary duplication of manpower
services. However, the recommendations were not im-
plemented, primarily for two reasons: lack of council and
GOMHD influence to enforce decisions on other agencies,
and a changeover in GOMHD staff and state adminis-
tration. In response to this lack of implementation, the
1977 report to the governor recommended that the council
be given more monitoring power over state agencies, (
more authority for coordination and utilization of resources
among prime sponsors and state agencies, and the es-
tablishment of a total employment and training system
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The second policy recommendation deals with special
target groups who experience a significantly higher in-
cidence ot unemployment and underemployment than
others — youth, blacks and other minorities, women,
handicapped, the elderly, and oftenders. There are several
problems connected with this recommendation For one
thing, there is no unified body of information that might
help determine the size, makeup, and location of these
target groups, or the severity of their need. Moreover, there
is not even a consistent definition of these target groups
across the manpower network
The third recommended policy addresses the issue of
labor market information, which in Illinois is available only
on a statewide basis, and thus fails to take into account
the large variations that exist in the state. A more efficient
labor market system is needed, one that provides accurate,
reliable, current data; more organization around units
of local government; detail of client characteristics; and
quick distribution of data. The council believes that they
can have a definite impact if these recommendations are
agreed upon by the governor.
CONCLUSION
The state has not been effective in coordinating statewide
CETA programs for several reasons. First, the congres-
sional legislation gave the states "responsibility" but
not the "authority" needed to coordinate statewide pro-
grams. For example, prime sponsor plans cannot be
vetoed by the state. Thus, state officials were put into a
position where they could only urge voluntary cooperation
upon those whom they wished to persuade. This proved to
be an unreliable mechanism for cooperative action
Second, state agencies over whom the state does have
some control often suffer from bureaucratic inertia. They
do not feel that the value of interagency cooperation has
been demonstrated. In their view, benefits are not given for
establishing linkages, but for how well their departments
achieve the goals assigned to them. Third, state agencies
have different organizational structures and boundaries
that inhibit cooperation. To alter these boundaries is to
tamper with political power bases that have evolved over
time. Unless the cost is low, governors are not likely to
make enemies just to attain better interagency coopera-
tion.
Finally, the state lacks the staff capability to develop a
comprehensive manpower policy. The information needed
to make decisions on a statewide basis is inadequate, as
is the ability of the staff to know what other state agencies
are doing in the manpower area. In brief, if federal policy-
makers really desire certain outcomes, they must be
willing to provide the means to achieve them.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PROPERTY TAXES
David L. Chicoine and Norman Walzer
The latter 1970s, especially following the passage of
Proposition 13 in California, brought renewed interest in
property taxes as a method'of financing local public ser-
vices. Discussions about property taxes have focused on
burden and, more recently, on various forms of taxpayer
relief. Limits on levies'or increases in tax base have been
imposed in some states. Such limits are met with major
opposition by local government officials who claim that
the rising costs of local public services are already plac-
ing considerable pressure on local resources, and further
limitations will only worsen the situation.
In Illinois, as in most states, local public services can
be provided through a wide variety of governmental struc-
tures Residents in some regions of the state receive vir-
tually all their services from general purpose governments,
whereas, in other areas, special districts are quite im-
portant. Since each of these types of government has its
special way of obtaining revenues, the amount of property
tax collected may be quite different. Moreover, residents
desiring additional services may find that certain govern-
mental structures offer greater input into decisions about
the level of services provided and, therefore, the amount
of revenue that must be raised. Finally, the same aggregate
expenditure can be financed from many different revenue
sources, one of which is the property tax. Thus, it is not
unlikely that two counties with the same aggregate expendi-
ture for services would have very different property tax
collections. One of the significant factors accounting for
these differences is the governmental structure
This paper seeks to shed light on the role that govern-
mental structure plays in property tax collections, using
1977 Census of Governments data for Illinois counties.
No attempt is made to justify or critique certain types of
government as being more efficient or preferable to others.
Rather, the concern here is whether more complex delivery
systems lead to higher property taxes and, if so, how much
higher. This paper is organized into two parts. The first
section discusses recent changes in government struc-
ture, some of the reasons for these changes, and their im-
plications for local finance. The second section reports
an empirical analysis of determinants of property tax col-
lections.
A MULTITUDE OF GOVERNMENTAL TYPES
In 1977. the U.S. Bureau of the Census counted 6,620 units
of government in Illinois, of which 5,522 could levy prop-
erty taxes. This number compares with 5,246 local govern-
ments in Pennsylvania, the state with the second largest
number, of which 3,282 had property taxing powers. A
profile of Illinois governments is provided in Table 1 with
a comparison of changes between 1962 and 1977 During
this fifteen-year period, two main trends occurred First,
as the result of a massive consolidation effort, there was
a 31 percent decrease in the number of school districts,
from 1.540 in 1 962 to 1,063 in 1977.
Table 1
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN ILLINOIS
Types of Governments 1962 1977
Percent
Change
Counties
A second, and more important trend for present pur-
poses, was the 29.5 percent increase in the number of
special districts, from 2.126 in 1962 to 2,745 in 1977 A
brief inspection of the increases, by type of district, reveals
major differences in growth patterns The greatest per-
centage increase was in utility districts, but, in absolute
numbers, the major growth occurred in fire protection and
park districts. More specifically. 150 fire protection dis-
tricts and 142 park and recreation districts were added.
Sewerage districts and library districts also increased
markedly.
Statewide, the net increase in number of governments
during the fifteen-year period ending in 1977 was only
2.6 percent, because the decrease in school districts
was largely offset by the increase in special districts
Had the reduction in school districts not occurred, the
growth in number of governments would have been nearly
30 percent
Comparing numbers of governments can be misleading,
since larger states usually have more units A clearer
picture is obtained by comparing Illinois with other states
using ratio of governments to population. In Illinois, for
instance, there was one government for each 1,691 resi-
dents. Rather than having the most governments per resi-
dent, Illinois ranks about seventeenth among states. Not
unexpectedly, rural states have more government frag-
mentation North Dakota, for example, has one govern-
ment for each 235 residents At the other extreme, Alaska
reported one government for each 45,684 residents. Over-
all, the national average was one government for each
2,668 residents based on total number of governments,
including those without property taxing powers.
Of course, statewide averages of government ratios
do not capture intrastate differences. Cook County con-
tained one government for each 9,692 residents while
Iroquois County, in eastern Illinois, contained one govern-
ment for every 191 residents. In some instances, multiple
districts overlap a city. Thus, Springfield residents are
served by fifteen independent or semi-independent gov-
ernments. Residents in one Chicago suburb of 13,000 are
served by sixteen separate governments, including multiple
school districts and townships.
Reasons for Special Districts
Why has there been such a proliferation in the number of
special districts in Illinois during the past fifteen years?
One explanation commonly proposed in the past suggested
that it is due to an attempt to escape state-imposed tax
and debt limits. When general purpose governments
reach taxing and debt limits, a new unit of government with
its own taxing limits is created.
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Providing services through special districts offers several
advantages to certain residents. First, those interested
in a specific service do not have to compete with other
services for budgetary consideration. The effective limit
on services provided is the amount of money that can be
collected from property taxes or other revenue sources.
Second, a special district providing a specific service
allows interested residents to monitor more closely the
services provided and to tailor programs to their liking
Interested residents can serve on the governing board
with a relatively small commitment of time and effort but
with a significant impact on services provided. Such service
also offers residents an opportunity to participate in
government, gain prestige in the community, and perhaps
advance their careers in the private sector. Businesses
value participation by their employees in public affairs
and often count these activities toward promotion
Third, special districts permit extension of services
beyond the boundaries of general purpose governments.
Rural residents desiring fire protection can obtain services
through a fire protection district that includes a munici-
pality and the surrounding hinterland. The same is true
for sewerage treatment and disposal. In some instances,
particularly fire protection, a special district is virtually
the only way rural residents can finance services.
Finally, there may be some services with high fixed
costs which can only be provided effectively by reaching
a certain scale. Reaching this output size may require
provision of services to residents outside the limits of
a general purpose government. In the past, governments
experienced difficulty initiating cooperative arrangements,
and sometimes special authorizing legislation was re-
quired to implement these agreements In these cases,
special districts offer decided advantages. Along the
same lines, a claim can be made that inefficiency in the
provision of services is likely with smaller, more numerous
governments because budgets are not large enough to
pay well-qualified employees. Also, cost savings from
large purchases may be less likely. Because of data limi-
tations, however, research findings on this efficiency ques-
tion have been mixed.
If single function districts have the described advan-
tages, why have there been attempts to limit their use or
consolidate them? There are several situations in which
special districts, particularly those overlapping other
governments, experience limitations. First, as a city
increases in population size, its needs for services change.
Officials in a fire protection district that included a small
municipality when it was created, may find that twenty
years later city residents desire a full-service fire depart-
ment although rural residents do not
Second, a city may grow through annexations in such
a way that it is served not only by its own municipal fire
department but also by one or more special fire protec-
tion districts The outcome of this scenario is confusion
among residents about who provides which services and
to whom. Cost savings may be possible from a better
sharing of equipment and manpower in these instances.
There is also a view that a large number of small inde-
pendent governments makes voters less able to identify
which government is causing tax increases and, therefore,
less likely to hold public officials accountable For instance,
when small governments each levy a property tax. the
tax bill contains a multitude of tax rates; and, until recently,
taxpayers could not easily determine which districts
they were supporting. Moreover, since each special pur-
pose district represents a small part of the aggregate tax
bill, local officials are less reluctant to increase their levies.
SPECIAL DISTRICTS AND PROPERTY TAXES
In recent years, the property taxes collected by special
districts have been increasing more rapidly than thoseA collected by other governments. A comparison of growth
in aggregate property taxes collected by type of govern-
ment between 1974 and 1976. for example, shows that
taxes collected by special districts increased 24.3 percent
compared with 11.4 percent for cities, 13.6 percent for
counties. 15.1 percent for school districts, and 22.4 per-
cent for townships (including road districts).
Although the rate of increase for special districts may
have been greater than other governments, they remain a
relatively minor portion of the property tax collections
statewide. In 1977, for instance, special districts (exclud-
ing school districts) accounted for only 11.5 percent of
property tax collections in Illinois Over the past twenty
years, the proportion of taxes collected by special dis-
tricts has increased several percentage points.
To analyze the impact of governmental structure on the
collection of these property taxes, a least squares regres-
sion equation was estimated using 1977 Census of Govern-
ments data for all Illinois counties except Cook.
Based on the above discussion, it is now possible to
suggest several reasons why numbers of governments and
governmental structure might affect per capita property
tax collections. First is the limited number of revenue
sources available to certain government types. School
districts and townships depend heavily on property taxes,
while counties and municipalities are less reliant on this
revenue source. Cities, counties, and townships have
access to some intergovernmental revenue sources which
special districts do not. For the same aggregate expendi-
ture, one might expect areas with more special districts
to have higher property tax collections.
Secondly, if special districts in Illinois have been used
to circumvent property tax limitations, then areas with more
special districts could be expected to collect more property
taxes. Of course, in this case, the higher tax collections
could simply reflect additional services. About the only
practical way to adjust for services is to control for aggre-
gate per capita expenditures but this is only a gross esti-
mate of services provided.
Finally, if it is true that more governments levying property
taxes confuse residents and lead to less accountability,
then one could find areas with a larger number of govern-
ments having higher property tax collections.
To determine the impact of number of governments on
per capita property taxes collected in Illinois counties, the
following equation was estimated:
Ptax = a + bilNC + b 2IGR + baEXP + b4MFG + bsGOV
+ beAGE + b?SCH + u.
where:
Ptax = Per capita aggregate 1977 property tax receipts in
Illinois counties
INC = Per capita income in 1977
IGR = Per capita intergovernmental revenues
EXP = Aggregate per capita expenditures by local govern-
ments in the county
MFG = Percent of county employment in manufacturingGOV = Number of taxing units per 10,000 residents in the
county
AGE = Percent of residents 65 years and older
SCH = Percent of population enrolled in public schools
> 1977
The rationale for each variable in the equation is provided
as follows
— Per capita income was included to adjust for wealth
in a county. Residents in counties with higher per capita
incomes are better able, and may be more willing, to
pay property taxes to support desired services. For
high-income families, property taxes may represent
a more desirable method of financing services since
homes with high market value are known to be under-
assessed. Also, property taxes are deductible against
federal income taxes. Thus, one could easily find a
positive association between per capita property tax
receipts and income levels.*
— Percent of people 65 years and older was included to
test whether aged residents exert a limiting effect on
property taxes. It is commonly thought that retirees are
particularly hard hit by property taxes (although circuit
breakers have helped recently) and tend to resist tax
increases. Aged residents also do not need certain
local services, such as schools, which are heavily
financed by property taxes. Thus, one would expect a
negative association between property tax collections
and the percentage of aged residents.
— The number of elementary and secondary school
children enrolled in public schools, as a percent of the
county population, was included to adjust between
counties for demands placed on schools. Since schools
receive almost half of their revenues from property
taxes and account for nearly 60 percent of the property
taxes collected statewide, one would expect counties
with more students to have higher property tax collec-
tions.
— Comparisons of property tax collections across counties
necessitate adjustments for services provided. If no
attempt is made to correct for differences in services,
then higher property tax collections may simply reflect
more services. Since services are nearly impossible
to measure directly, per capita expenditures were in-
cluded as a proxy. For present purposes, the ratio of
local public employment to population was used to
replace per capita expenditures with similar results.
— The number of taxing units per 10,000 residents was
included to determine whether the number of govern-
ments providing services makes a difference with
respect to property tax collections. Using the arguments
outlined above, one would expect to find a positive
association between number of governments and per
capita property tax collections
— Per capita intergovernmental aid was included to test
the impact of this revenue source on property taxes
collected. One might hypothesize that additional inter-
governmental revenues allow local officials to lessen
their reliance on property taxes, especially when local
taxpayers resist these taxes. A priori, at least part of
additional intergovernmental support would be expected
to be used for property tax relief and a negative relation-
ship between this variable and property tax collections
is anticipated.
— For citizens and government officials alike, the op-
portunity to transfer a portion of the property tax burden
is very attractive. Thus, counties with relatively more of
their property tax base in commercial property might
be expected to have higher per capita property tax
collections Unfortunately, detailed information on as-
sessed valuation by class of property is not available
in Illinois so that a direct test of this proposition is nearly
• A more complete examination of the relationship between income and
property taxes in Illinois was recently reported by A James Hems in Illinois
Government Research. 51, available from the Institute of Government
and Public Affairs
Table 2
DETERMINANTS OF PROPERTY TAX COLLECTIONS
Per Capita Collections
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UiE MBRA8Y OF THE
TAX INCIDENCE: PROPERTY TAXES, INCOME TAXES, AND EQUITY
J. Fred Giertz
1981
Property tax has been the major source of revenue for
local governments in the United States from the begin-
ning, and it remains so today in both the nation and in Illi-
nois Despite its longevity, it is still a controversial tax. It
is controversial in regard to its relative importance among
the array of various state and local taxes, its administration,
its effect on business activity and industrial location, and
especially, in regard to the distribution of the ultimate bur-
den of the tax. Despite its use over the course of several
decades — even centuries, there is still substantial con-
troversy among economists and confusion among the pub-
lic about who bears the burden of the property tax.
The purpose of this report is to clarify the issue of the in-
cidence of the property tax as compared with alternative
revenue sources, especially the state income tax. An un-
derstanding of the distribution of the burden of the existing
property tax and the effects of changing the level of taxa-
tion is vital in evaluating possible policy alternatives, such
as the full or partial replacement of local property taxes
which finance schools with an increase in the state income
tax. Obviously such choices involve many other considera-
tions in addition to the incidence of the various taxes, yet
incidence questions are of crucial importance and the fo-
cus of much public debate.
TAX INCIDENCE AND EQUITY: AN OVERVIEW
An analysis of tax incidence deals with the question of who
pays the ultimate cost of a particular tax or of the tax system
in general The difficulty in analyzing incidence questions
is that the person or organization legally responsible for
the tax and its remittance to the government may shift part
or all of the cost to others in the economic system. The pos-
sibilities for such shifting are numerous and often very com-
plex For this reason, the analysis of the distribution of the
cost of the tax among the members of society is much more
complicated than simply looking at who makes actual pay-
ment to the government.
Most incidence studies begin with an explanation of the
shifting of the tax through the economic system. The final
burden of the tax on individuals is then related to their in-
comes to ascertain whether the tax is regressive, propor-
tional, or progressive. For a regressive tax, the tax burden
as a percentage of income decreases as income increases.
It should be noted that a regressive tax does not mean nec-
J Fred Giertz is a professor at the Institute of Government and Public Af-
fairs, he holds a joint appointment with the Department of Economics at
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
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essanly that low-income persons pay more than high in-
come taxpayers, only that those earning a low income pay
a larger percentage of their income in taxes. For a propor-
tional tax, the tax rate remains constant as income in-
creases; that is, individuals of all income levels pay the
same proportion of their income in taxes. For a progressive
tax, the percentage of tax paid increases as income rises.
Not only do high-income individuals pay more with a pro-
gressive tax, they pay at a higher rate
It should be emphasized that the base for making calcu-
lations as to regressivity or progressivity is income and not
the legal base of the tax itself For example, the state sales
tax is a flat rate tax based upon retail sales whereby all in-
come levels pay the same percentage on each purchase
This tax is not necessarily proportional, however. People
of different income levels spend differing proportions of
their incomes on taxed items making the sales tax slightly
regressive rather than proportional.
The analysis of tax incidence is an exercise in economic
analysis that attempts to explain the distributional effects
of an existing or proposed tax. The results of such studies
can then be used to address the question of tax equity
While incidence analysis is an attempt to explain "what
is" or "what might be," equity considerations deal with the
question of "what should be." Tax equity questions intrin-
sically are normative or ethical in nature and involve the
value judgments of decision makers. They can never be
settled completely by the results of technical studies such
as incidence analyses, although such studies should play
an important role in the decision-making process.
THE PROPERTY TAX
The property tax in Illinois is a tax based upon the value
of real property: the value of land and its improvements. In
recent years, the Illinois property tax system has moved
away from the concept of a truly general tax on property
— one that taxes all assets at a uniform percentage of
actual value. The tax base has been narrowed for a vari-
ety of reasons Property owned by various levels of gov-
ernment and property owned and used for educational,
charitable, or religious purposes have always been ex-
empt from taxation.
The taxation of personal property has been eliminated
in Illinois over the last decade. Personal property refers
to all property other than land and the improvements on
land. It includes such items as automobiles, furniture,
tools, and machinery and business inventories A consti-
tutional amendment passed in 1970 eliminated personal
property taxes on individuals, while the constitution of
1970 contained a provision that effectively eliminated the
tax for business personal property for assessments be-
ginning in 1979.
In addition to the removal of personal property from
the tax base, other provisions have reduced the effective
rate of taxation for some real property based upon its
ownership or use. Elderly homeowners receive a home-
stead exemption which reduces assessed value. Elderly
homeowners and renters, as well as the disabled, may
qualify for "circuit breaker" subsidies if their property
taxes (or 30 percent of rent for renters) exceed 4 percent
of household income. All homeowners receive a limited
exemption of up to $3,000 for increases in assessed value
over 1977 levels. In addition, there are other special pro-
visions for the disabled and for home improvements as
well as differential assessment practices for agricultural
land. Cook County, under a constitutional provision, clas-
sifies property for assessment purposes based upon its
use. Residential and agricultural property is assessed at
a lower proportion of actual value than other classes of
property.
The property tax differs from such taxes as the sales or
income tax in that its base is not determined by a market
transaction. Instead, the tax base is the assessed value
as determined by local assessors. In Illinois outside of
Cook County, property is supposed to be assessed at
33'/3 percent of fair cash price. In actual practice, assess-
ment ratios (assessed value divided by market value) vary
widely both within and among counties. Intercounty dif-
ferences are dealt with through a statewide equalization
procedure.
Once the assessed value is set, tax liability is deter-
mined by multiplying the tax rate times the base of the
assessed value for each piece of property. The rate is not
determined solely by any one unit of government. The final
rate is the combined rate independently set by many dif-
ferent local governments. Over five thousand jurisdic-
tions have property taxing powers in Illinois with any one
piece of property subject to taxation by many different
governments, such as counties, school districts, town-
ships, and municipalities as well as many special purpose
districts. The property tax is by far the most important
source of tax revenue for local governments. In Illinois,
it accounted for over 80 percent of local tax revenues in
1977. For most local governments including public
schools, it is the sole source of tax revenue over which
they have direct control
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The Incidence of the Property Tax
The view of economists concerning the incidence of the
property tax has changed considerably. Traditionally, the
property tax has been viewed as a regressive tax. The
burden of the tax was thought to be borne by the occu-
pants (either renters or owners) of residential property
and by the customers of businesses which were taxed.
Since low-income families were believed to spend a
larger proportion of their income for housing and other
items reflecting the effect of the tax as compared to high-
income families, the tax was therefore considered regres-
sive. Recent empirical research has suggested that even
with this traditional view of incidence, the property tax is
much less regressive than was formerly believed.
The new view suggests that the property tax (as it af-
fects the nation) lowers the rate of return on all property
and not just the property directly taxed. If this is the case,
the burden of the tax would fall on the owners of capital
in general and thus would make the tax progressive. The
two approaches are not incompatible. Each is applicable
to a particular circumstance and relevant for certain
policy questions.
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF INCIDENCE
The traditional view of property tax incidence makes a dis-
tinction between the effect of the tax on land and the effect
on the structures on the land. The tax on land was con-
sidered to be borne by the owners without any shifting
Since land is basically fixed in supply, the imposition of
a tax on land will not elicit any response in terms of a re-
duction in the quantity of land supplied. This means there
is little, if any. possibility of shifting the burden.
The effect of the property tax on other assets was thought
to be very much like that of an excise or sales tax on the
services of those assets. For example, a property tax
levied on rental structures would lower the rate of return
on investments in rental housing, so that the immediate
burden would fall on the owners of existing rental struc-
tures. Since rental housing — unlike land — is not fixed
in the long run, the reduced rate of return would discour-
age new investment and would eventually lead to a con-
traction in rental housing stock which would lead to higher
rents. This increase in rents would, after some time, effec-
tively shift the burden of the tax from the owners to the
renters. A similar process would take place in the case of
business property. The tax on assets other than land would
be shifted to the consumers of the firms' products by way
of higher prices. With owner-occupied housing, the tax
would not be shifted, since owners would bear the entire
tax burden as owners of the land and consumers of the
housing services.
Under the traditional view, the incidence of the property
tax can be summarized as follows: (1) tax on owner-occu-
pied homes is borne by the owner, not shifted, and is dis-
tributed among income classes according to how housing
values as a percentage of income vary with income levels;
(2) tax on rental housing is shared by owners and renters
with the owners bearing the tax on land and the renters
paying the tax on the structures; and (3) tax on business
property is shared among the owners and the customers
of the business with the owners paying the tax on the
land and the customers, through higher prices, bearing
the remainder of the tax with the burden being dis-
tributed according to the purchases of the taxed firms'
products.
THE REPLACEMENT OF PROPERTY TAX
REVENUE WITH ALTERNATIVE REVENUE
"^
SOURCES
An increase in the state income tax (both individual and
corporate) is often suggested as a source of revenue to
finance a reduction in local property taxes. It is important
to know the incidence of these taxes for a meaningful
evaluation of this option.
The analysis of the incidence of a tax on the income of
individuals is considerably less complex and controver-
sial than that of the property tax. With little shifting pos-
sible, the individual income tax is largely borne by the
persons paying the tax. In general, an income tax pro-
vides considerable potential flexibility in regard to the
degree of progressivity or regressivity through the varia-
tion in marginal tax rates by income and through exemp-
tions and deductions.
Income taxes in Illinois are the most important source
of state revenue with combined individual and corporate
collections slightly exceeding sales tax collections. At
the same time, the state's income tax system is rather
tightly constrained by constitutional provisions. Thus the
tax is limited to nongraduated rates — at present it is 2Vi
percent — which eliminates one element of potential
progressivity. Some progressivity is introduced into the
system through the $1,000 per person exemption. This
flat dollar amount means that low-income taxpayers ex-
clude a larger percentage of their income than high-
income persons Higher-income individuals have the
advantage of the deductibility of the tax from their federal
tax base. An Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR) study for 1977 estimates that the tax in
Illinois is fairly progressive through lower income ranges
with little progressivity above the $10,000 to $15,000
range.
In comparison with the property tax the individual in-
come tax tends to be more progressive at very low in-
come levels, but it is probably less progressive in higher
income ranges. A change away from the property tax to
the income tax would probably not greatly change the
overall progressivity of the state and local tax system.
One important consideration in regard to the income
tax is that, while the rate of taxation at the state level is
relatively modest, this tax is effectively added to the
federal personal income tax and the payroll tax which
finances social security to yield a very high combined
marginal tax rate for many taxpayers. Public opinion sur-
veys in the early and middle 1970s consistently found
the property tax to be the least fair tax in the economy, with
the income tax considered the most equitable. Today that
is no longer the case Another ACIR study has revealed
that the federal income tax is now considered the worst,
or least fair, tax. This would seem to bode ill for increases
in the state income tax which relies substantially on the
same base as the federal tax.
The analysis of the incidence of taxation on corporate
income is more complex and controversial among econ-
omists than the analysis of the property tax. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to say that an increase in this
tax would very likely have incidence effects much like
those of the property tax. The movement from property
taxation to corporate income taxation would probably
have relatively little overall effect on incidence.
CONCLUSIONS
Conclusions about the incidence of the property tax as
compared to the income tax in Illinois may be summarized
as follows:
1. A synthesis of the traditional and new views of the
property tax suggests that a reduction in the statewide
average rate of taxation would largely benefit property
owners and consumers in Illinois and not the rest of
the nation.
2. The incidence of the existing property tax when based
upon permanent income is proportional or slightly pro-
gressive except at very low-income levels. A reduction
in the tax would increase slightly the regressivity of
the state and local system
3. While the overall incidence of the state and local sys-
tem would not change dramatically if the tax were
eliminated, property owners would experience sub-
stantial and often capricious gains and losses.
4 Any major administrative change in assessment for
property tax purposes would have results similar to the
elimination of the property tax. Thus a gradual change
toward the desirable goal of property assessed at a
uniform percentage of actual value would seem worth
pursuing, although it should be noted that much of the
recent dissatisfaction with this tax has been gener-
ated by reassessment procedures designed to pro-
duce such uniformity.
5. The individual income tax in Illinois is progressive at
low-income levels while roughly proportional at high-
income levels.
6. The replacement (either full or partial) of the property
tax with an increase in income taxation would not
dramatically change the overall incidence of the tax
system. After such a change, the combined system
would likely become somewhat more progressive at
very low-income levels while becoming less progres-
sive at high-income levels
For a small area such as a city, the older view of the
tax as an excise is more appropriate. For example, a
small city that naively accepted the new view might raise
property taxes with the expectation that most of the bur-
den would fall- on the owners of capital in other jurisdic-
tions and thus have little effect upon "the taxpayers in
the city itself. This would not be true, however. Raising
property tax rates in an isolated locality will reduce the
rate of return on capital in that jurisdiction below the rate
available in other areas. This would force the outmigra-
tion of some capital thereby driving up the cost of locally
produced goods in the area, including housing services,
in this case, a change in one small area has incidence
effects for the jurisdiction very much like the traditional
view where increases or decreases in property taxes are
borne by the owners of immobile local capital and the
consumers of locally produced goods and services.
In summary, the new view of the property tax as a bur-
den on all capital is the appropriate approach for analyz-
ing a change, such as the reduction of the average rate
of property taxation across the whole nation with replace-
ment income coming from the federal government. The
traditional view is more appropriate, however, if a city
or school district is deciding on an increase or decrease
in property tax rates.
This raises the important question under consideration
here. What would be the effect of a statewide reduction
in property tax rates in a large state such as Illinois 7 The
answer is that it would involve a combination of the two
views. There would be local excise effects along with a
certain amount of shifting of the benefits of lowered taxes
to capital in general across the nation. On balance, the
excise effects would likely dominate. A reduction in state-
wide property tax rates would attract a certain amount of
capital into the state which would raise the rate of return
(at least slightly) in other parts of the country Some of
the benefits of the tax reduction would, therefore, spread
to areas beyond the boundaries of Illinois. However, this
effect would be swamped by the excise effects of lowered
prices within Illinois of locally produced goods and ser-
vices, including housing services. In addition, the owners
of capital within the state would experience a windfall
gain from the change.
This conclusion that the excise effects dominate the
effects on capital is very important for policy purposes in
considering a statewide reduction in property taxes. If
most of the effects of lower property taxes in Illinois were
shifted to the owners of capital outside the state, such a
plan would obviously be ill advised. Such is not the case,
however While some fraction of the benefits will go be-
yond the boundaries of the state, most of the benefits
would go to property owners and consumers within the
state.
The Capitalization of the Property Tax
One source of potential inequity in property taxation is
the variation within districts of the ratio of assessed value
to actual value. If similar property is assessed at varying
percentages of actual value, this would violate the prin-
ciple of horizontal equity which calls for the equal treat-
ment of equals. In addition, if different types of property
have different assessment ratios (for example, if expen-
sive houses are assessed at a lower percentage of actual
value than less expensive homes), this would have impli-
cations for vertical equity as well.
Since variations in assessment ratios resulting from r
either intentional or unplanned actions by property tax
administrators are a source of unfairness, it would seem
that their elimination would improve the equity of the sys-
tem. While a gradual movement in this direction is very
likely desirable, a sudden elimination of the differential
would probably have some unforeseen consequences.
To examine this problem, it is necessary to determine
who gained and lost when the variations in assessment
came into being and who would gain and lose with their
elimination.
If two identical pieces of property of equal value were
for some reason assessed at different values, the owner
of the overassessed property at the time of the assess-
ment would experience a loss while the other owner
would experience a gain. If these differences were to
continue indefinitely, they would eventually be reflected
in the values of the two pieces of property. This process
is called capitalization.
The higher taxed asset now has a continuing tax liabil-
ity attached to it which is greater than the tax bill attached
to the similar property assessed at a lower rate. If these
properties are sold, the price of the assets will reflect the
differing tax liability with the higher taxed property sell-
ing at a lower price than the more lightly taxed one. In
this case, the property tax differential has been capital-
ized in the value of the assets.
What are the effects of the differential taxes and their
capitalization? The major effect is that the owners experi-
ence a gain or loss at the time the differential is estab-
lished. A person who subsequently buys lightly taxed
property will be forced to pay a higher price (which r
reflects the future stream of tax savings) than will a pur-
chaser of heavily taxed property (whose value is de-
pressed because of the expected heavy future tax bur-
den). The second-generation owners receive no special
benefits, nor do they bear any special costs of the dif-
fering assessments since these differences were ac-
counted for in the values of the two assets.
This has implications for the unexpected elimination
of such differences also. If the assessment variations
were eliminated, the present owners of the properties
would experience windfall capital gains or losses. The
present owner of the lightly taxed asset loses the tax
advantage which the previous owner captured in the sell-
ing price of the property. Likewise, the owner of the highly
taxed property would experience a windfall gain which
would not be passed on to subsequent owners.
This idea of capitalization applies to changes in the
property tax system as well. Many of the changes that
reduce taxes will be appropriated by the present owners
through increased property values and will not be passed
on to subsequent owners. For example, the favorable spe-
cial, long-lasting differential treatment of agricultural
land in regard to property taxation will largely be cap-
tured by the present owners through increased land value.
In the future, people who wish to buy agricultural land to
go into farming will not be helped by the change at all.
Their lowered taxes will be offset by the higher cost of
land. This same idea holds, to a certain extent, for many
other changes, including a general statewide reduction
in property tax rates. k
Using this approach, the incidence of the tax has been
viewed as regressive. This conclusion is based on the
following assumptions: (1) housing as a percentage of
income declines as income increases, thus placing a
greater burden (measured as a percentage of income) on
low-income homeowners than on high-income individuals;
(2) rent as a percentage of income is higher for low-in-
come families than for high-income ones; and (3) low-
income consumers spend a larger percentage of their
incomes on goods and services (which reflect the tax on
business property) than do high-income consumers.
These excise effects, which contribute to regressivity in
the tax, were believed to more than offset the progressive
element of the tax related to land ownership.
Even among those who accept this approach, there
have been suggestions in the last decade that past esti-
mates of incidence have significantly overstated the de-
gree of regressivity of the tax Much of this criticism
relates to the use of annual incomes of taxpayers as the
standard for computing incidence estimates as opposed
to long-term measures of income. There is much eco-
nomic research suggesting that family decisions about
consumption and savings are strongly influenced by
long-term income expectations (referred to as permanent
income) as opposed to the actual income received dur-
ing a particular twelve-month period. For example, fami-
lies which experience temporarily lowered incomes be-
cause of illness or unemployment normally do not make
major changes in their consumption behavior. These
families seem to bear a disproportionately heavy prop-
erty tax burden. Their tax burden would appear much
less onerous, however, if it were compared to their per-
manent income.
In addition, it has been found that family expenditures
for housing and other goods and services as a percent-
age of permanent income (as opposed to annual income)
do not vary a great deal among various income levels.
On the average, families of different income levels spend
approximately the same percentage of their permanent
income for housing and other items which reflect the
property tax in their prices. This means that even if the
tax is distributed according to the traditional view as an
excise on housing and consumption, it is more likely a
proportional or slightly progressive tax when incidence
is based upon a long-term measure of income as opposed
to a regressive tax. A note of caution is needed here, how-
ever. If housing owned or rented by low-income families
is assessed at a significantly higher percentage of market
value than that owned by high-income families, these
conclusions would not obtain
rate of taxation on the value of an asset can have a very
substantial impact on the percentage yearly return on the
property. Since all types of property in all locations are
taxed uniformly in this hypothetical system, there is very
little the owners of capital can do to shift the burden of
the tax. In this circumstance, the tax would be distributed
as the income from capital is distributed. Since the per-
centage of income derived from capital generally in-
creases as incomes rise, such a tax would be sharply
progressive except at very low income levels because
some low-income taxpayers have substantial property
holdings.
In addition, there might be some long-term effects of
the tax if it affects personal decisions about saving. If
saving and investment are reduced because of the reduc-
tion in the rate of return caused by the tax, there might be
a reduction in productivity resulting in lowered wages.
This sequence, however, is the subject of considerable
controversy and is yet to be resolved.
Obviously, the property tax system in the United States
is not a truly national system but a decentralized one with
varying bases, assessment practices, and rates. Some
modification of the results presented for the hypothetical
national system is, therefore, necessary. When the effec-
tive rates vary among districts, the short-run effect would
be that the owners of property in high tax rate areas would
clearly bear a greater burden than those in more lightly
taxed jurisdictions. This would not necessarily remain
true in the long run, however. To the extent that capital
is mobile, the differing rates of return on capital in dif-
ferent areas caused by the local property taxes would
induce a reallocation of investment.
Capital would tend to move from higher taxed areas
into jurisdictions with lower tax rates. This movement of
capital from high to low tax rate locations would eventu-
ally tend to equalize the aftertax rate of return among
the various areas. The increase in the supply of capital
in lighter taxed areas would reduce the rate of return
there while the rate of return in areas with higher taxes
would rise because of the exodus of capital. This process
effectively shifts some of the burden from the high tax
jurisdiction to all owners of capital through the equaliza-
tion of aftertax rates of return. On immobile assets such
as land, this shifting process could not take place, and
the burden would remain with the original owners. For a
series of many local taxes, this is very much like the con-
sequences of the hypothetical national property tax dis-
cussed above whereby the major burden is borne by the
owners of all capital with the property tax system markedly
progressive in incidence.
THE NEW VIEW OF INCIDENCE
While the traditional view of the property tax has not been
abandoned, it has been modified to a significant degree
by research in the last decade This research has focused
on the effect of the property tax on capital investment
decisions and has concluded that the burden of the sys-
tem of local property taxes in the United States falls much
more heavily upon capital than was once believed.
This can be explained in a general way by examining
the effects of a hypothetical national property tax of a
uniform rate on all property. Such a tax would have the
effect of lowering the rate of return on all capital invest-
ments. It should be noted that a relatively low percentage
A SYNTHESIS AND RECONCILIATION
OF THE TWO VIEWS
In assessing and comparing the two views, it would seem
that they are almost diametrically opposed in their con-
clusions. This is not the case, however, since each view
is valid in a particular context and for particular policy
questions. The new view is particularly relevant for ana-
lyzing the effects of a major change in the property tax
over a broad geographic area such as the nation. Thus,
a decrease in the average rate of taxation for the nation
as a whole would reduce the progressivity of the tax sys-
tem by reducing the burden borne by the owners of
capital
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REGULATING HOSPITAL FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION: THE ILLINOIS EXPERIENCE, 1975-79
Charles E. Begley and David C. Colby
In 1974 Illinois became the twenty-fourth state to enact
legislation requiring hospitals and other health facilities
to acquire certificates of need (CON) before proceeding
with large capital projects or significantly changing ser-
vices. This act created the Illinois Health Facilities Plan-
ning Board (IHFPB) whose thirteen citizen members are
appointed by the governor. The board has the authority
to review and approve all construction and modification
projects costing in excess of $100,000, all substantial
changes in scope of services or number of beds, and all
discontinuations of facilities or services. According to
the Illinois Revised Statutes, Illinois lawmakers hoped
that the CON program would "reverse the trends of in-
creasing costs of health care resulting from unnecessary
construction," while at the same time "guarantee(ing) the
availability of quality health care to the general public."
The rationale for government regulation of capital in
the health care industry is based on the judgment that
existing incentives for capital spending have generated
excessive investments in capacity. This market response
is due, in part, to the unique cost-reimbursement method
of payment for hospital and nursing home services which
guarantees that most costs accrued in the provision of
services, including capital costs, will be recovered. The
payment problem is compounded by pressure from physi-
cians and the general public to raise the "quality" of
medical services by the acquisition of the most advanced
medical equipment or the construction of the most mod-
ern medical facilities. Patient demand for the "best care
available" is encouraged by increasingly broad insur-
ance coverage which insulates patients from the true
cost of that care. The most recent coverage figures indi-
cate that in 1979, 187 million people, or 85 percent of
the civilian population, had insurance protection for hos-
pital expenses. This figure had grown from 159 million
in 1970 The combination of such demand and supply-
side factors had created a perverse market for medical
care in which the availability of medical equipment and
facilities largely guarantees their utilization (a phenome-
non called Roemer's Law). This situation was the most
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important reason for the development of a certificate of
need program in Illinois and is one of the main justifica-
tions given for its continuation.
In the present political climate, reform or elimination
of the certificate of need program is a distinct possibility.
At the national level, the deregulatory movement has led
to attacks on the program by officials in the Reagan ad-
ministration, who claim it is ineffective in containing capi-
tal spending and impedes competition in the industry.
In the 1980-81 session of the Illinois General Assembly,
legislation was introduced that would have abolished the
program. Although unsuccessful, the proposed bill re-
flects the controversy surrounding the program within
the state. As the debate continues, at both the national
and state level, it is a good time to examine the experi-
ence of the Illinois program. This article does that by
analyzing the decisions made by the certificate of need
program on hospital proposals from 1975 through 1979
and by examining some evidence of the program's im-
pact. In the first section, we present an overall summary
of the program's approval rate in terms of the number and
percent of projects approved, withdrawn, denied, and
modified; in the next section, we describe the types of
projects which the program favors; and in the final sec-
tion, we discuss some evidence of the program's impact
on hospital bed supplies. The complex process by which
CON decisions are reached in the state is not addressed
in this paper so that we may focus on the results of the
process and its possible impacts.
THE RATE OF PROJECT APPROVALS
Table 1 presents the disposition of hospital certificate of
need applications by year for the study period 1975-79.
For the entire period, the board received 1,059 applica-
tions totalling nearly $2.7 billion. This figure represents
proposed capital spending on all hospital projects that
exceeded the threshold for project review ($100,000 from
1975 to July 1979 or $150,000 after July 1979). The num-
ber of proposed projects and their costs varied from year
to year. There is no discernible pattern in the annual fluc-
tuations, but the disproportionately large amount of money
and number of projects that appeared in the first year of
the program probably reflects hospitals' anticipation of
more stringent controls in future years. This anticipatory
effect has been noted in many states as an implementa-
tion problem of CON. It suggests that the program's effec-
tiveness in containing capital spending will be dimin-
Table 1
SUMMARY OF CON DECISIONS: PROJECTS SUBMITTED 1975-79*
Total
Applications Approved Withdrawn Denied Under Review
Table 3
AVERAGE CHANGE IN NUMBER OF BEDS
PRE- AND POST-CON
Average Change in the Number of Beds
(All Counties)
Total
Average
Standard error
hospital investment plans and its negotiations with ap-
plicants during the pre-review stage and the review pro-
cess. Although there are no good measures of these
effects, an examination of the types of projects approved
by the program provides some insight into its cost con-
tainment potential.
THE TYPES OF PROJECTS APPROVED
Evidence from previous studies suggests that decision
making on CON proposals has been uneven, creating a
selective reward structure. For example, these studies
indicate that certificates of need are less easily obtained
for new facilities and for bed additions to existing facili-
ties than they are for equipment purchases and modern-
ization. An explanation for this selectivity is that bed need
standards are more quickly developed and easily applied
to project reviews than are need standards for new equip-
ment, new services, or modernization of existing services.
Information about the latter— such as their optimal use,
cost, and existing supply — is much more difficult to ob-
tain and apply to individual proposals than is information
about bed needs. Unfortunately, this selectivity causes
hospitals to redirect investment away from capacity ex-
pansion projects towards equipment and modernization
projects which increase the capital intensity of services.
Since hospitals are reimbursed on the basis of costs,
this selectivity may have the perverse effect of further
escalating the costs of health care to the consumer and
the government.
Table 2 presents information on the Illinois program
which addresses the selectivity hypothesis. The final row
for each year shows approval rates for eight different
categories of projects during the study period. The rela-
tive rank orderings of approval rates for the various cate-
gories over the years are similar with the exception of
those for modernization which vary greatly in no pattern
and those for outpatient clinics which vary with changes
in the law.
Projects involving new beds construction (see column
3, Modernization/Expansion) did receive a lower approval
rate (88.1 percent of the proposed costs and 86.9 per-
cent of proposed projects) than modernization projects
and equipment projects (93.2 percent of proposed costs
and 90 percent of proposed projects; and 93.6 percent
of proposed costs and 92.4 percent of proposed projects,
respectively), but the difference between them was not
significant. New facilities, however, were clearly discrimi-
nated against, having an approval rate (50.3 percent of
costs) far below that of other types of projects. Hence,
although the reward structure in Illinois rejects new bed
proposals in new facilities it tends to approve them in
existing facilities. One possible explanation for this re-
sult, given the general surplus of beds in the state, is
that the board is unwilling to halt expansion entirely but
considers the additional beds in existing institutions to
be less excessive than their addition along with the con-
struction of a new facility. Although both add beds and
increase the costs of health care, the lower relative cost
increase may be the key to approval. Another possible
and less complimentary explanation is that the board's
decisions are heavily influenced by the existing provid-
ers who desire protection from new competition. Both
explanations are consistent with the data, and there ap-
pears to be no available method to objectively establish
the "true" one. Further discussion of the effects of this
approval pattern on bed supplies in the state is provided
in the next section.
Among all categories of project proposals, parking fa-
cilities and physicians' office buildings have the highest
rate of approval. Prior to July 1979, the approval rate for
these projects was consistently higher than for other
project categories because they were not considered
reviewable by the board and were, therefore, automati-
cally approved. In July 1979, the board began reviewing
such projects; but most hospitals managed to submit
their applications prior to July in order to avoid the review
process. These two types of projects together with out-
patient clinics, which also came under review in July,
constituted 43 percent of all proposed expenditures in
1979. Additionally, in 1979, almost 98 percent of the costs
of outpatient clinics, 100 percent of the parking lots, and
over 95 percent of physicians' offices were submitted prior
to the July change in the regulations. Many of these projects
can be attributed to anticipatory behavior that stimulated or
redirected capital spending. If capital expenditure is stimu-
lated, this works against the cost containment objective. If
capital expenditure is redirected, then the effect on cost
containment depends upon the ratio of the capital intensity
of the potential investment to that of the actual investment.
We have not attempted to estimate either the proportion of
investments which were anticipatory or the costs of the
potential, alternative investments. However, the magnitude
of investments proposed in these areas raises the possibil-
ity that the CON program has stimulated investment in
certain areas while deterring investments in other areas.
IMPACT ON BED SUPPLIES
In this section, we examine evidence regarding the impact
of certificate of need on the growth and distribution of
hospital beds in the state. A pre-post design is adopted
to compare changes in the number of hospital beds and
their distribution during the four years before implemen-
tation of certificate of need (1971-75) to the four years
immediately following (1975-79). Similar methodology has
been used to evaluate programs in other states; (especially
useful is a study on New York by E. Rothenberg). It should be
noted that this approach is only one way to evaluate the
impact of the program and, further, focuses on only one
aspect of the program's activities.
Table 3 indicates that the overall increase in the num-
ber of nonfederal, short-term general hospital beds in the
state was smaller in the four-year period after than be-
fore introduction of the program. This finding confirms
the assertion that the program has been successful in
slowing the rate of expansion of bed capacity. It should
be noted, however, that statistically insignificant differ-
ences are observed when average changes in the num-
ber of beds for each county are compared between the
two periods. This can be attributed to the large inter-
county variation in the bed change figures. To eliminate
some of the variability, the counties are grouped by pop-
ulation; the results are similar. The difference between
the average change in the number of short-term beds for
each county except Cook, DuPage, and Lake (the three
most populous counties) was smaller in the post- than
in the pre-certificate of need period, but again the dif-
ference is not statistically significant. The same result
is observed when the data are applied to the three largest

the number of areas with surpluses. Meanwhile, bed
shortages and bed shortage areas increased.
It may be concluded from these findings that the cer-
tificate of need process needs some improvements. The
state must begin to develop positive incentives, possibly
financial, in order to stimulate construction in counties
having a deficiency of beds. Furthermore, where a sur-
plus exists, the program must be tougher on the expan-
sion plans of existing facilities.
From the beginning, the program has been plagued
with implementation problems, such as the anticipatory
effects that occurred in the first year of the program and
again in 1979. These problems kept the program from
reaching its full potential, but with their elimination and
with further strengthening of the program, the future im-
pact should be greater.
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PRISON CAPACITY AND'SENTENCING SEVERITY: A LOOK AT ILLINOIS, MICHIGAN, AND PENNSYLVANIA
Peter F. Nardulli
After a brief lull in the late seventies and early eighties, crime
is once again a prime concern among a large number of
Americans. More people are mentioning crime in periodic
surveys of public problems than in the previous decade, and
the 1982 governor's race in California may have been won at
the eleventh hour by a strong law and order appeal. In the
minds of many, criminal punishment is an integral part of the
crime problem and society's efforts to combat it. It is viewed
as both a real and a symbolic deterrent to crime, every bit
as important as a mobile, effective police force. This has led
to a reexamination of sentencing practices and a revision of
sentencing codes, an increase in minimum punishments, and
even new prison construction. Illinois, for example, moved
from an interdeterminate to a determinate sentencing code,
abolished its parole board, and enacted Class X legislation
providing more severe sentences for selected heinous crimes.
More recently it has embarked upon a campaign to increase
its state penal capacity. Indeed, a recent report of the Illinois
Economic and Fiscal Commission shows that the Department
of Corrections received 75 percent of all new capital project
dollars for FY 1983 — in excess of $80 million.
Many students of criminal courts have doubted the effec-
tiveness of these reforms. They note the low visibility of most
sentencing decisions and the vested interest of most criminal
court practitioners in the status quo. Of particular concern
are the long-established "going rates" for routine offenses
on which county plea bargaining practices are based. To
better understand the sentencing process — and improve
our chances to reform it — we undertook a long-term com-
parative study of criminal courts. The focus of the present
essay is on factors that affect sentencing severity. Such
factors are, of course, of special interest to those concerned
with increasing the deterrent effect of sentencing.
COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS
The criminal court study was conducted in nine counties in
Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. The Illinois counties were
DuPage, Peoria, and St. Clair; the Michigan counties were
Oakland, Kalamazoo, and Saginaw; the Pennsylvania counties
were Montgomery, Dauphin, and Erie. Three hundred inter-
Pete r F. Nardulli is an associate professor at the Institute of Government and
Public Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the University of
Illinois This report is based on a larger, three-state study being conducted by
Professors Nardulli, Roy Flemmmg (Wayne State University), and James Eisen-
stem (Pennsylvania State University), with major funding from the National
Institute of Justice
views were conducted with judges, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys yielding over 10,000 pages of transcripts. In addition,
we collected extensive amounts of information on 7,500
criminal cases in the nine counties. These data, together with
our observations, provided us with many insights into criminal
court operations, as well as a means to test our ideas
empirically.
The nine counties were selected to gauge the impact of
important county differences on criminal court operations.
One area of concern was socioeconomic welfare; another
was the political views of the county's populace. We felt
these were important because counties with deep social
cleavages may sentence differently than more homogeneous
and prosperous counties. Also, more politically conservative
counties could be expected to sentence more severely than
more liberal counties To fulfill these criteria, we selected for
each state one economically declining county (St. Clair, Sag-
inaw, Erie), one autonomous county (Peoria, Kalamazoo,
Dauphin), and one suburban ring county (DuPage, Oakland,
Montgomery).
Table 1 reports data on some of the economic and political
indicators we investigated As expected, the ring counties in
each state are the most prosperous — with per capita in-
comes hovering at about $10,000 in 1979. The declining
counties are far less so; per capita incomes stood at somewhat
over $6,500. Politically, DuPage and Dauphin counties appear
to be the most conservative, followed by Peoria and Mont-
gomery counties. The Michigan counties appear fairly mod-
erate, while St. Clair and Erie counties are moderately liberal.
The nine counties also showed some important differences
in crime rates and penal capacities. According to the FBI
reports on violent personal crime rates (per 100,000 popula-
tion) for the ten-year period preceding this study (1971-1980),
Peoria and St. Clair counties have the highest rates; Kala-
mazoo and Dauphin counties are far lower. Two Michigan
counties (Oakland and Saginaw) have fairly low personal
offense rates, but two of the ring counties (DuPage and
Montgomery) and Erie have the lowest.
With respect to penal capacities we must consider both
county jails and state facilities. Large county facilities may
increase the likelihood that a judge will incarcerate marginal
offenders. At the same time, county detention is often not
appropriate because state law usually precludes county de-
tention for more than a one- or two-year period Data collected
on the local jails in each of the counties show that all of the
Michigan jails were built during the 1970s; only those in St.
Clair County in Illinois and Erie County in Pennsylvania were
ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY
Table 1
SELECTED MEASURES OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
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Public assistance
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built during that decade. The jails in DuPage and Dauphin
counties were built during the 1950s. Peoria County's jail is
over 65 years old, and Montgomery County's is over 120
years old. Not surprisingly, both Peoria and Montgomery
counties, along with Oakland County, regularly house pris-
oners outside the county — at considerable cost.
Measuring relative capacities of jails can be tricky. Here
relative capacity is defined as the percentage of all individuals
arrested in 1980 for one of five serious offenses — murder,
rape, robbery, assault, and burglary — that could be incar-
cerated in the county jail at one time. This measure, reported
in row 4 of Table 1, shows some significant variation. Four
counties have obviously larger capacities: Kalamazoo, St.
Clair, Saginaw, and Erie; four others had somewhat lower
capacities: Peoria, Dauphin, Oakland, and DuPage. Mont-
gomery had clearly the smallest capacity.
At the state level, a number of further observations may
be made. Michigan's institutions tend to be newer; almost
three-quarters were built after 1950 and one quarter during
the 1970s. Four of Pennsylvania's eight institutions were built
before 1925, as were three of Illinois' ten.
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Another important dimension to state penal systems is
their capacity. The criteria a judge uses for determining
whether a defendant merits "state time" may vary with the
relative capacity of state institutions as well as the extent of
their utilization. The flow of prisoners to the state penal
system may increase to fill the available spaces; it may slow
once capacity is reached. Our data (Table 2) show that
Michigan has distinctively greater capacity than either Illinois
or Pennsylvania. This is true regardless of what measure is
used. Michigan has more absolute capacity, more capacity
per 100,000 population, and more capacity per 1979 arrests
for serious UCR (Uniform Crime Rates) crimes, as designated
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Illinois ranks consis-
Table 2
CAPACITY MEASURES OF STATE LEVEL ADULT
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
(1979)
Illinois Michigan Pennsylvania
Confinement capacity
(No. of prisoners
who can be
accommodated)
Capacity per
100,000 population
Capacity per adult
arrest for senous
UCR crimes (violent
personal crime plus
burglary)
Proportion of capacity
utilized (December
31,1979)
11,320
10066
11,627
127.39
.43
99
.62
1.15
8,093
68.67
34
.91
Source: Sourcebook otCrimeJustice Statistics — 1 981
,
Table 1 .68. Excludes community-
based facilities. Information supplemented by inquiries to state correctional departments
to insure comparability
for other factors to affect sentencing levels. Where detention
capacity exceeds these "core requirements," it becomes
possible for other factors to play a role (i.e., they become
unleashed). Thus social and political factors may only play a
role where detention capacity is high.
The importance of detention capacity for understanding
differences in sentencing severity is obviously not limited to
its interrelationship with social and political factors, which are
speculative in any event. It also has a direct effect upon
severity.
The finding that is most striking is the distinctiveness of
the Michigan counties. These differences can be attributed
to the greater detention capacity of the Michigan penitentiary
system — as well as to its medium security and decentralized
orientation and, perhaps, its qualitative advantages. Moreover,
the only within-state differences of any consequence are in
Michigan. These can be explained with reference to differ-
ences in local detention capacity. Kalamazoo is the most
punitive of the three Michigan counties, and it has the most
detention capacity; Oakland is the lowest and has the least
capacity.
Severity Levels Across the Three States: A Longer View
To insure that the results reported above were not a short-
term phenomenon unique to our sample of cases, we ex-
amined some data on state incarceration rates (the number
of people in state penal facilities per 100,000 population) for
the period 1926 to 1980. These data (see Figure 3) confirm
what the earlier analysis showed: Michigan sentences more
severely than do Illinois and Pennsylvania; Illinois normally
sentences somewhat more severely than Pennsylvania. These
differences hold up even when controls for serious crimes
and arrests for serious crimes are introduced.
If examined carefully, these data also reveal some interesting
insights into the role that penal facilities may play in statewide
sentencing levels. The late 1960s and early 1970s saw great
public concern over the crime problem, and there was much
pressure on criminal court judges to sentence more severely.
During the seventies, Michigan sharply increased the number
of incarcerated defendants; Pennsylvania had only a modest
increase; and Illinois lay somewhere in between.
Data on prison construction suggest a reason for these
different responses to the public clamor for "get tough"
measures. Michigan built six new penal institutions during
this period; Illinois built two; and Pennsylvania, none. While
we cannot draw any firm conclusions from this — only an
experimental design could do that — the data do suggest
that judges and prosecutors may have been wrongfully bear-
ing the brunt of public dissatisfaction with the sentencing of
criminals. They seem perfectly willing to fill up the penal
facilities if the executive and legislative branches provide the
space, at least during periods of high concern with crime.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented here suggests that a strong relation-
ship exists between penal capacities and sentencing severity
in states and counties. While an experimental design would
be required to resolve the issue conclusively, it appears that
the supply of prisoners will increase to meet the available
number of beds — at least during times of great public
concern with crime. However, if the Michigan experience holds
true elsewhere, it may be that capacity levels are not the
only important factor. A decentralized state penal system with
a large number of medium security prisons also seems to
encourage commitments. Judges may be less hesitant to
Figure 3
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utilized a form of diversion for felony cases during the time
this study was conducted.
SEVERITY: A MORE RIGOROUS EXAMINATION
The data in Figure 1 are raw numbers which do not control
for either differences in offense seriousness or the criminal
records of the defendants, both of which are primary deter-
minants of sentences. Moreover, since the data ignore the
length of incarceration, they are only crude indicators of
sentencing severity. Fortunately, multivariate statistical tech-
niques exist which allow us to control for these factors while
simultaneously examining differences in sentence length across
counties.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 2; it reveals
that important differences exist. The most significant of these
are across states. The Michigan cases received much more
severe sentences than those from either of the other two
states — about eight months more overall. There is no sig-
nificant difference between Illinois and Pennsylvania when
offense and criminal records are controlled. At the county
level Michigan again shows some statistically significant dif-
ferences. Kalamazoo County is more severe than both Oak-
land and Saginaw counties, and Saginaw County is more
severe than Oakland County. No meaningful differences exist
across the other counties.
may well be countering one another, leading to inconclusive
results. Second, other factors may be constraining the impact
of the social and political factors. This suggests that the
relationship between contextual and socio-political factors
and sentencing is more complex than initially contemplated.
Conflicting influences are best illustrated in the non-Michi-
gan counties. For instance, social strains and the severity of
the crime problem in DuPage and Montgomery counties led
us to expect lenient sentences; however, both have very
conservative political leanings, which would lead to more
severe sentencing expectations St. Clair County has a similar
problem. While it is a moderately liberal county, it has a
severe crime problem and serious social cleavages.
Despite the problems which these conflicting influences
doubtless cause, they cannot entirely account for the con-
fusing picture that we have been shown. As noted earlier,
Peoria County has consistently more punitive expectations,
yet is relatively lenient. Moreover, while the social and political
characteristics of the Michigan counties fairly consistently
yield moderate expectations, they sentence relatively severely.
Some of this can be clarified through the second explanation
made earlier: the possibility that some other factor constrains
the impact of these influences.
The best candidate for this "other factor" is detention
capacity, both local and state. Detention capacity could
Figure 2
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE FOR MINIMUM MONTHS OF CONFINEMENT
Illinois
DuPage Peoria St Clair
Months
15 r
10 -
5 -
33
-1.7
TZZH
-1.5
Michigan Pennsylvania
Oakland Kalamazoo Saginaw Montgomery Dauphin Erie
13 1
tently behind Michigan, while Pennsylvania has the lowest
capacity. Despite these capacity figures, the data on utilization
reveal a totally different picture.
Pennsylvania has the lowest capacity and the lowest utili-
zation; Michigan has the highest capacity and the highest
utilization. This overutilization led to a court ruling which held
that Michigan's entire adult penal system violated constitu-
tional standards, as did selected prisons in Illinois. Pennsyl-
vania was one of only thirteen states in 1982 which did not
have any type of pending litigation concerning its state penal
system.
Sentencing Predictions
The social and political differences across the nine counties
led us to a number of expectations concerning sentencing
levels. Thus we felt that sentencing levels in a heterogeneous
county — especially one suffering from some economic mal-
aise or where crime is highly concentrated in a major city or
among an identifiable population group — may be more se-
vere than in prosperous suburban counties with no severe
crime problems. Peoria, St. Clair, and Dauphin counties are
in this category, because they all have fairly high crime levels,
especially in their major city. Moreover, the county's minorities
are also highly concentrated in the major city.
Finally, blacks made up over half of the court system's
felony defendants (as represented in our case samples) in
all three counties. DuPage and Montgomery counties are
categorized as more lenient because of their homogeneous
population and their low, diffuse crime levels. The other
counties have one or more moderating influences which lead
us to classify them in the middle.
As for political ideology, it would seem that if judges try to
reflect the views of their constituents, those in more con-
servative counties are more likely to sentence similar defen-
dants charged with similar offenses more severely. The same
may be true for the impact of the crime problem factor. In
counties where crime is a serious problem, judges may feel
more compelled to sentence severely than do judges in
counties with minimal crime problems. For example, Peoria
County's high rate of crime and its strong political conser-
vatism both lead to the prediction that judges will hand down
severe sentences. The political conservatism factor in DuPage
and Montgomery counties suggests severe sentences but
the low level of serious crime leads to a prediction of lenient
sentences.
The predictions concerning the impact of local jail capacity
follow the data presented earlier: lenient in Montgomery
County and severe in Kalamazoo, St. Clair, Saginaw, and Erie
counties. With respect to state penal facilities the Michigan
counties seem to enjoy a distinct advantage over those in
Illinois and Pennsylvania. The capacity of the Michigan system
is the largest by any measure. In addition it has a newer,
more decentralized penitentiary system oriented to less se-
rious offenders. This is expected to increase the attractiveness
of penitentiary commitments to Michigan judges, especially
with respect to the more plentiful, marginal offender.
Sentencing Patterns
Before turning to our analysis of severity, it will be useful first
to examine overall sentencing patterns. Our concern is with
five basic sentence forms: a penitentiary commitment, a jail
term, probation, diversion, and monetary punishment (resti-
tution or a fine). Probation is by far the most common of
these, accounting for close to half of all sentences. Peniten-
tiary and jail sentences are each used in roughly 20 percent
of all cases, while diversion and money punishments account
for the remaining 10 percent of the cases.
In many instances more than one form of punishment is
meted out. For example, all county jail sentences were
accompanied by some term of probation (30%), a fine (21%),
a combination of probation and a fine (17%), or some other
form of punishment (32%). Fifty-five percent of all probation
cases were also given a fine, while another 4 percent were
given some other form of punishment, usually a term of
probation to be completed after being released.
An examination of Figure 1 reveals that the basic pattern
does not characterize all counties. It reports the proportion
of sentenced cases in each of four basic sentencing forms
by county, along with the proportion for all nine counties (the
grand mean). It should be noted that the money category is
not included because of a lack of variance across counties.
Several observations can be made on the basis of Figure
1. First, in two Michigan counties, Kalamazoo and Oakland,
the penitentiary commitment is the modal form of punishment,
followed by jail confinement. Dauphin, Montgomery, and
DuPage counties are the least likely to send defendants to
the penitentiary, while they are among the most likely to use
probation (along with St. Clair County). Peoria and St. Clair
counties are the least likely to use the local jail. Oakland,
Kalamazoo, and Erie counties are the least likely to use
probation. Oakland and Erie, however, employ diversion far
more than the other counties. None of the Illinois counties
Figure 1
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Penitentiary Jail Probation Diversion
send marginal offenders to such facilities than to large,
fortress-like, maximum security prisons.
Despite the clarity of these results, we should be careful
in interpreting them. While more and better penal capacity
may increase sentence severity, it is not clear that more
severe sentences will "solve" the crime problem. Most crim-
inals do not get caught, and it seems that the danger of
incarceration is remote to most who are contemplating criminal
acts. Offenders are certainly less likely to commit criminal
offenses while they are incarcerated but whether they emerge
rehabilitated or merely better schooled in the ways of crime
is an open question. This last point is important when deci-
sions about new prison construction are being made.
Most criminal practitioners view repeat offenders as be-
longing to one of two categories
—
"losers" or "bad guys."
Losers are people who seem to drift aimlessly from one bad
situation to another and appear unable or unwilling to exert
much control over their lives. While they are not considered
particularly dangerous to the community, they may have a
high nuisance value. "Bad guys," on the other hand, are
hostile to society and purposely and continually flaunt the
law.
One of the reasons for the low rate of incarceration reported
earlier is that many convicted defendants are either first
offenders or losers. While some of these individuals may turn
into "bad guys" later, most agree that incarceration would
not be beneficial to them at the present. Restitution, super-
vised probation, fines, work release, and diversion seem more
appropriate and are much less costly. Costs per inmate for
a new medium security prison range from $40,000 to $50,000,
maximum security costs are in the $67,000 to $80,000 range.
Whenever the expansion of penal facilities is being consid-
ered, especially at the state level, it must be remembered
that the distinctions among defendants may be lost in the
rush to fill available spaces. While many will argue that there
is a vast reservoir of "bad guys" who should be in prison,
we must consider the very real possibility that a large number
of marginal offenders would be imprisoned as well. Although
incapacitation may be a legitimate sentencing goal, this would
be a very costly way of dealing with such offenders. Moreover,
if they emerged as better criminals, this policy would exac-
erbate the crime problem in the long run. In addition, these
enhanced capacities may "unleash" influences that are kept
at bay by a lack of excess capacity
As we have seen, despite considerable socioeconomic and
political differences across the six Illinois and Pennsylvania
counties, there are virtually no sentencing differentials across
them (when offense and criminal records are controlled). In
other words, equals are being treated equally. The existence
of excess state penal capacity may lead some counties to
incarcerate certain classes of offenders who are not being
incarcerated elsewhere, thereby giving rise to sentencing
disparities across the state.
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The 1980 census provides the latest glimpse into who lives
where in this nation and its states Changing locations of
people have prompted publicity recently about a repopulation
of the American countryside and revival of its small town
These tendencies suggest new directions and dimensions of
national settlement patterns. Moreover, these changes chal-
lenge governments and their officials at all levels to allocate
public works and services to areas where they are needed
and demanded. Maps of population redistributions can help
clarify government plans and actions.
As one of the megastates, Illinois reflects national trends.
The state, with its diverse population, variety of places in
which to live—ranging from small hamlets to a major metrop-
olis, and mixture of economic activities, serves as a microcosm
of the country at large. The need to redraw legislative districts
has focused some popular attention on the fact that Illinois
and other midwestern and some northeastern states did not
grow as fast as the rest of the nation during the 1970s
Somewhat less well known is information about where people
have chosen to live within each state's boundaries.
Most Illinois residents—as well as United States residents
in general—continue to live in or near major urban places. In
1980 four people in five, or 81 percent of the Illinois population,
lived in 23 counties designated by the Bureau of the Census
as metropolitan (Figure 1). This concentration has remained
unchanged essentially since midcentury and earlier; for al-
ready by 1930, three-quarters of the people in Illinois lived in
these urban counties. A fraction of the state's population
thus reside in the remaining 79 nonmetropolitan counties.
Today 73 percent of the United States population— 165 million
people—are congregated in metropolitan areas.
Even more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that throughout
the country (including Illinois) nonmetropolitan areas grew
faster in the past decade than metropolitan areas for the first
time in our history The pull of cities, so prevalent for most
of the century, appears to have weakened— not only for the
largest centers but also for middle-sized places. If this trend
continues, the dominance of our metropolitan areas may well
subside at some point in the future In Illinois, for example,
the population in nonmetropolitan counties increased 6 per-
Everett G Smith, Jr , a native of Urbana. Illinois, is a professor in the Department
of Geography al the University of Oregon He was at the University of Illinois
from 1961 to 1965 with a joint appointment in the Office of Community
Development and the Department of Geography Professor Smith authored an
earlier issue of Illinois Government Research (January 1970) entitled "Twentieth
Century Voting Patterns for President in Illinois'
cent between 1970 and 1980, while metropolitan counties
increased 2 percent during the decade. In the 1960s and
1950s, by contrast, the 23 metropolitan counties in Illinois
registered population gains of 12 and 20 percent respectively,
while nonmetropolitan counties in the state could muster
gains of barely 2 and 1 percent.
COUNTY PATTERNS
The relative attractiveness of nonmetropolitan over metro-
politan areas in recent years reveals a restless people,
evaluating and reevaluating their personal as well as the
nation's resources and moving to locations perceived as more
desirable for work or retirement, or both. Patterns of population
Figure 1
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gains and losses at the county level over several decades
emphasize these dynamics (Figure 2). The unshaded counties
on the maps highlight the continuity of urban and suburban
growth in northeastern Illinois and in and around the larger
cities downstate. More striking were declines in the 1970s in
the state's most urban counties, especially Chicago's Cook,
coupled with increases in counties more accustomed to
population losses than gains for most of the twentieth century
This decentralization indicates not only that people have
been evacuating big central cities and their suburbs, but also
that residents who might once have migrated to urban areas
are staying in smaller communities and rural areas. Although
the identity of who makes these choices and what precipitates
them awaits interviewing in the field, results of these multiple
and complex decisions appear in the changing patterns of
settlement.
During the 1970s only a handful of the 102 Illinois counties
— 14 in all—experienced population declines. In five of these,
significant drops in city populations affected county results
Chicago's Cook County, along with Madison and St Clair
counties, part of metropolitan St. Louis, and Rock Island
County stand out. For the first time ever, each of these
counties lost people Cook County decreased by more than
4 percent. Without Chicago, however, Cook would have
increased almost 6 percent. Chicago lost more than a third
of a million people during the decade, and adjacent suburbs
declined by another 100,000 residents.
The five suburban metropolitan counties surrounding Cook
County, on the other hand, increased 25 percent between
1970 and 1980—more than twice the national average growth
rate. Overall, the ten metropolitan areas in Illinois continued
their long-term gains, adding a net of 200,000 people in the
1970s, as peripheral growth offset losses in older, more central
urban districts and counties.
Most nonmetropolitan counties in Illinois also increased
their populations in the 1970s, reversing more familiar expe-
riences of repeated decreases Before 1970, about half or
more of the counties in Illinois— not always the same ones,
of course, but primarily those in nonmetropolitan areas—
experienced population losses in any given decade. Between
1960 and 1970, for example, 50 of the 102 counties in the
state declined; in the 1950s, the number was 51; and in the
1940s, it was 55. Only the 1930s resembled the 1970s. In
that decade 27 counties—almost double the 14 affected in
the 1970s—decreased in population. Fifty years ago, during
that earlier economic depression of this century, people clearly
saw fewer opportunities in cities and remained in rural areas
waiting for better times.
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Since 1900, therefore, most local government officials in
Illinois counties have had to adjust public programs and
finances for population declines more often than for increases.
Specifically, 58 Illinois counties lost people in four or more of
the eight decades between 1900 and 1980 (Table 1). Just
one in this group, Menard County, holds metropolitan status,
but this role is new, for it was not until the late 1970s that
the Bureau of the Census included Menard County with
Sangamon County to enlarge the Springfield Metropolitan
Statistical Area. The population profile of Menard typifies the
majority of Illinois counties: it had more decades of loss than
gain during this century. Population figures increased in the
1930s and after 1960, but the number of people living in
Menard County in 1980 remained below the peak for the
century registered in 1900.
Only one Illinois county—Stark— lost people in every dec-
ade between 1900 and 1980 Located north of Peoria, Stark
County comprises prime farmland, a relatively flat prairie
without many wooded tracts, water resources, or rolling
countryside that people seeking homesites beyond cities and
towns increasingly choose. Stark County is also a bit too far
from Peoria, Galesburg, and Moline-Rock Island for daily
commuting In addition, the farm population continues to drop,
as farms expand in size and diminish in number. This migration,
mostly out of the county, still exceeded the slight gains in
the four incorporated places made during the 1970s.
Stark County, however, may join other rural counties that
In nonmetropolitan counties, for example, there were fifty-
one townships or precincts in 1980 that had experienced
population increases of more than 23 percent between 1970
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and 1980 and that were neither an incorporated place nor
located next to a city Many of these "open country" areas
with new residents border on lakes created on smaller rivers
in central and southern Illinois, such as Lakes Shelbyville,
Mattoon, Sara, Carlyle, Rend, Kincaid, Cedar, Crab Orchard,
and Egypt Comparable settings with rapidly growing popu-
lations are in townships with lakes in the floodplam beside
the Illinois River both above and below Peoria and Pekin.
North Otter Township in Macoupin County, adjacent to and
just south of the Springfield Metropolitan Area, increased 73
percent in population between 1970 and 1980 There are no
incorporated places in North Otter, and for seven successive
decades, from 1900 to 1970, the township lost people. By
1970 only little more than half of the 1900 population lived
there During the 1970s, however, the number of people
increased from 493 to 852 new people Inspection of topo-
graphic maps reveals that all but a handful of these occupy
dwellings around a lake called Sunset formed by damming a
small tributary to Otter Creek Although Sunset Lake covers
parts of two mile-square sections in the township, the lake
is too small to appear on the official 1981-82 Illinois Highway
Map Ironically, larger Otter Lake, also created since the mid-
1960s a few miles west and identified on the official state
highway map, contains only a few houses near its shoreline,
according to topographic maps.
CONCLUSION
The 1980 census reveals that in Illinois today vast areas
contain residents on sites never before occupied and that
people are moving to or near farmsteads that were evacuated
in years past as small farms were expanded into huge tracts
and the countryside was emptied of its population. Many
unincorporated hamlets, villages, towns, and smaller cities
have shared in this population redistribution. Past experience
suggests that such redistributions will continue.
Selective as they are, these locational shifts can strain the
resources of local and state governments. Careful monitoring
of where people move, however, can help officials prepare
for the future needs of citizens in their jurisdictions. Those
from areas with similar settlement patterns can discuss past
experiences and trade views on future expectations, thereby
reducing uncertainty for themselves and the people who
elected them Maps like the ones presented here can help
in this process. More detailed documentation of settlement
changes for smaller areas can then refine the needs and
further assist in these important public tasks.
children who can live more cheaply in the country by renting
a former farmhouse and by tilling a few marginal acres around
it on a part-time basis; and some may be escaping city taxes
and, in the process, "externalizing their costs," to use the
economists' language. All must have cars and trucks that
run, and all seek sites, once restricted to the very rich, with
a physical amenity or some combination of space, view, trees,
water, and slope Because the climate in Illinois will never
rival Arizona's, even in summer, many people will migrate
from the state to find that vague and heterogeneous region
we call the Sun Belt. But Illinois, which looks flat, cropped,
mined, and cluttered with industry from the heavily travelled
routes used by most people, contains many locations that fit
the desires of people who hanker for a "place in the country."
Decreases in unincorporated population, particularly through
central Illinois, reflect continuing movements away from farms
without compensating nonfarm settlement in these open,
prairie lands. Losses in larger urban counties reflect municipal
annexations. Cook County, for example, decreased 63,300 in
its unincorporated population, as some of Chicago's suburbs
extended their city boundaries. Even so, 132,800 people still
lived in unincorporated territory of Cook County in 1980, more
than in any other county in the state. Similarly, almost half-a-
million people lived in the unincorporated parts of the five
metropolitan counties adjacent to Cook in 1980. Together
they registered an increase since 1970 of 60,300 people
outside the corporate limits. This 16 percent increase in
suburban Chicago occurred despite city boundary changes
and the formation of several new municipalities.
The Rockford Metropolitan Area and other northern Illinois
counties also added to their unincorporated populations in
the 1970s. Most of the counties along the Mississippi and
Illinois rivers increased, too, or recorded slight losses of a
few hundred or so. The large shaded region in Figure 3,
showing more people living outside cities and towns in eastern
and southern Illinois, corresponds closely with counties that
gained in total population between 1970 and 1980.
Changes in Effingham County again illustrate the trend.
Each of the ten incorporated communities in that county
increased in population during the 1970s, exhibiting the affinity
of many people for living once more in smaller towns. People
residing outside these corporate limits, however, accounted
for more than one-half of the total rise in population during
the decade. In 1980, 12,500 people lived in unincorporated
parts of Effingham County. This figure exceeded the city of
Effingham's total and represented two of every five people in
the county. A small portion of these people still farm full time.
Many more dabble part time with several cattle and a few
acres of crops, while most people have absolutely nothing
directly to do with the land other than weeding and harvesting
summer gardens and mowing their lawns.
Growth Areas
Maps of population growth patterns in the 1970s based on
units smaller than counties (i.e., townships and precincts)
disclose more precisely the dynamic locations in Illinois (Fig-
ures 4 and 5). Exceeding the Illinois and United States average
rates of increase between 1970 and 1980 were areas that
included outer suburbs and metropolitan margins as well as
corridors between these places near routes of access such
as freeways and amenities such as rivers. A broad growth
region surrounds Chicago and close-in suburbs and extends
northwest in a thick swath past Rockford toward Wisconsin
and Iowa. More people settled away from this large growth
area in northeastern Illinois in parallel paths in the Rock and
Illinois river valleys to the Quad Cities and to Peoria and
south toward St. Louis.
Across central Illinois, the growth corridors tend to link
larger urban centers. To the south, population increases in
the 1970s show a pattern that spreads widely through the
more rugged and wooded lands of Little Egypt. Aside from
significant losses in the largest cities and adjacent suburbs,
areas of slow growth or population decline appear as pockets
of productive prairie and other agricultural lands relatively
remote from major transport courses ana areas with desirable
physical amenities.
The map locating the most rapidly growing places and
areas in Illinois during the 1970s shows suburbanization and
metropolitan decentralization as important forces in the set-
tlement of the state. Especially striking is the concentration
of growing places around Chicago and the townships farther
out in the rolling moramic and lake country that are gaining
newcomers at a rapid rate. County subdivisions beyond
metropolitan areas that added people at rates more than
twice the national average express similar desires of people
for more personal space.
Figure 4
POPULATION GROWTH PATTERNS IN ILLINOIS
1970-80
Less than 5 Per Cent
Increase or Decrease
liopltthi ..)»
bam of County
? . .
Table 1
POPULATION LOSSES, BY DECADE AND COUNTY:
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owiALL-CITY COUNCILS AND THEIR PART-TIME EXPERTS:
DEALING WITH ATTORNEYS AND ENGINEERS
John Hamman, Kent Williamson and Alvin D. Sokolow*
Illinois has hundreds of small municipal governments Just in
the nonmetropolitan areas of the state, there are almost 700
incorporated villages and cities with populations of less than
5,000 apiece. Serving a total of more than 600,000 residents,
these small and largely rural municipalities are a major part
of the local government apparatus in Illinois,
Rural governments resemble in many respects municipal
operations in larger and more urban communities. They have
similar basic programs and responsibilities — police and fire
protection, water supply, streets, wastewater treatment, eco-
nomic development, parks and recreation, etc. They are also
entangled in many of the same kinds of intergovernmental
programs, including state and federal mandates, and grants
Where the small municipalities generally differ from larger
ones, is in the ready availability of expertise and information
for policymaking and management. Few small cities have
even a chief executive officer, such as a city manager. They
rely instead on city councilmembers and such generalist
officers as city clerks for day-to-day administration and infor-
mation gathering. Certainly their tiny bureaucracies lack the
internal resources needed for such specialized purposes as
legal advice, engineering, planning, and budgeting — forms
of expertise that are provided by full-time specialists and
even entire departments in big-city and large suburban gov-
ernments.
To obtain advice and information in these and other areas
of concern, the small municipalities turn to outside help. Legal
and engineering services, the two forms of specialized aid
most frequently required, are usually obtained through con-
sulting arrangements. Because they are outside contractors,
the attorneys and engineers who serve small governments
have a different relationship to their municipal bosses than
m-house officers and employees The major difference is that
such consultants are relatively independent, not subject to
the same degree of administrative control as are regular city
staff members.
With such an independent status, how do the outside
experts get along with the city councils that employ them''
' John Hamman and Kent Williamson were research assistants at the Institute
of Government and Public Affairs at the time the research for this report was
conducted Hamman is currently a Ph D candidate in political science and
Williamson recently received an M A in political science, both from the University
of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Alvin D Sokolow is professor of political science
and associate director of the Institute of Governmental Affairs at the University
of California. Davis Sokolow is co-investigator (with Beth Honadle of the U S
Department of Agriculture) of the two-state rural capacity study, from which
this report is drawn
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This paper examines the working relationships between coun-
cils and their part-time attorneys and engineers, using data
from a study of four small municipalities in rural Illinois.* Our
study found that, while the small governments are in fact
highly dependent on the outside expertise, the independent
status of the consultants causes frequent tension and dis-
agreement. The sources of tension, however, are not the
same for attorneys and consultants.
Located in east-central Illinois, the four municipalities —
three cities and one village — had 1980 populations of be-
tween 1,655 and 3,839 (see Table 1). Their mayors are "weak"
in an organizational sense, and formal powers are largely in
the hands of the municipal councils (4-8 members each).
Councilmembers, generally as "commissioners" or chairmen
and other members of small committees, participate directly
in the administration of municipal services including some
supervision of employees In this report the four municipalities
are identified by fictitious names: Grassland, Topcorn, Nativity,
and Acorn,
Table 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESEARCH
MUNICIPALITIES
WHAT THE CONSULTANTS DO
Part-time attorneys and engineers are employed by each of
the four rural governments. They are hired and fired by the
municipal councils and receive direction from these legislative
bodies and the mayors. Most of their local contacts are with
councilmembers and mayors, although they also advise and
work with other municipal officials such as city clerks and
public works foremen.
What specific tasks are performed by these outside ex-
perts9 Obviously, the attorneys and engineers provide quite
different types of expertise Less obvious, but equally signif-
icant is the fact that their operating styles and personal
relationships to municipal officials also differ.
The Attorneys
City attorneys spend much of their time drafting, reviewing,
and interpreting local ordinances. Councils are often uncertain
about the best way to proceed with non-routine actions such
as the condemnation of local property or the issuance of
industrial revenue bonds. They rely on their attorneys to clarify
and articulate possible options and potential liabilities. One
attorney summed up his activities by saying that:
[One part of the job] would be drafting documents which
would take the form of ordinances, resolutions, or agree-
ments that the city might enter with another person or
governmental entity. We've been involved with condemn-
ing property for sewer improvements.
As city attorney, my main responsibility would be to
advise the city council on any matters that come before
them that have legal ramifications. They usually contact
me through the city clerk. My general procedure is to
take the question, make sure I understand the nature of
the problem, which having lived there for some time
usually is fairly easy . . . and I will render an oral opinion
or a written opinion.
Occasionally the attorneys also handle more complex is-
sues. At the time of our research, Grassland's attorney was
representing his city in major litigation, attempting to close
and clean up a hazardous waste dumpsite which had qualified
for the US Environmental Protection Agency's Super Fund
program. Much of the attorney's time was spent in consulting
with state and federal officials. He had also taken a natural
gas wholesaler to court to recover alleged overcharges to
the municipal-owned gas utility, stemming from discriminatory
pricing practices by the wholesaler. A few years earlier, the
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attorney for Topcorn had represented the city in its efforts to
switch engineering firms for the design of wastewater plant
improvements. Problems like these are outside the general
practitioner's usual area of expertise and frequently require
extensive research and time. To be somewhat better prepared
and more knowledgeable about developments in the field of
municipal law, city attorneys attend seminars conducted by
the nearby University of Illinois School of Law and often read
materials published by the Illinois Municipal League.
Among the four communities, only one attorney has a
formal contract with his council; the others work by verbal
agreements. The attorneys average between five and ten
hours a month on routine city business (each represents only
one municipality); litigation, other major projects, and partic-
ipation in council meetings are extra activities. All but one of
the attorneys are compensated on an hourly basis; their rates
are approximately $45 00 per hour These rates are up to 25
percent less than those charged private parties for compa-
rable assistance The rationale is that councils are stable
clients and punctual bill payers The attorney of the largest
community receives a retainer under a written contract; he
is the only attorney in the sample who attends council
meetings regularly.
Depending on the type of assistance, attorneys work with
different local officials. When drafting new ordinances, or
when called upon to render opinions on policy related ques-
tions, they are likely to work with the mayor or possibly a
councilmember acting for the entire council. Most routine
matters are dealt with quickly by a phone call or letter to the
city clerks.
All four attorneys are general practitioners and are current
or former residents of the communities they serve. Not
surprisingly, they also have social, business, and political ties
to councilmembers as well as other local officials. Occasionally
this leads to a change of roles; for instance, Topcorn's former
municipal attorney now serves on that city's council.
The Engineers
Unlike the attorneys, the engineers who serve these small
municipalities are members of large firms (employing as many
as 15-20 employees each), which specialize in work for
municipal and other local governments. The firms are not
directly located in the small cities, but have offices in nearby
major urban centers — Champaign, Decatur, or Mattoon. Thus
the engineers have relatively limited personal links to the
officials who retain them, and they keep in touch mainly by
phone and on an irregular basis.
Each of the firms is a multi-disciplinary operation, employing
a variety of engineering and other specialists. One engineer,
describing the services his firm could provide, said:
We are architects. We do civil engineering projects, which
is my daily work, and we do mechanical and electrical
engineer work, too. So we cover it all
—
municipal build-
ings, private buildings, public utilities, roads, drainage.
Working agreements are made between the communities and
the firms on a project-by-project basis, and a cost ceiling is
negotiated for each. If the arrangement works out, the firm
may eventually become known as the city's engineers, even
though there is no formal contract. As indicated in Table 1,
three of the four city engineers in the sample had worked for
their cities for fifteen years or more at the time of the research.
Work is done on large and small projects, including street
repairs, water system improvements, parking lot construction,
drainage, and renovation of municipal buildings.
greater physical and personal distance from the councils
The technical nature of their work may also protect them
from community pressures. However, engineers can also
become enmeshed in local disputes. A good example oc-
curred in Topcorn when the council changed engineering
firms in the middle of design work for multi-million dollar
improvements in the wastewater treatment plant. Although
the facilities plan (the first stage in an EPA-supported clean
water project) prepared by the original consultants had already
been accepted by the city and the state, the council com-
missioned an alternative plan from a second engineering firm
and decided to engage it for the remainder of the project.
The original consultants took the city to court and were
awarded $20,000 for breach of contract Unrepentant, one
councilmember remarked, "All I can say, it's worth every
penny of the judgment."
While city officials were hesitant about discussing this
chapter of council history, two explanations have been ad-
vanced by interested parties. One is blatantly political: The
engineering consultant developed ties with an incumbent
faction on the council that was later voted out of office. The
newly elected members made an issue out of the expense
and lack of progress on the wastewater plan. The consultant
was squeezed out because of the narrowness of his political
base
CONCLUSIONS
Legal and engineering services are needed by virtually all
municipal governments. For small cities, unable to employ
full-time and in-house professional staff, the standard method
for obtaining such expertise is to retain part-time consultants
As this study of consultant-council relations in four small
Illinois municipalities shows, the outside attorneys and engi-
neers provide essential information and advice. They contrib-
ute fo municipal policymaking as well as to routine adminis-
tration, helping the city governments define issues, manage
programs, obtain access to other expertise, and cut through
the complexities of state and federal grant and mandate
programs.
Yef the consultant-cify relationship is an ambiguous one.
While highly dependent on their part-time experts, the mu-
nicipal councils at times are also distrustful and wary of the
attorneys and engineers. Professional advice is not always
accepted or appreciated, and sometimes the experts are
blamed for the slow or unsuccessful resolution of difficult
problems. Conflict between political leaders and their experts
can of course occur in any setting, including large urban
governments where the engineers and attorneys tend to be
full-time employees. The added tension in small cities comes
from the relatively independent position of the outside con-
sultant. City leaders have very little control over the scope
and terms of the experts' work, in large part because the
consultants have other clients and flexible practices. Nor are
they totally dependent on their municipal employers for fi-
nancial security and career advancement The lay citizen who
serves on a small-city council is also less likely to have the
wherewithal to assess the performance of specialists and to
assimilate their information and advice. This situation is made
even more difficult in small communities where there are no
generalist administrators such as city managers.
Our observations in the four Illinois municipalities led to the
conclusion that there are three primary sources of council-
consultant tension: contrasting objectives, communications
gaps, and local politics. Both engineers and attorneys are
affected by political developments at the local level. Negative
repercussions are most likely to occur if either kind of con-
sultant becomes very closely allied with a particular faction
and that faction is then voted out of office.
In small communities, politics is closely interwoven with
what we have called community ties; the extent to which a
consultant has such ties, will in some measure determine his
ability to communicate effectively with the local council. A
local attorney with close and long-standing ties to his com-
munity will probably be selected as the council's legal advisor
in preference to a newcomer, and as long as he does not
get on the wrong side of a political battle he is likely to keep
the position. Consulting engineers — from large, multi-skill
firms located in some distant town — face a different set of
problems. Tensions between them and their councils are most
likely to erupt over poor communications — misunderstand-
ings that develop precisely because the engineer is not a
member of the local communications network — and over
fundamental differences in the ultimate goals that each side
has Both kinds of problems arose during the design, funding,
and construction of the wastewater treatment projects that
all four cities undertook.
It should perhaps be pointed out that money plays an
important role alongside (or in spite of) any of the three
sources of tension we have cited. If there is a great deal of
money, problems in communicating may never flare up to the
point where heads have to roll. Take for example the expe-
riences of consulting engineers to Topcorn and Grassland.
Grassland completed its wastewater plant in a relatively short
time and adhered closely to the recommendations of its
engineers. It also had enough money for the project, pos-
sessing a relatively affluent revenue base (fortified by a
municipal power distribution system) In Topcorn, however,
the community's ability to finance its wastewater project was
a constant source of concern. And the engineers who began
that project did not see their work completed, since they
were replaced by another firm. While politics and poor com-
munications certainly played a major part in what happened
in Topcorn, money doubtless played a role as well.
Despite the tensions, councils and experts generally main-
tained smooth and productive working relationships over long
periods of time. At the time of our research the attorneys in
the sample had been working for their cities an average of
four years apiece, while the engineers had an average tenure
of almost fifteen years. Only two consultants have actually
been dismissed in recent years — an engineering firm whose
contract was terminated ostensibly because of cost problems
in a wastewater project, and a city attorney who was let go
after a new council was elected. Overall the part-time experts
were major and effective participants in the governing process
of these small cities.
Complaints about ambiguity are frequently heard from
engineers who point to the difficulty of tying local officials
down to specifics. While the engineers said they received
adequate direction on general goals, they, noted that the
councils were not able to take decisive action on short notice.
This was attributed to the councils' limited knowledge and
experience in major community projects. Several attorneys
also mentioned councilmember mdecisiveness as an obstacle
to expeditious action. Tension is frequently generated when
specific items in grant applications are being worked on, and
the consultants push councilmembers to state their intentions
clearly and specifically An engineer we spoke with saw it
this way:
Things go pretty smooth when they [councilmembers]
recognize that you're a professional, and ask constructive
questions The problems come up when they're real
picky and hands on, or completely out of touch and
suspicious.
Poor Lines of Communications
That a healthy rapport and exchange of information between
councils and consultants is necessary for the effective use
of expertise really goes without saying. Problems in com-
municating with the councils are troublesome for both engi-
neers and attorneys. One engineer described communication
problems in wastewater plant expansion projects;
Normally, the problems in communication are concen-
trated in the preliminary part of it [facilities planning].
When you get into design and construction, things seem
to be more specific, whereas they aren't in the earlier
stages, and communications can definitely break down.
The complex tasks encountered during planning, design,
and construction of major wastewater plant improvements
were a major cause of communication breakdowns between
councils and engineers. Since the development of these
projects consists of many sequential, interdependent steps,
council disillusionment towards the end of a lengthy project
may lead to allegations of engineering errors and cover-up.
Other small-town councilmembers may share the exasperation
of the Acorn alderman who disgustedly commented about
projected construction overruns
The council can get hurt on this thing; the contractor
can get hurt on it; why, the only one who can't get hurt
is the engineer who rigged it up.
An engineer is also particularly vulnerable to criticism and
blame when a third-party regulatory agency is involved. Strict
state and federal water quality requirements irritated many
councilmembers during wastewater treatment expansion proj-
ects. Councilmembers criticized engineers for not correctly
anticipating changes in regulations as well as for "over-
designing'' projects that legitimately needed to be brought
into compliance. Such contradictory criticisms prompted
counter complaints from the engineers, who felt trapped like
the Greek messenger of old — innocent themselves but con-
demned for delivering bad news. This is illustrated by the
experience of a former engineering consultant for Topcorn.
According to a colleague, the offending engineer failed to
prepare the Topcorn council psychologically for the complex-
ities, cost, and time required for a major wastewater plant
project. When it became clear just how costly the project
would be, the council decided to blame the complications on
the outside consultant.
While their frustrations at being "caught in the middle"
were no doubt valid in some cases, the presence of govern-
ment regulators enabled some engineers to shift blame for a
variety of deficiencies onto the backs of state and federal
agencies. The key to winning this triangular game boiled
down to convincing the small-city councils that the regulators
were the uncooperative outsiders, and that the engineer was
merely an instrument of the council's will. No doubt, one's
perspective in large part determines the validity of these
criticisms. It is true that federal and state standards and grant
availability do change with time. How well these are antici-
pated and conveyed by the engineers to the councils bears
directly on the smoothness of council-consultant relations.
A different kind of communications gap faces attorneys
who try to get their city councils to consider the legal
ramifications of particular actions or to prepare for anticipated
lawsuits Despite the cautions of their legal advisers, many
small-town councilmembers are unwilling to tackle such prob-
lems seriously. They are seen as hypothetical or "what if"
situations, not worthy of the same attention as more practical,
everyday problems.
Generally, however, attorneys have fewer difficulties than
engineers in communicating with small-city governments. This
is due in part of course to the fact that the two positions
have different sorts of ties to the local government, a point
we made earlier. Since the legal experts tend to have local
ties and to be familiar with community issues and idiosyn-
crasies, they fit neatly into the informal operations of small
municipalities. Just how important these ties can be is illus-
trated by an example from Nativity, which had to look for a
new attorney after their old one moved out of town. In his
place the council hired a former resident who had moved his
office back into town The new city attorney continues to be
a member of the local Jaycees and Chamber of Commerce
and maintains lifelong friendships with several councilmem-
bers. As all of the parties involved noted, the appointment
was only natural, and everyone was happy with it.
Finally, it should be noted that all four attorneys in our
sample were general practitioners and had no other municipal
clients. As a result, their advice and information were usually
tailored to the cities' unique situations.
Dealing with more technical forms of expertise and serving
numerous local government clients, the engineers function
on a less personal basis. They tend to standardize their
consulting work, giving different communities similar an-
swers — such as wastewater project designs — to perhaps
qualitatively different problems. As more distant technicians,
not as sensitive as the attorneys to local conditions, the
engineers are less effective in communicating information and
advice to the councils.
Politics
Local political developments can have a profound effect on
both the local city attorney and the consulting engineer from
some distant community. The greatest danger — if the ex-
periences from our small sample of communities hold true
for others as well — lies in a change in council membership.
A good example of this may be seen in the fate of a former
Grassland attorney who had been associated with council-
members, who in turn wound up on the losing side of a
controversial effort to build a municipal swimming pool. The
ostensible reason for his replacement by the newly-elected
council was that his rates were too high. Interviews revealed,
however, that his close association with the losing coalition
was at least partly responsible
Engineering consultants to small cities may be somewhat
better insulated from such local developments because of
One type of project that all four cities were Involved In was
the design and construction of a new or improved wastewater
treatment facility. This happened as a result of federal and
state clean water requirements enacted during the 1970s for
community sewer systems. These million-dollar-plus projects
are easily the most expensive and complex construction
activities ever engaged in by small cities In addition to
preparing plans and overseeing the contractors, engineers
have helped cities apply for and administer the grants needed
to finance the wastewater projects and serve as liaison with
the state and federal agencies that enforce the regulations
and administer the grant programs
The average time spent on any particular community's
business varies considerably depending on the nature of the
project One employee estimated that his firm put in a little
over 300 hours in the course of a year to complete the facilities
plan required for the phase 1 grant of the community's
wastewater project
As is true of the lawyers, the engineers maintain contact
on routine matters through the city clerk The engineering
firms also communicate regularly with the employee in charge
of operating the municipality's water and wastewater facilities.
These operators, who are certified by the state, are able to
provide technical information to the engineers.
Engineering consultants usually attend only those council
meetings at which their projects are being discussed. Once
a council has initiated a project, both parties usually find it
necessary to place aspects of it on the agenda. On relatively
routine undertakings, such as parking lot or street repairs,
this may simply mean presenting and justifying bills, or giving
progress reports. On more complex projects, such as the
wastewater facility improvements, considerable time is often
spent defining alternative designs and funding strategies. As
a major project progresses, some changes in the original
material and design specifications usually have to be made.
These too require council approval If time is of the essence,
the mayor may contact an engineer directly and resolve an
issue before the city council meets.
Normally one member of a firm is assigned to a project
The liaison person may call on other members of the firm if
assistance is needed. This is often the case in wastewater
projects where details pertaining to both grant administration
and facility construction have to be managed.
HOW THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOVERNING
PROCESS
Consulting engineers and attorneys assist their city councils
and officials in numerous ways They (1) help to define goals
and issues, (2) provide continuity and direction in completing
major undertakings, (3) provide access to other outside
expertise, (4) absorb uncertainty, (5) serve as scapegoats for
unpopular actions, and (6) provide general technical and
administrative assistance
Small-town councils sometimes do not know what they
want done, which makes the goal-definition task that much
more critical for the consultants A good illustration of this is
the tremendous difference between wanting an economical
expansion of a wastewater treatment plant and obtaining a
grant to complete the project An engineering firm's expertise
and the experience gained from similar projects elsewhere
brings continuity and focus to the process The consultants
can also tap other more specialized outside sources, as
Grassland's attorney did when he called in state and federal
officials to help close and clean up the chemical waste site
situated on the outskirts of the commmunity
Consultants are able to relieve councils of some of the
responsibility of implementing unpopular state and federal
mandates. For example, the engineering consultants helped
the Nativity council justify the installation of new equipment
in the water plant that would eventually be required by state
health authorities. Sometimes the consultant — wittingly or
unwittingly — serves as a scapegoat for local government
officials, drawing the blame for problems that appear upon
completion of a particular project The dismissal of the first
engineering firm that worked on the Topcorn wastewater
project is a good example here.
Finally, consultants are often called upon to assist with a
broad array of administrative tasks, from writing grant pro-
posals to interpreting procedures In Nativity and Acorn, city
attorneys recently recodified local ordinances which had been
recorded over the years in serial order. Engineering firms
administer the wastewater grants received by small cities,
which means handling the bulk of paperwork and routine
contacts with state officials As a result of their longstanding
contacts with the small cities, and the files they keep on the
communities' physical plants, the engineering firms also mon-
itor the condition of the water and sewer systems
SOURCES OF COUNCIL-CONSULTANT TENSION
The relationship between the consultants and the small city
governments is not always a smooth one. Tension often
occurs between the producers and consumers of legal and
engineering expertise The tension may come about because
councilmembers distrust the consultants and doubt the value
of their advice. The result may be that major projects are
delayed or that expert advice and information is ignored.
Sometimes consultants and their municipal bosses even part
company, as occurred in several of our communities in recent
years. Generally, however, the consultants serve their cities
for long terms, as shown in Table 1.
Recent events in the four Illinois communities suggest the
following three sources of consultant-council tensions.
Contrasting Objectives and Ambiguity
Perceptions of goals and objectives can differ markedly
between communities and their engineering consultants These
differences seem to result from inherent differences in the
interests of the two parties as well as a more general inability
to come to terms on exactly what is to be done. For example,
the city of Nativity found it difficult to get a grant to help
finance the expansion of its wastewater treatment plant. The
council worked with its engineers for more than two years to
devise an acceptable proposal Once, against the advice of
the consultants, the city submitted an application which was
rejected by the state EPA Focusing on a short-term objective,
the council sought to complete only the specific improvements
necessary to get a state-imposed sewer ban lifted so that it
would be more attractive to industry The consulting engineers
and state officials, however, were interested in longer term
objectives, including the expansion of the plant's capacity to
accommodate future growth This would have required a more
expensive project than the community desired.
Nativity councilmembers felt the engineers were insensitive
to their particular situation, an observation repeated in other
cities. The Nativity council recognized that the more expensive
alternative would give the community a better plant in the
long run, but they were fearful of the sharp increases in
service charges (and possibly taxes) that would be required
for the local part of construction costs and for the added
maintenance of a larger plant.
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PLEAS WITHOUT BARGAINING: GUILTY PLEAS IN THE FELONY COURTS OF ILLINOIS,
MICHIGAN AND PENNSYLVANIA
Peter F. Nardulli
Roy B. Flemming
It is widely agreed that the vast majority of convictions in
criminal courts are the result of guilty pleas. There is also
surprisingly little disagreement that most guilty pleas are a
consequence of plea bargaining, of one form or another
Uncritical acceptance of the notion that guilty pleas are
synonymous with bargaining has had several negative results
One of the most significant is that researchers overlook the
outlines of two very different conceptions of the guilty plea
process in answering the question: What makes the plea
system work?
While most observers agree some form of trial penalty
exists to encourage pleas (i.e., a more severe sentence will
be given to defendants who are convicted after trial), they
differ over how pleas are put together. These differences form
the basis for two competing models. One could be termed
the "concessions" model. Adherents of this model are nor-
mally vociferous critics of plea bargaining. Although they span
the ideological spectrum, they are in general agreement that
charging manipulations and sentencing concessions grease
the wheels of justice. The other is the "consensus" model,
which stresses the importance of shared understandings in
lubricating the court's machinery. Concessions and explicit
bargaining have a role to play, but they are restricted to a
small subset of cases involving lengthy sentences, evidentiary
deficiencies, or some other type of problem.
How two such different models of the guilty plea process
could co-exist without attracting more comment can best be
explained by reference to the tale of the blind men and the
elephant Depending upon their research technique and de-
sign, the type and location of court studied, ideological
orientation, etc., plea bargaining researchers left their field
sites with different perceptions of the guilty plea process
This suggests two observations. First, the two models are
not mutually exclusive in the sense that all guilty pleas in a
court operations become quite evident. For example, to what
extent do charge modifications characterize the guilty plea
process9 What is the nature of these modifications9 What is
the nature of sentencing patterns in plea cases, i.e., are
sentences for a given offense characterized by wide disparities
or narrow similarities9 Answers to these important questions
will provide insights into the nature of the guilty plea process
and the ability of the competing models to portray it.
Looking only at the implications of the two models for the
structure of the guilty plea process, two issues become
apparent (see Figure 1). One is the role of charge reductions.
Regardless of any other concessions, these are important
because they can limit the defendant's legal liability at
sentencing The second issue concerns the role of what some
term the
"going rate," the normal range of sentences for a
particular type of offense, which is largely based upon the
historical practice within a given county. It is similar to the
price of milk in a supermarket. While the price will vary in
different parts of the country, consumers in any single area
expect the price for a gallon of milk to be within a given
range.
Figure 1 suggests that in a pure concessions model bar-
gaining over guilty pleas will involve substantial revisions in
the original legal exposure of defendants as counts are
dropped and charges are reduced to satisfy the interests
and goals of participants. Sentences will vary considerably
not only because the participants change from one case to
another but also because the negotiating skills and resources
of the actors will vary and be largely unrestrained by prece-
dent. Modified versions of the concessions model would
Ttygiescribe processes characterized either largely by charge or
by s^rfltftpic^jDargaining
f f /\ ^Extensive cnttge manipulations involving substantial re-
niiljctj&nj would support the view that guilty pleas are then ma n i 'TJLctHi s n
jurisdiction must result from a series of concessions or emerg^y^. result or cB*6*Herable horse trading and that give-and-take
from rnnQpncM 10 That i<; hnth spt<; nf hlind mpn wprp rnrrpnt *._ tftow+ko v*,hpoIc nf nictiro Thrc arnumpnt wnnlH hp nraatlvfrom consensus. That is, bo ets of blind e e e co ec {.
as far as they went A second instructive observation is that
plea bargaining researchers too often have failed to document
their field perceptions empirically The perceptions became,
in effect, covenants of faith Moreover no one rigorously
examined their role in the guilty plea process.
Once these covenants of faith are acknowledged for what
they are — hypotheses about the very essence of the guilty
plea process — gaping holes in empirical research on criminal
Peter F Nardulli is associate professor in the Institute of Government and
Public Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the University of
Illinois He has written in the area of police service delivery, criminal courts,
and state prison problems Roy B Flemming is associate professor of political
science at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan and was a visiting
scholar at the Institute of Government in the spring of 1984 His book on bail
proceedings in Detroit and Baltimore received the Hmdelang Award for the
best book published in 1983 on criminal justice
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wheels of justice This argument would be greatly
,/G* Figure 1
EMPIRICAL DIMENSIONS OF GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
Influence of Going Rates
Legal Exposure
strengthened if there were also empirical evidence of wide
ranging sentencing disparities (for the early, "untainted"
charges) Without such evidence the charge manipulations
would be vulnerable to the accusation that they are wholly
symbolic, made only to mollify defendants, -and that defend-
ants are being duped
In contrast to the various versions of the concessions
model, the consensus model predicts high levels of consist-
ency on both dimensions Charge and count modifications
will be relatively infrequent, and there will be minimal variation
in sentences for comparable cases and circumstances. If
charging modifications are in fact infrequent, it would seem
reasonable to conclude that common understandings and
perceptions among court participants underlie the process
and that participants are chiefly concerned with pigeonholing
defendants, not with negotiating over relative advantages It
follows that if there is charging consistency there must also
be sentencing consistency Otherwise, it could be argued
that beneath the placid surface of charge constancy a lively
trade in guilty pleas is being conducted — with sentences
as currency
DATA SOURCES
To examine the level of charging and sentencing disparities,
data from a broadly-based, intensive study of criminal courts
in nine medium-sized counties (with populations ranging from
100,000 to 1,000,000) in Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
were examined The Illinois counties were DuPage, Peoria,
and St, Clair, the Michigan counties were Oakland, Kalamazoo,
and Saginaw; the Pennsylvania counties were Montgomery,
Dauphin, and Erie
The nine counties were selected to gauge the impact of
two important county differences on criminal court operations:
socioeconomic welfare and political attitudes To fulfill these
criteria, one economically declining county (St, Clair, Saginaw,
Erie), one autonomous county (Peoria, Kalamazoo, Dauphin),
and one suburban ring county (DuPage, Oakland, Montgo-
mery) was selected from each state.
It will be useful to describe some of the differences in the
sites to demonstrate that the data do not represent any
single, narrow slice of middle America. Table 1 reports the
economic and political characteristics of the nine counties
The ring counties were the most prosperous — with per capita
incomes hovering at about $10,000 in 1979 The declining
counties were far less prosperous; per capita incomes stood
at somewhat over $6,500 Politically, DuPage and Dauphin
counties appear to be the most conservative, followed by
Peoria and Montgomery counties The Michigan counties
appear to be fairly moderate, while St. Clair and Erie counties
are moderately liberal
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The nine counties also showed some important differences
in crime rates. According to the FBI reports on violent personal
crime rates (per 100,000 population) for the ten years pre-
ceding this study (1971-80), Peoria and St. Clair counties had
the highest rates, Kalamazoo and Dauphin counties were far
lower. While two Michigan counties (Oakland and Saginaw)
had fairly low personal offense rates, two of the ring counties
(DuPage and Montgomery) and Erie had the lowest.
It is obvious that these counties differ markedly even though
they are all midsized American communities. Indeed, they
were selected because of their differences. No claim is made
that the criminal courts of these counties are in any way a
representative sample. They are not. However, their diversity
helps undercut the types of biases that often creep into
findings based on only one or two locales.
In these nine counties extensive case data on almost 7,500
felony defendants were collected. The number of defendants
ranged from 1,162 in St Clair County to 594 in Erie County.
They represent roughly a year's cases in each county; the
nine sets of cases, on balance, reflect about nine years of
dispositions. Most were disposed of during 1979 and 1980.
In most counties all cases for a given time span were included
in the sample. However, in some counties systematic samples
were used. In addition, 300 interviews were conducted with
the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys who handled
the cases.
One last point should be made. For the purposes of this
paper the analysis rests on a merged pool of the county
samples since the primary interest was in painting a broad
picture The fusion of data from a variety of different jurisdic-
tions insures that this picture will be fairly balanced.
CHARGING MODIFICATIONS AND GUILTY PLEAS
The modification of charges pending against a defendant can
have an important effect upon the decision to plead guilty
because it limits his potential exposure to legal sanctions.
This exposure depends upon the severity and range of
penalties associated with the charges lodged against him
upon which he could be convicted and sentenced after a
trial While the going rate for an offense normally limits the
probable range of sentences, its outermost boundaries are
still set by statute Modifying charges can, therefore, change
potential exposure in ways that are either positive or negative
for the defendant. Because of the differences in potential and
probable sentences — and the possibility that some charge
reductions may be largely symbolic — the analysis of charge
reduction is relatively involved and multifaceted First, we will
look at the incidence and pattern of charge modifications.
Second, we will measure the magnitude of these changes
Frequency and Focus of Charge Modifications
Four empirical patterns of charge modification were found in
guilty plea cases: (1) no changes in charges, (2) a "pure"
reduction in the number of counts or seriousness of offenses,
(3) a "mixed" modification, with an enhancement of counts
or charge seriousness later followed by a reduction; and (4)
a straightforward enhancement in exposure through increases
in the number of counts of charge seriousness. Diagram 1
reports the frequency of these patterns.
Complete consistency — no modifications in any count or
charge from the time of arrest through final disposition
—
occurred in 60 percent of the cases "Pure" reductions were
made in over a quarter of the cases (26 7 percent) Enhance-
ments took place in roughly 13 percent of the cases, but the
lion's share of these were "mixed" cases: 71 percent of the
enhancements were later mitigated through reductions Charge

enhancements normally took place when the indictment or
information was filed, reductions were made later on in trial
court. Comparisons of the arrest and conviction charges show
that this two-step process produced real reductions, and they
should, therefore, be combined with the "pure" category to
gain an accurate picture of concessions
Together the two groups accounted for 36 percent of the
entire pooled sample of cases, at first glance a rather sizable
proportion This should be qualified by the observation that
the concessions usually focused on secondary or tertiary
offenses, not the primary or most serious charge. For example,
68 4 percent of the "pure" reductions entailed alterations in
these secondary charges. For the "mixed" cases, the pro-
portion was 50 1 percent. Altogether only about 15 percent
of the cases involved a reduction in the primary offense. As
a final matter, it bears mentioning that the number of true
enhancements amounted to only 210 cases, or slightly less
than 4 percent of the pooled sample. For this reason the
following discussion generally concentrates on charge reduc-
tions.
Depending upon one's views these data show either too
much charging manipulation or too little (i.e., the reductions
of secondary offenses are insignificant and wholly symbolic,
resulting in the deception of most defendants). While such
an assessment is premature at this point, we cannot even
begin to address such issues without comparing charge
changes in guilty plea cases with those in trial convictions
Some adjustments are bound to occur in a process as complex
as the criminal justice system Hence, a certain level of charge
reductions may not be unique to plea cases but simply
inevitable within the dispositional process. Table 2 reports
data on the incidence of a charge reduction by mode of
conviction
In general, charge modifications were neither ubiquitous in
guilty plea cases nor rare in trial convictions Reductions were
significantly more likely (statistically speaking) in guilty plea
cases than in the trial cases But it also is quite evident that
charge modifications were not unknown in trial convictions,
due to dismissal or the acquittal of certain counts Reductions
were made in 30 percent of the trial cases, a figure not greatly
dissimilar from that for guilty pleas (38 4 percent). The differ-
ences narrow when focusing on reductions of the primary
charge; 10.9 percent of the convictions in trial cases were
for reduced primary charges compared to 15.1 percent of
the guilty pleas.
The fundamental similarity in the charge reduction patterns
of guilty plea and trial cases introduces a certain element of
ambiguity to the data reported in Diagram 1. The fact that
yawning gaps do not appear by mode of conviction suggests
that at least some of the charging concessions (which sup-
posedly limit a defendant's legal exposure at sentencing)
might have occurred even if a plea had not been submitted.
Table 2
INCIDENCE OF A CHARGE REDUCTION BY MODE OF
CONVICTION
Guilty Plea Trial Conviction
Any Charge
Reduction
Reduction of
Primary Offense
38.4%"
(5462)
15.1%*
(5564)
30%"
(370)
10 9%*
(387)
An examination of the magnitude of these concessions may
erase some of this ambiguity.
Magnitude of Charge Reductions
Modifications in defendants' potential legal exposure occurred
roughly one-third of the time and most often involved only
the secondary charges, leaving the primary charges un-
touched. Could these changes be largely symbolic? Or were
they real concessions7 To shed light on whether the reductions
were meaningful or not, two measures of magnitude were
used. The first was the number of counts dropped The other
was more refined and measured the change in probable or
projected sentences due to charge reductions.
Count Drops
The most common form of charge concession in guilty plea
cases was the dismissal of one or more counts in a multi-
count indictment or information. Such drops occurred in 29.9
percent of the cases, as can be seen in Table 3. The average
number of counts dropped (for the cases where a count drop
occurred) ranged between 1 and 2 (mean = 1 .7, median =
1.3). The counts dropped accounted for half of the counts
charged (mean proportion of all counts dropped = .55, median
=
.50). Count drops occurred in only 23.1 percent of trial
convictions, but the mean number dropped was 2.0 (median
=
1.6), somewhat larger than the mean in guilty plea cases.
Both statistics are significantly different from those in guilty
plea cases, but substantively the differences are not very
meaningful.
Projected Sentence
The analysis of count modifications is not totally satisfactory
because it is crude and does not say much about their
substantive significance. Its crudeness is due to the fact that
it equates the dropping of a theft charge with a rape charge,
and it misses cases involving only charge modifications
unaccompanied by count modifications (e.g., reducing aggra-
vated battery to simply battery). Also, the count analysis
lacks strong substantive implications because the conse-
quences of count modifications for any realistic assessment
of a defendant's projected sentence are uncertain Dropping
the third and fourth counts of a "string" indictment may have
little or no impact on the actual sentence
To examine the magnitude of charge modifications, an
"offense seriousness score" was constructed. It measures
the differences between the original mix of charges and the
final set. These offense seriousness scores are equivalent to
the average sentence received in a county for a particular
Table 3
COUNT REDUCTIONS BY TYPE OF CONVICTION
Average number
Percent of of counts
all cases dropped
Average counts
dropped as a
proportion of
counts charged
•
Significant at 05 level
"
Significant at 001 level
Table 4
WEIGHTED CHARGE REDUCTIONS BY TYPE OF CONVICTION
Charge Reduction:
Guilty Pleas
Trial Convictions
Note N S = Statistically not significant
Percent of
all cases
23.9NS
(965)
22.0NS
(62)
Average weighted
modification
(in months)
Mean Median
7.6NS 14
11.6NS 1 1
Percentage of all
weighted changes
that are less than
six months
79
79
Average weighted
modifications as
a proportion of
weighted charges
Mean
,39NS
.40NS
Median
24
.35
offense For example, if the average armed robbery sentence
was 48.6 months, then the offense seriousness score would
be 48.6 These scores were highly correlated (r = .70) with
the actual sentences, as one would guess, and gives us a
good basis for estimating the impact of a charge reduction
on a defendant's sentence. If a reduction is from an offense
with an average sentence of 16.4 months to one with an
average sentence of 12.4 months, we can project that the
reduction is "worth" about 4 months at the sentencing state
'
Table 4 reports data on the changes in weighted serious-
ness scores between arrest and conviction. Almost a quarter
of the guilty plea cases in this subset of most frequent
offenses received a reduction in one of the first three arrest
offenses. The mean projected sentencing value of these
reductions was 7 6 months, but that figure is highly skewed
by a handful of extreme cases. As the median value of 1.4
months indicates, half of those pleading guilty had charge
reductions "worth" somewhat less than two months in proj-
ected sentence. Almost 80 percent of the defendants received
reductions under six months.
Another way to view this is that, of all defendants who
pleaded guilty, only about 5 percent received a charge
concession likely to be "worth" at least six months. It should
be remembered that the absolute level of charge reductions
is limited by the projected sentence of the total package of
charges. Thus it is important to note that the last two columns
in Table 4 report the reductions as proportions of the summed
seriousness scores. The mean value of these proportions is
.39, and the median is .24. According to the median figure,
then, the projected sentences of half of the defendants who
pleaded guilty and received some form of charge reduction
was cut by a quarter.
While these proportions seem fairly significant, it should be
kept in mind that they represent less than one quarter of all
guilty plea cases. Moreover, if these statistics, as well as the
others reported in Table 4 are compared with the attrition of
charges in trial cases (row 2), it is not at all clear that the
charge reductions which do occur are real concessions. There
' The existence of multi-count indictments compounded the difficulties of
analysis somewhat because the impact on sentencing of a charge when it is
listed as a second or third count on an indictment is not nearly as great as
when it is the most serious count charged To handle this problem, the average
impact of second and third counts was estimated These estimates were used
to weight the impact of the second and third counts Thus in the case of
multi-count indictments, the offense seriousness score is a weighted, summed
measure The interpretation of changes in these scores, however, remains the
same
One last point should be mentioned To enhance the reliability of the analysis,
infrequent miscellaneous offenses were excluded from it These offenses
occurred too infrequently to obtain reliable measures of their seriousness This
eliminated about 28 percent of the guilty plea cases, but 4038 still remained
for the analysis
is no significant difference between plea and trial cases in
terms of the proportion of cases receiving some charge
reduction or the magnitude of charge reductions.
"Knockdown" Patterns in Primary Charges
The magnitude of reductions ("knockdowns") in sentencing
exposure for defendants does not appear to be substantial
Count drops are common, but they usually focus on secondary
charges. The sentencing impact of these changes is corre-
spondingly limited, because second and third charges are
not translated into units of punishment equal in weight to
those of the primary charge, Most charge modifications, then,
subtract very little from a defendant's probable sentence
irrespective of what the penalties of the dropped or reduced
charges may be in the criminal code. If more than symbolic
alterations occur, the primary charge or major offense clearly
must be changed. However, only about 15 percent of the
cases had such changes Although they are relatively rare
events, there is merit in looking at what happens when
primary charges are reduced to see if there is any pattern
to the reductions and whether they are concentrated in a
handful of charges. The analysis is again restricted to the
basic types of offenses handled in the courts
A relatively small number of charges were subject to
knockdowns. The seven primary offenses listed in the first
column of Table 5 accounted for 68 percent of all knockdowns
in the pooled sample of cases. That the reductions were
guided by fairly clear-cut decision rules is made clear by the
fact that the reduced charges listed in the fourth column
amounted to nearly half (45.6%) of all knockdown charges.
In other words, when changes in primary charges took place,
the odds were good that the offense was one of those listed
in this table and that the charge to which it was reduced
involved one of those arrayed in the "knockdown" column of
the table Reductions in primary charges, however, tended to
concentrate in two charge categories — burglary and aggra-
vated battery. Over 40 percent (44.1 percent) of all knock-
downs occurred in cases with these charges. While serious,
these offenses are not in the same league as murder, rape,
and armed robbery which altogether accounted for about 16
percent of the knockdowns (134 cases in total). With the
exception of theft and possession of hard drug cases, the
other charges were more likely to lead to a conviction on
reduced charges than what might be expected given their
representation in the total pool of cases.
GOING RATES AND GUILTY PLEAS
Count modifications, and to a lesser extent changes in primary
charges, occurred with some regularity in the courts, but
their impact on sentencing was marginal at best. Reductions
Table 5
COMMON KNOCKDOWN CHARGES
(from arrest to trial court disposition)
Original primary
charge at arrest
Percentage of all
Table 6
THE DISTRIBUTION OF SENTENCING CLUSTERS
BY MODE OF CONVICTION
Type of Sentencing
Cluster
Percentage of
Qualifying
Guilty Plea Cases*
Percentage of
Qualifying Trial
Conviction Cases*
Probation
Cluster
Between
Probation and
Low Cluster
Low Cluster
Between Low
Cluster and
High Cluster
High Cluster
Above High
Cluster
No Cluster
Above Probation
658
(2759)
7.4
(302)
11.1
(457)
7.3
(298)
2.6
(106)
2.5
(104)
38
(155)
38 7
(91)
11.9
(28)
11 9
(28)
21 7
(51)
1 7
(4)
60
(14)
8.1
(19)
Total 1000
(4181)
100
(235)
' These data exclude 1072 cases involving convictions of non-regular offenses
(i.e., not one of the 13 offenses discussed in the text)
process. The first column of Table 6 presents the data on
this question for defendants who pleaded guilty.
When the three major clusters are combined, they include
79 percent of the guilty plea cases. Going rates clearly play
a prominent role in determining sentences in guilty plea
cases. The fact that the probation cluster had 65.3 percent
of the cases does not diminish the significance of these
findings; the simple reality is that many felony cases involve
first offenders or people convicted of routine crimes who
receive minimal punishment. What is not apparent from this
table is that proportionately fewer cases are located in clusters
as the charges mount in seriousness and hence sentencing
latitude The correlation between offense seriousness and
being in a cluster is - 29, indicating that sentence bargaining
is concentrated in the more serious cases.
Are the sentencing norms represented by these clusters
as effective in constraining sentencing after a trial conviction?
The short answer is No. While nearly 79 percent of the plea
cases fell within one cluster or another, only 52.3 percent of
the trial cases did, a difference that is statistically significant
well beyond the .001 level As the second column of Table 6
indicates, the probation cluster includes proportionately fewer
cases and the "off-cluster" categories include more, raising
the possibility of a trial penalty that moves defendants who
fail to plead guilty "up a notch" in the sentencing hierarchy.
Table 6 suggests that sentencing is dominated by a small
handful of going rates for a specific offense, but it cannot
reveal whether the pigeonholing process was consistent The
assignment of going rates to defendants could be distorted
by bartering or capriciousness An examination of the criminal
records of the defendants in various clusters provides some
insight into the consistency of this assignment procedure. To
do this a trichotomized criminal record variable was con-
structed About half of the defendants were first offenders,
and these were assigned a separate category. The remaining
half were divided roughly in half based on whether they had
less serious or more serious records This variable was then
Table 7
THE COMPOSITION OF SENTENCE CATEGORIES BY
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR RECORD
(guilty plea cases only)
Probation
Cluster
Low Cluster
High Cluster
assignment was heavily influenced by the defendant's criminal
record.
While one could develop the implications of these findings
along severaMmes, two seem most fruitful. The first concerns
our understanding of the dispositional process. Perhaps the
most obvious implication here is that while the concessions
model may explain an important fragment of the guilty plea
process, it is but a fragment. The consensus model provides
a more realistic perspective from which to explain how routine
policies and courthouse culture shape the guilty plea process.
However, the two are not mutually exclusive.
Equally important are the policy implications of these find-
ings. They speak to those who would abolish plea bargaining
and replace it with some modified trial form, such as prevailed
in the United States in the mid-nineteenth century or as
presently exists in some West European systems.
The data suggest that the costs of a plea oriented dispo-
sitional process are not as great as many had earlier pre-
sumed. Many felony cases involve mundane situations which
are currently handled in a routinized, consistent manner. To
dispose of these cases by means of a trial would lead to the
demise of the trial as we now know it. To accommodate the
increased flow of cases would inevitably entail many modifi-
cations in trial procedure, some of which may not be salutary.
More importantly, the large volume of "undisputed disputes"
would dull the sensitivities of those charged with the respon-
sibility of conducting trials. Ultimately trials could become
less effective in cases where they are most needed.
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